119. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Gorbachev, Human Rights and Jewish Emigration
Summary: Gorbachev has taken an assertive stance toward human rights and emigration, refusing to be put on the defensive and accusing the West of neglecting the “economic and social” dimensions of human rights. Gorbachev’s rhetoric is consistent with Soviet policy, which has included increased repression of dissidents, a severe cutback in emigration, and efforts to manipulate Western and Israeli concerns [Page 484] about Soviet Jewry for foreign policy purposes. Despite these negative trends, the Soviets clearly are interested in influencing Western publics before the Geneva meeting, and might be receptive to resolving major human rights cases. The U.S. therefore should intensify efforts to win the release of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and other dissidents and to resolve family reunification cases.2 However, the U.S. should not allow progress on high visibility cases to obscure broader human rights issues, and should resist Soviet efforts to defuse the Jewish emigration issue by dealing with private Jewish groups in the West. End summary.
Gorbachev and Human Rights
During his recent visit to Paris, Soviet leader Gorbachev demonstrated a new and more assertive Soviet approach to human rights and emigration. Despite persistent questioning by the Western news media, Gorbachev refused to be put on the defensive. In a pre-summit interview with French television, he astonished Western audiences by claiming that Jews enjoy more rights in the Soviet Union than in any other country. In addition to upholding the Soviet human rights record, Gorbachev tried to put the West on the defensive by talking about “economic and social rights” and pointing to unemployment, racial tensions and other problems in the West.3
Gorbachev’s handling of human rights suggests that he may be overly self-confident about his ability to sway Western audiences with clever propaganda arguments. In comparing the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union with that in other countries, Gorbachev overstated his case and undermined his own credibility. In stressing the allegedly democratic character of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet, he offended many West Europeans by charging that “workers and peasants” are not represented in European parliaments. He also disappointed Western observers by his public attack on Anatoly Shcharanskiy.
Gorbachev’s blunt, almost brutal approach to human rights is consistent with the overall pattern of Soviet policy in recent years. The Soviets have intensified the repression of dissidents and have cut back on the numbers of Jews, ethnic Germans, and Armenians granted permission to leave the Soviet Union. The Soviets have been unresponsive to Western demands that Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and other well-known dissidents be allowed to emigrate.
Despite the harsh Soviet posture toward Shcharanskiy and other dissidents, rumors persist that Gorbachev may be considering a pre- or post-November gesture such as a negotiated release of Sakharov or [Page 485] Shcharanskiy. While the Soviets show few signs of wanting a breakthrough on this issue, the possibility that Gorbachev will try to influence the pre- or post-meeting atmosphere by a major human rights gesture cannot be excluded.
The one area of human rights on which Gorbachev has shown some flexibility is that of family reunification, which can be portrayed as an “administrative” rather than a “political” issue. Discussing family reunification cases with the U.S. does not require the Soviets to concede even implicitly that they obstruct emigration or unjustly persecute Soviet citizens. In any case, the Soviets can block the emigration of particular individuals by claiming that they had access to “state secrets.”
Jewish Emigration
Jewish emigration from the USSR has declined from over 51,000 in the peak year of 1979 to 896 in 1984. The drastic decline has been accompanied by an increase in the intensity and a change in the character of official repression of Soviet Jews. The most striking feature of the present campaign of repression has been the arrest and imprisonment (on various pretexts) of teachers of Hebrew. Alarmed at these developments, Soviet Jews have looked to the West for support and have urged the world Jewish community to use “quiet diplomacy” in dealing with the USSR on the emigration issue.
The way in which the Soviets have responded to Western and Israeli attempts to raise the issue of Jewish emigration strongly suggests that the current Soviet leadership believes it can exploit concerns about Soviet Jewry for foreign policy purposes. At a minimum, the Soviet leadership would like to eliminate emigration as a subject of U.S.-USSR government-to-government discussion and transfer the issue to private, non-publicized channels. This would help to prevent U.S. administrations from “linking” trade and other issues to emigration.
In addition, the Soviet leaders hope that a subtle policy of carrots and sticks toward Israel and the world Jewish community will succeed in defusing Jewish emigration as an international political issue. Soviet officials traveling in the West have hinted that direct emigration flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv could result if French Jewish groups were to moderate their protests against Gorbachev during his visit to France. In an apparent gesture to the Soviets, Israeli Prime Minister Peres is reported to have tried to discourage large anti-Gorbachev demonstrations by Jewish groups in Paris. When World Jewish Congress (WJC) director Edgar Bronfman visited Moscow in September, Soviet officials are reported to have pledged that Jewish emigration will rise over the next several months, but linked continued increases to “positive [Page 486] signals” from the world Jewish community.4 Many Israeli and WJC officials are highly skeptical of Soviet intentions, and oppose concessions and goodwill gestures. But others are willing to work with the Soviets in searching for common ground.
Policy Implications for the U.S.
As the November meeting approaches, the United States should:
—intensify efforts to negotiate the release of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and other well-known dissidents;
—“pocket” Soviet gestures on family reunification, but not allow Soviet moves in this area to divert attention from broader human rights issues;
—continue to press the Soviets on the Jewish emigration issue, but in doing so carefully consult with the WJC, the government of Israel and other interested parties;
—continue to undercut Soviet efforts to talk about “economic and social rights” by pointing out Soviet failures in these areas.
- Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/ Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 10/1–31/85. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by VanOudenaren on October 11. Shultz initialed the memorandum and wrote in the top margin: “PR/R2, I need some strong talking pts for the Moscow trip.” With this note, Shultz was tasking Peter Rodman and Rozanne Ridgway.↩
- See footnote 10, Document 114.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 114.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 94.↩