Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

133. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1988, 9:25–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze, March 22 Morning: Human Rights, START

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnek (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksander A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
  • Teymuraz A. Stepanov, Assistant to Shevardnadze
  • Sergei P. Tarasenko, General Secretariat Head, MFA (notetaker)
  • Unidentified Embassy notetaker
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)

The Secretary noted that the opening meeting and the photographs had taken a little over half an hour, so the ministers had about two hours before the NRRC ceremony.² He invited Shevardnadze to speak first, as the guest.

Shevardnadze recalled that the day before they had agreed to begin the next day with humanitarian issues. He wanted to say that recently, and especially at their Moscow meeting—and he wished to emphasize that—they had had more substantial and productive discussions relating to human rights and overall humanitarian questions. He thought that trend should be continued, expanded, in the course of their work. It was obvious to him that in the past there had been a lopsided approach, with recriminations, mutual complaints, endless accusations, an accusatory mood and tone. That might continue, since without criticism there could be no movement. But in view of their experience he would like to raise the possibility of moving in parallel with criticism of the respective countries, and looking at positive experience on both sides. They could give an example at the level of ministers to the experts on how to discuss these issues.

As an example, Shevardnadze went on, drawing on the outlines that Mikhail Gorbachev had presented to the Supreme Soviet the Soviets had presented proposals to the Congress for a regular mechanism of discussion of these issues. They now had Congress’ agreement. They should speed up on the specifics, and begin these discussions as soon as possible.

A second example, Shevardnadze went on, would be establishing exchanges of information on changes in the legislation of the two countries. He had in mind not only national legislation, but also legislation of the states and, in the Soviet case, the republics. It was a tradition in both countries that the states and, in the Soviet Union, the republics, including the autonomous regions, had specific institutions relating to their national character. Such exchanges could be established right after the ministers’ meeting. He had with him a large group of experts, who could discuss beginning such work with the Secretary’s experts.

Shevardnadze continued that in the Soviet Union a lot of work was going on to improve legislation, in the democratization process. This was not simple. They wanted to make their legislation fully consistent with their international commitments. Many laws were consistent, but more work needed to be done. For example, they were working on how to reduce the applicability of the criminal code provisions on capital punishment, and eventually to abolish it. He understood that there was a problem on this in the U.S. as well, especially with regard to minors. This was being discussed in the United Nations. There was for instance a West German proposal there. He thought there could also be bilateral discussions on that topic. He asked whether the legal experts of both countries could not have a special meeting on it. The Soviet experts would like that. The ministers could decide on it. Various forms were possible: a round table, small groups. The important thing was the decision to launch such discussion.

In their last meeting, Shevardnadze continued, he had commented on the human rights reports issued by the State Department. These sometimes contained a non-objective view of Soviet developments. There was bias with regard to facts, and this became part of the public domain, and distorted public opinion. He did not rule out that the same attitude existed in reverse in the Soviet Union. This could be discussed at some level. It was important for the Supreme Soviet to get accurate information on the U.S. We were at an important stage in our relationship. There was a good trend, and it should be supported across the range of our relations, including human rights.

Shevardnadze said he had been informing the Secretary of what was happening concerning the democratization of Soviet society. Enormous work was underway. It affected, for instance, freedom of conscience. They were making an effort to meet more fully the needs of religious believers. They used to deny a problem existed. They said their system was universal. Now they were working on the problems. This also concerned trade union rights; visa rules; the duration of the prohibition on exit for people possessing state secrets—the Secretary had raised this, and they were working on it; visas for temporary visits abroad; and improved conditions for journalists. They were working particularly hard on the last topic. But he had had a meeting with Soviet journalists working in Washington, and they too had problems. Your people were aware of them, Shevardnadze said.

Shevardnadze continued that a decree of the Supreme Soviet setting out guidelines on psychiatric help was being prepared. Socialist law and mercy would be reestablished. Already, from March 8, a new special article of the RSFSR Criminal Code provided for up to two years’ imprisonment for anyone deliberately and illegally placing someone in a psychiatric hospital.

Nationality questions would be discussed at a large party gathering in the near future, Shevardnadze went on. They would be discussed at a Central Committee plenum, at the party conference, in Supreme Soviet sessions. They would be discussing how to improve inter-ethnic relations. How to improve all spheres of national life was an important matter of national sovereignty, in the life of the autonomous republics. The Soviets used to say the question was resolved. It was true that it was basically resolved, but as the country developed national consciousness was growing, so it was not surprising that new problems arose.

The U.S. was also a multiethnic country, Shevardnadze continued. The principle of your nationality policy is different from ours, he said, but differences like that deserved discussion. It was important to get an objective view of what was happening in both countries. If there were positive developments they could be treated more favorably, in a spirit of good will.

Shevardnadze said that specific humanitarian cases should be resolved on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. They paid attention to the questions the U.S. had raised, but the U.S. had not clarified their questions. Violations of human rights in the U.S. were of concern to their people. He had raised the names of the famous terrorists two or three times; he did not need to repeat them. There was concern about them in the Soviet Union. The Soviets studied all the U.S. requests to them, and tried to act on them. It was quite natural that they ask for reciprocity. The Secretary had very properly said that these discussions were a two-way street.

We have mentioned Nazi war criminals, Shevardnadze went on. Perhaps when the lawyers meet they could set up a special group to discuss why it was so difficult for the U.S. to move in this area. He was in favor of discussing this in a more specific way, so that the Soviet public could be informed of what had been done.

There was also racism, Shevardnadze continued. The U.S. was a highly civilized society, so that any form of racism was alarming to the U.S. side and of legitimate concern to the Soviet side. Experts could go into the details in the working group.

He had also spoken of the need for the U.S. to ratify the various human rights covenants, Shevardnadze continued. This problem was also a matter for discussion. The Soviets had been trying to bring their domestic laws into accord with their international commitments. Some decisions were needed here.

Shevardnadze said he thought perhaps he should not raise the question of the international conference. He would just say that the Soviets had proposed it, but if the U.S. was categorically against it they would not pursue it. But it seemed to them that with the process of renewal underway, with their efforts to improve democracy, it would be good for people to come and see what was happening, good to try to expand international cooperation. They did not want to compete with the French and British. They had their own ideas. The area was large enough for many ideas. They had agreed to the idea of a meeting in Paris, because of the anniversary of the Revolution. They also thought a meeting in London on information would be alright. They thought their conference could take place subsequently. He urged the Secretary to give the idea careful thought.

Since he had been discussing the need for a fair, objective picture of each country in the other, Shevardnadze continued, it would be useful to have discussions between the information services of both nations. He knew that information was mainly private in the U.S., but there is also after all a government policy. If the U.S. felt that Soviet reporting was biased, the Soviets were ready to listen. But some U.S. broadcasts about the Soviet Union were pure provocations, and irritated the Soviet side. He felt this question deserved analysis, study.

Shevardnadze said he had to raise the question of discrimination against Soviet trade unionists once again. These were denials of visas to people who were legitimately invited by American unions. Perhaps they deserved more specific discussion.

Shevardnadze observed that a rather large number of people with Soviet citizenship, of Soviet origin, resided in the U.S. Quite a few reported that they suffered persecution, difficulties in implementing rights that were normal for U.S. citizens. Perhaps the U.S. side could look at those complaints. In the context of the trends now underway in the Soviet Union, such people spoke to the Soviets more frequently. The Secretary had often raised questions involving Soviet Jews, and the Soviets had looked at them and solved problems where they could. It would be good for him to give attention to the situation of Soviet people in the U.S.

Shevardnadze said he had a letter from the children of former Soviet citizen Ogorodnikov, who had been arrested and jailed. The children wrote that during the trial there had been illegitimate violations of U.S. procedures and laws. He did not know if that were true, but if it were the principles of humanism required that it be given attention.

The working group could go into the details, Shevardnadze concluded; he had wished to give a general overview. These things affected the mood of their peoples. Things were changing for the better between the two countries, and we should be discussing these things in a spirit of mutual respect, taking into account overall relations.

The Secretary said he agreed a positive approach was called for. We had identified positive things happening in the Soviet Union and said so in our public statements. Perhaps it would be a good idea to formalize that in the working group. We could add to what we had said before. We had gone beyond the working group to a round table; that represented progress. We welcomed the rise in emigration levels, and the release of prisoners of conscience. We could make a list of such positive developments.

The Secretary continued that he thought capital punishment was a good subject for the working group. In this country states made the determination on whether or not there should be capital punishment. There was a particular issue concerning minors. He knew that we had invited someone from the Soviet Embassy to hear arguments on that before the Supreme Court, and he understood it would be making a ruling fairly soon.

Concerning the State Department human rights reports, the Secretary said we would welcome sitting down with the Soviet side and going through them, hearing Soviet comments. We wanted to make them as accurate as possible. He would note in passing that they had changed to reflect developments in the Soviet Union. But going through them would be useful.

Turning to the Brazinskas’, the Secretary said this was a very difficult case. The hijacking had occurred elsewhere; they had been tried in Turkey, and released; and they had then come to the U.S. We condemned and abhorred their act, but it took place before U.S. laws on which we could act were in effect, and we had no legal basis to pursue them. But he wished to reiterate our revulsion at all acts of terrorism. We also supported work on hijacking. The international regime on hijacking had matured over the past twenty years, so now there were not many of them.

We review the cases of Nazi war criminals, the Secretary continued, and pursue them. We have the same attitude toward them. Of course they had rights under U.S. law, so prosecution took time. But we had in recent years sent two back to the USSR, Fedorenko and Linnas. That showed what our attitude was.

Shevardnadze said he had more material on this topic. It should be discussed more specifically. The Secretary said “fine.”

Turning to the problem of trade union visas, the Secretary continued, there was a view here, particularly strong in our trade union federation, that our unions were produced by different processes, and were thus not comparable. Shevardnadze had mentioned changes in the relevant Soviet laws. We would be observing them.

Shevardnadze asked what the problem was. He asked why the U.S. could not admit trade unionists with legitimate invitations. This did not happen in the FRG. There had to be a special situation here.

The Secretary observed that American trade unions had been produced by a process independent of management and outside the control of the state. Soviet unions had not been so produced, and had considerable administrative duties, for social welfare and the like, and hence management functions. So when we used the word, we meant different things. The U.S. side continued to be ready to invite Soviet trade unionists if Soviet trade unionists could also be invited by our unions at their choice. And of course we would observe the changes in Soviet laws.

Shevardnadze said the problem was the very specific situation where an American trade union invites someone and the U.S. Government does not issue a visa. The Secretary said that reflected the view of our overall trade union federation, the AFL–CIO, which stemmed from what he had said. Bessmertnykh observed jovially that this suggested U.S. officials were not quite free. A Vice President of the AFL–CIO had invited a Soviet trade unionist; thus the State Department is not even reflecting the view of the AFL–CIO.

Shevardnadze urged the Secretary to study the problem. The Secretary said we would study it, but he expected we would find the same strong view on the differences between our trade unions.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary clearly had an incorrect idea of what Soviet trade unions were like, of their management function. It was true that they were partners with management. They signed collective contracts each year. Under them the unions oversaw the fulfillment by management of its obligations in such areas as health, safety, vacations. If management violated these the union could sue. No one could be fired without the approval of the union. Shevardnadze said he hoped the Secretary would meet some union people when he came in April. They were interesting, worthwhile people.

The Secretary asked whether, if the union disagreed with management, it could express its disagreement by having workers walk off the job, go on strike. Shevardnadze said it could. The Secretary asked if it did. Shevardnadze said that had happened. The Secretary said he would be educated if he heard it had happened, on a large scale. Shevardnadze asked why he had mentioned a large scale. The Secretary noted that in our Western democracies statisticians kept track of various things, including strike days, for individual countries. He had not seen comparable Soviet statistics.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary should not seek a copy of a situation where private firms dominated. The Soviet worker’s way of life depended on socialist production. The manager was elected by open or secret ballot. The financial situation depended on what the factory produced. If there were strikes, how would the workers be paid? But the collective contract guaranteed the workers’ social and collective rights. If management did not comply with the contract they could take measures, including strikes. Strikes could take place. He knew of one large factory where the workers had taken two or three days off for discussions with management, during which they had worked problems out. He would like to take the Secretary to a large factory.

The Secretary said he would consider that. He had spent lots of time in factories, when he had been a labor mediator. In Shevardnadze’s country all large factories belonged to the state, while ours were private. That got them back to the fundamental differences which explained the visa problem.

Shevardnadze said the U.S. gave visas to Soviet parliamentarians, and the Soviet parliament was also different from the U.S. Congress. It gave visas to Soviet scientists, who had a different basis for conducting their research. It also gave more visas to Soviet party officials than to Soviet trade union officials. There was something obsolete here.

The Secretary said we would see. Trade unions had a particular place in the ideological differences between our systems. Shevardnadze suggested the two sides study the U.S. experience with strikes. The Secretary said he was not advocating strikes, but without the right to strike the ability of workers to defend themselves was severely limited.

With regard to the children who had written about a bad trial for their parents, the Secretary continued, we would be happy to receive information. Ambassador Schifter would be happy to receive it. All U.S. citizens were guaranteed equal treatment under the law.

Concerning discrimination, the Secretary went on, we had severe laws prohibiting any on the basis of race, color, sex, even AIDS. Of course laws were one thing and the general consciousness of society another. We had struggled long with this issue, and had made some headway. Symbolism was important here. One of the few named national holidays, which included Washington and Jefferson, was now for Martin Luther King, Jr. That symbolized our view that discrimination was unacceptable. We were proud of the headway we had made. We were also proud that people could express complaints and fight over them. Our Civil War had to a considerable degree been fought over this issue. He could also say that in his own career, in government and private life, it had weighed heavily with him.

Shevardnadze said that nevertheless not all problems in this area had been solved. The Secretary replied they never would be. Shevardnadze said that was true. The Secretary continued that the main thing was to work at it continuously.

The Secretary said he wished to touch on some problems he had raised before.

The short list of cases he had given Shevardnadze in Moscow was important to him, the Secretary said. The only actions we had seen since that time were negative. One was particularly poignant. Just before going to Moscow, he had met Mrs. Vileshina in Florida. Since then, her husband Mr. Pakenas had been refused again. We could not see why they were separated. The only reason we could figure out was because he had given lectures decades ago under police auspices. We did not understand that. Mr. Schifter would go into it.

Speaking more broadly, we saw increasing openness in the Soviet Union, the Secretary went on. But we also noted the increase in violence and in arrests to discourage people from expressing their views. We had the names of 350 prisoners for political and religious reasons. We thought they should be released.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to give him their names. He was a member of the Soviet leadership, and thought the Secretary was wrong. That number was also circulating in Congress, but it was wrong. This should be an assignment for them to discuss next time in Moscow. The Secretary said we would give it to the Soviets right here. Shevardnadze said that would be fine; he would provide a file for each name.

The Secretary said that if the Soviets released all these prisoners, and got rid of the category of divided spouses, they would be removing an issue in our relations. We observed what they did with prisoners of conscience. Emigration appeared to be on a bit of a plateau, and we thought lots more wanted to leave. This was important, obviously so to the Israelis, and thus important to any role the Soviet Union would play in the Middle East peace process. He had noted what Shevardnadze had said about state security. We were willing to go into cases.

Turning to the human rights meeting in Moscow, the Secretary recalled that as he had told Shevardnadze before, we were prepared to see it go forward, but the conditions had to be right. He had been struck by what Academician Sakharov had said about it. Sakharov obviously had the issue very much on his mind. He also had a list of prisoners, with perhaps 250 people on it.³ He had said publicly that there should be no conference until they were released. We had also given a list of things we would like to see happen in Vienna. These were our criteria. We did not think they should be hard to meet, since they were things the Soviets were talking about under openness.

Meanwhile, the Secretary continued, the Vienna meeting was being held up basically by Shevardnadze’s delegation. This was not just our opinion, but also the opinion of the neutral and non-aligned countries. The priorities were freedom of movement and of religion, human contacts, the Helsinki monitors. He thought that realistic expectations were involved, since what we were asking was consistent with things the Soviets were undertaking. We did not see why the Soviet delegation could not move more. We were perfectly willing to look at a conference if the conditions were right.

Shevardnadze asked what the Soviet delegation in Vienna was not doing properly. The Secretary said problems fell into two categories. The first had to do with prisoners of conscience. The second had to do with what was in the Vienna document. Shevardnadze replied that after all negotiations were going on. He thought they were going well. Things were moving with regard to human contacts. He did not think there were real problems. The Secretary said that was not our impression. Ambassador Schifter would go into more detail. He asked Ambassador Ridgway to comment. Ridgway said we had been in touch with Ambassador Zimmermann, and it was as the Secretary had described it. The two problems were prisoners and the text. If one leapt ahead this also related to the mandate for conventional stability talks. To get there a balanced outcome would be needed.

Shevardnadze said that was one aspect. But concerning the humanitarian aspect, he did not think serious problems remained. He thought they had been cleared up. The Secretary suggested they both look into the situation in Vienna. We thought it should be possible to get a satisfactory outcome simultaneously in all three CSCE areas. In our judgement the document was hung up basically on Soviet reluctance to move in directions the others wanted to go. The outcome hung on that.

Shevardnadze said the 22nd had been the deadline for proposals. The Soviet delegation had had all the necessary instructions. He thought there was no problem. When the Secretary came to Moscow they would look at the question of prisoners carefully. The Secretary had said Sakharov’s list had 250 names. The Soviets would look at each and every case, to explain why they were in prison. VOA coverage on the Boston cultural events had reported demonstrations appealing to the Soviet Foreign Minister on a certain case. It turned out on checking that the person had been in prison fourteen years, but for embezzlement of state property. The case concerned a thief.

Shevardnadze said he was sure Sakharov did not invent the names on his list. But, he asked, who supplied the information? He could provide the Secretary with very specific data on each case. If they were prisoners of conscience, why should the authorities isolate them? They had ways to express their views. They should look at each and every case. There were not 350 prisoners in this category. He could say that with all responsibility. The Secretary said they should go through them here, in order to solve the problem. Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary asked what more there was to say on human rights. They had had a good, thorough discussion. He would pass on the notes to Ambassador Schifter. The working group could report to the ministers during the ministerial, and then continue afterward. Shevardnadze said he also believed the discussion had been good. It had been more specific and concrete.

The Secretary suggested, if Shevardnadze agreed, that they turn to strategic arms. Shevardnadze joked that they should turn to them, not use them. The Secretary said Shevardnadze could lead off if he wished. Shevardnadze said he never refused a legitimate privilege.

Shevardnadze said he had already mentioned that little time was left before the President’s visit to Moscow. At the present meeting they had to hammer out the principles needed to resolve problems related to the treaty on 50% reductions. The main questions were clear.

Shevardnadze continued that he would like to say the Soviet leaders considered the President’s visit an important event, and believed it could become a major landmark in international politics. They had every right to see it in this way, provided the appropriate documents were ready. The ministers had received clear instructions from their leaders in Washington. They were addressed first of all to the foreign ministers and their coworkers. He could not say these instructions had been acted upon in a sufficiently intensive way. Some complaints were due the negotiators, but the ministers were also responsible.

The day before, Shevardnadze said, he had mentioned the important question of the ABM Treaty, and he would return to it later.

He wished first to single out a few difficult problems on the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty. They required collective efforts, especially at the foreign ministers’ level.

The first problem, Shevardnadze said, had to do with long-range SLCM’s. In Washington Mikhail Gorbachev had stressed that without resolution of that question there could be no START agreement, since without resolution a channel would be left open for building strategic offensive weapons, and nullifying the agreement to reduce them.

What should we decide?, Shevardnadze asked. Perhaps at this meeting they would have to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable figure. The Soviets had made a proposal, and had received no answer. He could reaffirm that such a ceiling on long-range SLCM’s could be set at 400. This was not a new figure. Why had the Soviets proposed it? Because they thought the figure should not be too high, in order not to negate the START agreement.

The Secretary, his colleagues, the President had mentioned that verification would be difficult, Shevardnadze went on. This was true. The problem existed. But the Soviets believed it was not hopeless. A solution could be outlined.

Concerning verification of mobile ICBM’s the Soviet side had submitted proposals, Shevardnadze continued. He was ready to continue the discussion, to provide more specifics. He expected the Secretary to act in the same way on a question of interest to the Soviets, on SLCM’s. If the U.S. believed they were not verifiable, the Soviets were ready for joint measures to ensure that they would be verified.

What was the concept?, Shevardnadze asked. Previous proposals had focussed on national technical means, including remote monitoring. They had also proposed inspections of submarines and surface ships and at basing facilities; he wished to stress the latter. In addition, however, they could ask their experts to study the verification of long-range SLCM’s by permanent inspections in specially designated arming facilities, where the systems were armed, after which they were loaded on submarines and surface ships of agreed types.

They had used this method in other areas, Shevardnadze went on, but they would have to designate a limited number of facilities, whose location would be designated in the memorandum of understanding. In the U.S. draft there had been no mention of baseline data for SLCM’s. This was not normal. Under the Soviet concept, arming them in any other location than those designated would be prohibited.

The Soviets also proposed suspect site challenge inspections, on a yearly quota. There would also be a ban on loading SLCM’s on submarines and surface ships anywhere except in basing areas, for instance on the open sea. They recognized this would be a difficult limitation, but there was no other way.

If some vessels were already equipped with such systems when the agreement went into force, there would have to be demonstrations to the other side for counting purposes. The procedures for such demonstrations would have to be agreed between the two sides.

The Soviets also proposed conducting a special remote monitoring experiment in April. There would be Soviet equipment on helicopters and airplanes. The U.S. would designate ships. U.S. experts would then observe with the Soviet equipment. This could happen in the Mediterranean or in some other area. The U.S. could also test its own equipment with Soviet participation.

The Soviet side recognized that remote monitoring was not a panacea, did not provide a complete guarantee. But together with other measures it could help provide a solution.

That was what he had to say on long-range SLCM’s, Shevardnadze concluded. If this key question were not resolved, one could hardly hope that a START agreement for 50% reductions could be concluded.

The Secretary said he thought Shevardnadze had identified perhaps the most difficult issue. Not that there were not other difficult issues, but this was the most difficult. We had thought a lot about it; we had examined it. We had not found a satisfying answer. We would take Shevardnadze’s ideas, and see if they added anything. Or, because they clearly added something, we would see if they added enough. We would also look at the Soviet proposal for an early experiment, and see what it yielded for us.

We were prepared to deal with these issues, the Secretary went on. But we had not yet seen possibilities comparable to those in other areas. We were not prepared to put down a flat “no.” But in the end it might not be possible to verify here. If verification proved impossible, we would be prepared to make unilateral statements, and live with them. But it would be more satisfactory to achieve agreed verification.

General Powell said we had spent a great deal of time examining these issues. Yazov and Carlucci had discussed them too. We would follow up Shevardnadze’s suggestions. The Secretary said Carlucci had reported he found his conversations with Yazov constructive. They had also talked about the prospect of our top military people meeting later this year. Shevardnadze noted he and the Secretary had been asking for that for a long time. It would be good if such a meeting took place. But it would be even better to agree on SLCM verification.

Shevardnadze said the question of principle was whether the sides agreed that inspections were possible. We would be having it for INF missiles. We should be applying this to ballistic missiles. The Secretary said the U.S. was in principle for inspection. Shevardnadze said if that were so, the sides were on the same wave length. The specifics could be resolved.

The Secretary said he wished to recapitulate what had been agreed: 1600 delivery vehicles, 6000 warheads, 4900 ballistic missile warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles, a bomber counting rule, various items on verification, 50% reductions in throwweight. In Moscow they had agreed to focus on verification and task their negotiators to develop three documents. This had worked out. It had been a good approach.

Shevardnadze said he would like to deal with the most difficult issues. If they were not resolved they would not be doing the protocols. Perhaps they should tell their experts to work especially intensively on SLCM’s.

Turning to ALCM’s, Shevardnadze said they should have clarity on this fundamental issue. The Soviets were proposing to count on the basis of the actual maximum number for which each bomber was equipped. This of course was on a basis of over 600 km. range. The actual maximum number for the B–52 was 28. Soviet experts believed that, and it was based on what was published in the U.S. The number for the B–1B was 22. If that were accepted the Soviets would drop their insistence on a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM’s and other heavy bomber weapons. This had been discussed, and he thought the Secretary understood the basic Soviet concerns. He thought that issue could be resolved.

The third issue was verification. The Soviets suggested there be inspection of heavy bomber bases. Inspectors should look at the bombers and their equipment, and there should be demonstrations of their functioning.

Karpov reminded Shevardnadze of the 600-km. range figure. Shevardnadze said he wished to stress once again that he was talking about a 600-km. range threshold.

Shevardnadze continued that he had some suggestions to make on mobiles. At Moscow the two sides had worked on this issue, and the Secretary said that the U.S. side was more confident progress could be made than in the past. To remove grounds for U.S. concern the Soviets had mentioned their readiness to agree to a separate sublimit for mobile ICBM launchers. He could now provide a figure of 800 launchers.

The Secretary asked how many warheads Shevardnadze had in mind. Or was he just talking about launchers? Shevardnadze replied that the actual number would not be as high as 800; but there should be a limit on the total. The Secretary said he understood the Soviets had one system with a single warhead, and another with multiple warheads. The unit of count would be critical. The sort of mixture was important. Shevardnadze replied that the Soviets would decide on the number of warheads. That could be resolved. What he was proposing now was 800 missiles for mobiles under the 1600 ceiling.

Shevardnadze continued that verification would not be simple, and the Soviets understood that. Previous proposals had included national technical means, continuous inspection of production, and notification of changes in the number and location of launchers. The Soviets were ready for an expanded system, particularly for ground-mobile ICBM launchers. For baseline purposes they could agree to open the roofs of the buildings for a period of time, to assist NTM. This was already agreed for INF. There would be one such opening a year for each base. The geographic coordinates of the bases of ground-mobile launchers would be given in the MOU.

Verification of rail-mobile launchers was the hardest of all, Shevardnadze went on. The Soviets suggested that during the baseline data inspection they be corralled at bases for counting. He would say that if this could be expanded to include SLCM’s all the problems would be solved. They also proposed suspect site inspection of rail cars to make sure that numbers were not greater than at the time of the baseline inspection.

The number of non-deployed ICBM’s should be strictly limited, Shevardnadze continued. There should be no more than an agreed number per base, and these should be those intended for replacement. Moreover, they should be at such a distance from the base that rapid reload would not be possible. This was of fundamental importance.

Shevardnadze said he understood the need to digest all this. Serious experts should examine these ideas. The major Soviet experts had worked on them. What was emerging was a uniform system of inspection procedures.

The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze had some comments to make on sublimits.

Shevardnadze said he saw two alternatives:

—First, concerning reentry vehicles for ICBM’s and SLBM’s, the text could record a sublimit of 3300 with regard to both, and also a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM’s and other heavy bomber weapons.

—Second, the possibility was open, within the 4900 warhead limit which the Secretary had said the U.S. would prefer to stick to, for each side to mix freely between ICBM and SLBM warheads. Each side would decide for itself.

That was what he had to say on sublimits. He had also mentioned the sublimit of 1100 ALCM’s and other heavy bomber weapons. But, as he had said, if the ALCM counting problem would be resolved that could be dropped.

The Secretary asked if they should continue on strategic arms. They had five minutes before the ceremony, and the Senators were waiting. Shevardnadze said in that case it was time to call a break. He had more on the protocols and the MOU. The Secretary agreed they should take a break and continue after lunch.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State.
2. Reference is to the opening of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the Department of State and the opening of a parallel center in Moscow. The centers were established as a result of an agreement signed by Shultz and Shevardnadze on September 15, 1987. See footnote 4, Document 67.
3. In telegram 2345 from Moscow, February 5, the Embassy indicated that it had obtained a copy of a publication that contained the list of political prisoners “that Andrei Sakharov reported by hand to Gorbachev on January 15.” The Embassy noted that the list contained the names of 286 individuals and provided these names. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880105–0149)
4. See Document 134.