Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

201. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 1, 1986

SUBJECT

• Looking Ahead to Possible Soviet Retaliation Against Cuts in the Size of Their UN Missions

PROBLEM

Our decision to cut the size of the Soviet UN Missions (SMUN) will have significant counterintelligence benefits, and should also help defuse domestic pressures to cut the size of the Soviet Embassy here.² Gorbachev is likely to respond forcefully to show he can be just as tough with the Americans on this issue as he was with the British, French and Italians on the question of expulsions. The Soviets are already grumbling about what they claim is our hardening rhetoric and the pressures we are putting on them to implement reciprocity in the relationship. This memorandum is an effort to look at possible Soviet retaliatory actions, and is a first look at possible USG responses.

SOVIET RESPONSES

Bilateral: The Soviet reaction to the British expulsions last year and the French and Italian expulsions this year was forceful, immediate and reciprocal. Remarking that “Gorbachev is not Brezhnev,” a suspected KGB officer recently warned Embassy Moscow that any expulsion of Soviet diplomats would meet with an immediate and equally sharp response. However, the absence of a multilateral U.S. mission in the Soviet Union will make it difficult for Moscow to respond with exact equivalence. We do not believe the Soviets are likely at first to expel U.S. diplomats from the USSR or to impose a personnel ceiling on our Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets will do everything they can to obstruct or delay the reductions. They will certainly not agree with our proposal that they cooperate in identifying SMUN positions to be retained under the new ceiling. They may well refuse to remove personnel from New York voluntarily, thereby challenging us to expel them.

The following are possible Soviet reactions. We have also listed some preliminary steps we might take to respond in kind:

—Soviet Action: refuse to issue visas or to provide promised housing to U.S. contract personnel designated to replace Soviet nationals in Embassy Moscow. Possible Response: expel some Soviet support staff, and restrict housing available to Soviets in U.S.;

—Soviet Action: withdraw some or all of the Soviet national employees from Embassy Moscow, including those working on the housing units in the new Embassy complex. Possible Response: speed up to maximum extent possible arrival of new contract personnel, tighten availability of housing for Soviet personnel in U.S., limit materials for construction of new Soviet Embassy complex;

—Soviet Action: deny Soviet diplomatic visas for Embassy Moscow personnel for every SMUN employee denied a U.S. visa. Possible response: reciprocate by denying diplomatic visas to Soviets coming to their missions in the U.S.;

—Soviet Action: block or delay U.S. shipments of materials for our new office building. Possible response: similarly restrict Soviet shipments.

In informing the Soviets about the reductions, we will make it clear that our action was motivated solely by legitimate concern about the unwarranted size of the Soviet UN Missions, and that we do not believe it need have a broad impact on our bilateral relations. However, we must make it clear that we are prepared to respond to Soviet retaliation firmly and appropriately. Our goal will be to make clear our determination to stand by our decision on the SMUN reduction without unnecessarily accelerating the cycle of retaliation. At the same time, we will warn the Soviets that if they choose to begin retaliation, we will not accept an outcome which results in a significant imbalance in our respective bilateral presence. We have obtained White House authorization to present a number of bilateral initiatives for the 1986 summit a few days before we inform the Soviets about the SMUN reduction.

UN and Public Diplomacy: Soviet public diplomacy is likely to play on three themes: the anti-Soviet nature of our action, its negative effect on superpower relations, and the illegality of the measure and its consequences for the United Nations. At the UN, they will challenge the U.S. right to implement the reductions, and try to rally other countries against the move. They will try to convince the UNSYG that this is part of a U.S. attempt to emasculate the UN system. They are also sure to press the UNSYG for his support in the Host Country Committee and in taking the case first to arbitration and, if necessary, the International Court of Justice.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (05/14/1986); NLR–775–18–106–1–4. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost. “MR,” presumably Max Robinson of EUR/SOV, initialed for Ridgway. Drafted on February 28 by Hillas; cleared by Sell, Parris, Palmer, Kovner (IO), Borek (L/UNA), Kozak (L), Williams (IO/UNP), and Nolan (M/OFP). Hillas initialed for all clearing officials except for Palmer. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it, and a typed note reads: “Roz, when are we going to let them know? GPS 3/3/86.” An unknown hand wrote immediately under this note “Friday, March 7.”
2. See footnote 2, Document 191. In telegram 71362 to Moscow, March 11, the Department reported that Ridgway met with Sokolov on March 7 to explain the U.S. decision to reduce the size of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. In summarizing the meeting, the Department noted Ridgway delivered talking points and that Sokolov “characterized the action as an unfriendly step that was bound to have negative consequences for US-Soviet relations.” The Department indicated that Ridgway “stressed that there was no reason our decision to reduce the size of the Soviet UN Missions should create difficulties in our bilateral relations. She emphasized the unreasonably large size of the Soviet UN Missions, and the extensive growth in the number of Soviet UN Mission personnel.” Unfortunately, the remainder of telegram 71362 is corrupted and the text is unavailable. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860179–0704) In telegram 3990 from Moscow, March 10, the Embassy provided further reporting on Soviet reactions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860183–0448)