139. Personal Notes of Secretary of State Shultz1
G Summary
1. Geneva meeting great importance2
2. against approach that says only for exchange, get acquainted, and agenda for future
3. not idealists or over simplify—much over years has piled up so one meeting can’t solve all
4. also if only fact of meeting, that would be disappointment to all = was it necessary at all—another?
5. serve all if this meeting gives a number of political impetus to improvement
6. need realistic assessment of world developments—refers to earlier conversation and this is source of nourishment of USSR politics + need to build new international life
7. but we meet and we understand the weight and responsibilities in world situation
8. both of us need policies to meet worries and problems felt everywhere
9. recent policies take account
a. war and peace are at center of attention
b. people pre-occupied by arms race and stop threat of nuclear war
c. present everywhere is urge to develop better relations and peaceful coexistence
[Page 607]d. in world are great problems of economic, ecological in all countries, especially developing world3
e. also now more interdependent than ever
—all this should be taken account of in our policies—USG and USSR
10. USSR has taken steps to meet these problems: war and peace, Europe, Asia, Africa
11. But US should also think about new approaches
12. R2 in next three years should think ahead to stay in power
—now trying to make old look like new
—bring policies in line with realities of national interests
—problems around the world always blamed on Moscow = nonsense
—blames transnationals for debt
—points to Latin America and poverty
—US “robbing them”
—this will explode into a problem for everyone
—same in Africa and Asia
—restraint should be exercised and interests of each side’s interests into account
—but must support “internal independence” as a matter of principle
13. can move ahead on this based also solving human rights and divided families—exceptions involve State secrets
14. key question is approach to receiving security at lower level
—ready to work to go down to 2000
—with condition of preventing militarization of space = a barrier for both sides
15. should not regard such a decision as a “defeat” but rather would gain strength over the whole world
16. Geneva meeting = instructions to give on outer space
—technologies
—research fundamentals
—but not arms in outer space and creation of defense
—otherwise rethink everything
17. unproductive to try to persuade USSR of the usefulness of a space weapon = policy based on deep analysis and “we are not amateurs”—have deep knowledge of what is involved.
18. regional, bilateral, all others
—when we can consult and even act together
- Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Personal Notes of Secretary Shultz (10/01/1985–10/23/1985); NLR–775–23–61–1–8. No classification marking. These notes were transcribed by an unknown person in the Department of State from Shultz’s handwritten notes of his November 5 meeting with Gorbachev. Shultz’s handwritten notes are ibid.↩
- In his personal notes, Hill wrote: “R/O of S-Gorba 10–2. Combative. Interrupting, to the point that ‘even some of my gems didn’t get translated.’—Headline? STALEMATE ON EVE OF SUMMIT. S: ‘What’s wrong w/ that’” line is I did my best boss, now it’s up to you.—Art [Hartman]: Gorba was posturing, showing how tough. Try to intimidate us. Everything linked to SDI. Nothing possible unless we give it up. Will start a new arms race, he said. Rather than offensive cuts, it will lead to Soviet off. buildup.—Gorba revealed deep ideological feeling and mind set. Also a void (McF term) of information & understanding about the U.S. with our feeling that much of it due to Doby’s slanted reporting. (But sure don’t need Doby to do that—all the info available here is utterly false. A universe of falseness. TO SUM UP VISIT—Shev refused to talk. Gorba sought to intimidate. S invited here in order to be frightened by Soviet approach.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for November 5, 1985; NLR–675–3–25–1–1). The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill’s handwritten notebooks.↩
- Blank underscore is in the original.↩