Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

137. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Associate Director for Programs, International Communication Agency (Carter)¹

Washington, July 6, 1978

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy—July 5²

At the meeting we agreed that a major overall purpose of this public diplomacy effort will be to inject greater realism into the international discussion of arms control and disarmament issues. Following are some of the themes that were proposed for special emphasis. Assuming that the summary adequately reflects our discussion, I find it to be less satisfying than it sounded at the time. Several questions: (1) Are these truly the ideas on which we wish to have international consensus? If not, what’s missing? (2) What role should we give issues raised in the SSOD Program of Action³ or which relate to specific negotiations? (3) How would we open and sustain productive discussion on any given issue with any given group?

1. Arms control and national defense are two sides of the same coin, because both aim at reducing the threat of war by maintaining the security balance. We of course prefer to see the balance maintained at lower, less costly levels, and look to arms control as the major path to that end. Although some countries, particularly among the non-aligned, may not be impressed with the argument that a strong U.S. defense is essential for world peace, we should not be hesitant to make the point at appropriate times, or to be defensive about our necessary force modernization measures.

2. A good arms control agreement is one which contributes to stability. It should maintain, and hopefully improve, military stability in the sense that in a crisis neither party would be tempted to initiate—or threaten—a first strike. Likewise, it should enhance stability in the dynamics of the arms competition by ensuring that growth in arsenals stays within agreed limits. We should also emphasize that U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation is based primarily on its destabilizing effects, and less on an assessment that it would be directly harmful to narrow U.S. interests.

3. In international arms control negotiations the U.S. seeks agreements that are equitable to all sides, and are readily perceived as such. Agreements which go against the interests of signatory nations will obviously not be viable over the long run.

4. Any arms control agreement must be adequately verifiable, so that the participating nations can have confidence that the terms of the agreement are being followed.

5. The successful completion of arms control agreements, particularly between the superpowers, forms an important part of the improvement in overall political relations. The converse is even more true: the failure of such negotiations is likely to have an additive detrimental effect.

6. Arms control is not a spectator sport. All nations should contribute to efforts to reduce tensions in areas where they are important actors. Conventional arms transfers and nuclear nonproliferation are two issues where the positive participation of other countries is essential to reaching viable solutions which meet legitimate security or energy concerns but are not destabilizing. In both instances we should be prepared to counter charges by supplier countries that the U.S. is infringing on their markets and by recipient countries that the U.S. is trying to perpetuate what they consider their second-class status.

At the meeting the following action assignments were agreed upon:

1. All members will review this paper and bring their comments to the next meeting. They will also offer suggestions on: countries to which priority should be given, possible governmental and non-governmental program participants, and seminal literature on the major arms control and disarmament issues.

2. Dr. Putnam will solicit CIA assistance in pulling together information on arms control issues where the Soviet Union has found the most resonance among foreign publics and those where it is most on the defensive.⁴

3. Mr. Halsted will secure Larry Weiler’s views on the attitudes of non-American NGOs that participated in the SSOD.

4. I will develop a paper outlining some suggested ways that the ICA infrastructure could be used to support programmatic activity relating to this effort.⁵

The next meeting of the committee is tentatively scheduled for the latter part of the week of July 10.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 7/78. No classification marking. Alan Carter addressed the memorandum to Putnam, Kahan, Thompson, Van Allen, Halsted, and Spevacek. A copy was sent to Bray.
2. A copy of the participant list and Putnam’s handwritten notes from the July 5 meeting are ibid.
3. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, June 30, 1978 (S–10/2) contains the SSOD Program of Action.
4. Attached but not printed is a copy of Putnam’s undated comments on the proposal. Putnam noted, “Ask Bray if he’s willing to have ICA do the study=He thinks ICA probably less equipped than CIA, but he’ll check out possibility of: 1) joint ICA–CIA work or 2) Bray tasking memo to CIA. He’ll get back to me.”
5. See Document 139.