238. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- M-B-B Lunch—Argentina and Chile (U)
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]
Chile
A year has passed since the Letelier sanctions were imposed and we had agreed among ourselves to review policy towards Chile about now. State had, in fact, begun to do so, when Christopher put a stop to it. I asked to have this item put on the agenda2 so that we could get a determination whether or not we want to go through with the policy review or simply leave matters for the next administration to deal with. It is a fairly close call:
Con
—There are no pressing issues at stake for the next several months.
—The Chilean Government remains fairly odious and has recently perpetrated a mockery of the democratic process, perpetuating the rule of Pinochet.3 It may also be retrogressing on human rights.
—By leaving changes to the next administration, we give them some cards to play.
Pro
—The Letelier sanctions have had no effect, were never intended to be kept on permanently, and are now counterproductive to our own interests (e.g. the UNITAS issue).
[Page 701]—Despite some recent setbacks, Chilean human rights performance with regard to violation of the person has improved greatly and in the course of events this should have been recognized. The Letelier sanctions have overlaid this, however, with the result that we are much tougher on Chile than on Argentina where Basket I4 violations are much worse. This is anomalous and discredits our human rights policy. It also leaves us badly out of balance as between these two Beagle Channel contestants.
—Since we said that we would review our policy, let’s do it. We are still the Government. (S)
RECOMMENDATION: I think we should go ahead with the review on two grounds:
—Let’s leave a credible policy behind, and
—If we don’t sort things out better, we will be inviting the next administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater, for we should continue considerable restraint in our relationships. (S)
I am not disturbed by the idea that there may be no specific actions that this Administration will be taking towards Chile; what I am concerned about is leaving behind appropriate guidelines (e.g. reaffirming the President’s decision on 1981 UNITAS participation; how to vote on IFI loans to Chile).5 (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Chron Files, Box 92, Chile, 5/79-1/81. Secret. Sent for information.↩
- A reference to the November 19 luncheon meeting between Muskie, Brown, and Brzezinski. (Memorandum from Bartholomew to Muskie, November 18; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary—Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 82D100, Box 3, MBB Lunches Oct-Dec 1980)↩
- A reference to the September 11, 1980 plebiscite in Chile. In a September 12 memorandum to Carter, Muskie wrote: “With most of the votes counted, 67 percent have voted in favor of a new constitution and a transition plan which restores congressional elections in 1990 and presidential elections in 1997. The Chilean people were not offered an alternative. At our noon press briefing we expressed regret about the length of the transition period, the lack of media access for opponents, and repeated government intimidation of the opposition. We stressed our interest in seeing Chile return to a stable democracy.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State), 9/80)↩
- A reference to the CSCE Final Act, or Helsinki Accords, comprised of four “baskets” or categories of international issues, including human rights.↩
- In a November 18 memorandum to Muskie, Bartholomew wrote: “the NSC staff believes that if we do decide on any significant initiatives towards Argentina, we should at the same time review our sanctions policy towards Chile.” Next to this point, Muskie wrote: “next admin!”↩