91. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
13860. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round Eight: Summary of Developments. CW Message No. 17. Ref: Geneva 6492.2
1. Round eight of the US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, which began on August 18, 1978, ended on September 14, 1978. During that period six plenary and five drafting group meetings were held.
2. Discussions during the round focused on the scope of prohibition and on declaration and verification provisions relating to Chemical Weapons production and filling facilities. There was no progress in resolving the central outstanding issues, e.g., those relating to declara [Page 201] tions and verification. The major issues remain as discussed Reftel. On secondary issues results were mixed; some progress was made on a few points, on a number of issues the U.S. was unable even to obtain a clear statement of Soviet views.
A. On the positive side, the Soviets:
(1) Finally responded to U.S. requests for clarification of their position regarding production “capabilities” (albeit in an unsatisfactory fashion as noted subpara 2B(2) below).
(2) Responded favorably to some aspects of the U.S. proposal to prohibit transfer of certain super-toxic chemicals to non-parties.
(3) Responded favorably to the U.S. proposal that the ceiling on possession of super-toxic chemicals for protective purposes be one ton although differing with other aspects of the U.S. proposal.
(4) Accepted part of the U.S. list of “important” precursors.
B. On the negative side, the Soviets:
(1) Have provided only vague confirmation of what in U.S. view are areas of agreement already reached regarding scope.
(2) Continued to reject the U.S. proposals regarding declaration of CW production and filling facilities, proposing instead to declare only aggregate production capacities.
(3) Continued to reject any pre-agreed OSI without offering any suggestion for compromise.
(4) Have reiterated their initial position that only those precursors which are used in the final production stage should be covered.
(5) Specifically mentioned PRC’s adherence in context of entry into force implying this may be requirement for entry into force of convention.
(6) Maintained their position that use of chemical munitions should be allowed for protective training purposes and that super-toxic chemicals for military purposes not related to chemical warfare should not be prohibited.
(7) Rejected U.S. proposal for centralization of production of super toxic chemicals for protective purposes.
3. While the tone of both the plenary and drafting group meetings continued to be friendly, the Soviets resisted U.S. efforts to engage them in give-and-take discussions. In comparison to past rounds the Soviet representatives were much more restrained in drafting group sessions. It is not possible to assess to what degree this Soviet behavior in the negotiations was governed by overall bilateral relations and to what degree by the issues in the Chemical Weapons negotiations. As regards such issues, however, it is increasingly apparent that declarations and pre-agreed verification are the critical issues and until these [Page 202] matters are resolved, it will be difficult to make progress on other issues, even if there is no direct connection.
4. We recommend that consideration be given to raising these issues at senior political level in the near future.
5. List of detailed backstopping tasks is being provided septel.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780376–0142. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information; Priority to Bonn. Sent for information to London, Moscow, Paris, and USUN.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 88.↩
- Not found.↩