221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile1
202396. Subject: Foreign Minister Cubillos Conversation with Assistant Secretary Vaky.
1. During Colombian presidential inauguration2 Foreign Minister Cubillos, who headed the Chilean delegation, asked to meet with me. We met August 8 for about forty minutes. Cubillos’ basic purpose was apparently to establish contact and a channel with me, and, secondarily to give me his position and points of view. It seemed to me to be almost catharsis for him; he did most of the talking in almost stream of consciousness fashion.
2. In summary, Cubillos made three general points:
A) Individual USG officials were in effect “interfering” in Chilean matters and complicating things by their public comments and observations. For example, he said, US companies told him that, when they consulted with Department officials, they were told to be careful because things “were not going to last down there.” He claimed to have chapter and verse on these kinds of comments. Cubillos went on to say that he found the climate in the US very difficult, and he really had not been able to talk to anyone with the frankness and openess he desired. He was by the way highly laudatory of you and of his relations with you; he in fact cited this as the kind of model he would like to replicate elsewhere.
B. Chile was at a cross-roads right now. Events could proceed one of two ways—a continued move toward return to constitutional democratic government though this would be at the “Chilean pace and with Chilean dignity;” or a reaction by the military and return to an iron totalitarian government. He said he joined the government to push for the moderate line. It is a mistake, he said, to believe that the Letelier case would split the government or bring down Pinochet.3 That would [Page 656] not happen. Things which allowed the military hardliners to feel aggrieved, such as apparent offenses to “Chilean dignity,” hurt the chances of the moderates.
C. Once the Letelier extradition requests arrive,4 the matter will be in the hands of the Supreme Court and out of the hands of the executive branch. The court, Cubillos said, is truly independent and it is certainly respected as such within Chile. What it says will have the full support of all Chileans. The court can do one of three things: (1) refuse the request on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient; (2) accept the evidence as sufficient and extradite; or (3) accept the evidence as sufficient but exercise its prerogative under the treaty and try the accused in Chile rather than extradite. Cubillos said he believes the last is what will happen.
3. I limited myself to saying simply that as he knew our relations had been deeply affected by the history of events since Allende’s fall and the very serious record of human rights violations that had occurred. I recognized the very significant improvement in individual human rights matters. Chileans should be aware that, now, the Letelier case is a central element in our relations. It was, however, our very firm position that this was a strictly legal, judicial investigation which had no political intent and which we intended to keep “depoliticized.” This case, however, deeply affected the American people, and what Chile does with respect to our extradition requests will inevitably be closely watched by the American people. We fully expected that the sincerity and integrity of the Chilean judicial process would be evident in this matter.
Cubillos’ third point above was in reply to my comments.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328-0054. Confidential; Priority; Exdis; Stadis. Drafted by Vaky; cleared by McNeil, Barnebey, and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.↩
- The inauguration of Julio Turbay as President of Colombia took place on August 7.↩
- In a September 15 INR report entitled “Prospects for Chile’s Pinochet,” Crist wrote: “The outcome of the Letelier assassination case and its impact on US-Chilean relations could test President Pinochet’s ability to continue governing Chile. The indictment of top Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) officials, including Manuel Contreras, by a US Grand Jury has had serious repercussions for the Chilean Government, but Pinochet believes he can weather the storm.” ([document number not declassified]; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin American, and African Analysis, Job 07S01568R, Box 1, Folder 10)↩
- The extradition requests were presented on September 20. See Document 225.↩