Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 12, 1988, 9:10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Third Meeting with Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, President’s National Security Advisor
  • Max Kampelman, Counselor of the Department of State
  • Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Maynard Glitman, INF Negotiator
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Viktor Karpov, MFA Department Head
  • Col. General Nikolai Chervov, Soviet General Staff
  • Viktor Sukhodrev, MFA Acting Department head (notetaker)
  • Sergei Tarasenko, Chief of Shevardnadze’s Secretariat
  • Pavel Palazhchenko, (interpreter)
  • (fnu) Nagradov, Soviet Mission, Geneva (notetaker)

After the photo opportunity and an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Kampelman reported that he and Ambassador Karpov had reached substantial agreement on the form of the paper (on futuristics). It would be an exchange of notes between the two governments. Ambassador Karpov and his counsel had recommended a few changes that morning. The U.S. side had reviewed them. It believed they strengthened the text, and did not alter its meaning. The only issue that remained concerned the form of finalizing the documents. Both recommended that it be finalized that day, without going through embassies.

Karpov said he had nothing to add. The texts were agreed.

Shevardnadze commented smilingly that Karpov and Kampelman normally reported differently: on how hard things were, on how dramatic the situation was, on how there were no solutions. This time their reports had been simple. The Secretary said that the more quickly they finished and established what they had agreed through signed documents, the better off the sides would be. It would be an advantage to put down and sign the agreement. Kampelman said they intended to do so that day. Shevardnadze suggested that they formalize the matter in their second session that day. He asked Karpov to confirm that it would be an inter-governmental agreement, and Karpov did. The Secretary suggested there be a little ceremony with the signing.

The Secretary then suggested they hear the reports of their INF negotiators.

Ambassador Glitman reported that they had reached a fair number of agreements, but he wished to focus on those issues where there were still difficulties.

The first concerned missiles coming out of Votkinsk, he continued. There was no guarantee that the size of the SS–20 containers leaving Votkinsk would be big enough to hold SS–20’s but too small to hold anything else. The factory produced them assembled, and the U.S. side needed to inspect them to make sure they held only SS–20’s.

The Secretary invited Chervov to comment issue by issue. Chervov said that on this one there was a difference of opinion about the treaty. If one followed the U.S. position as set forth by Glitman, the sides would have to revise the treaty and its inspection protocol. This question had not been in the treaty; a change in the treaty would be required. The agreement there was that the main criterion would be checking the SS–20 without its warhead in its canister. That was what was recorded. Checking it without its canister and without its warhead would require a change in the treaty.

Glitman said the U.S. side saw no need to change either the treaty or the protocol. The measurements were for assembled missiles as well as canisters coming out of the final assembly plant, as referred to in Article 11. The protocol called for inspection of shipments of missiles, and we knew they were assembled without their front sections. The memorandum of understanding allowed for determination of their length and weight. It was hard to see the purpose of inspections if such systems were not inspected. We had hoped that the Soviet side would not ship systems with dimensions between those assembled without their front sections and those assembled with their front sections but in their canisters. This turned out to be a misunderstanding. Hence the Soviet side might be shipping items in containers large enough to hold an assembled SS–20 without its front end but in containers too small under the Soviet interpretation for the U.S. side to open and look at. We would have to say we could not verify if SS–20’s were coming out or not.

The Secretary invited Glitman to go on to the next issue. That concerned site diagrams, Glitman continued. The sides had agreed to reciprocal inspection of the whole areas covered by the diagrams. The diagram was the whole page with everything on it. The problem concerned three Soviet site diagrams, of missile production facilities. The Soviet side now said that, contrary to the U.S. understanding, not all but only a portion of the areas covered by these diagrams was subject to inspection.

This raised legal and practical problems, Glitman said. The legal problem was that the treaty provided for no change in the boundaries on the diagram, and for inspection of everything within the boundaries. The practical problem was that in the negotiations the Soviet side had discussed—and we had prepared our diagrams to reflect that it had been agreed on—inspection of everything in the facilities on the diagrams. On our side this included the factory where cruise missile launchers are made, and the same held for the factory where Pershings are made. The Soviet side could go anywhere; the pattern was repeated.

As a practical matter, Glitman continued, if we changed what the treaty said, what was agreed to, this would reduce the areas subject to inspection throughout the document. The document was available to the public and the Senate. They would see this as a retreat from the agreement. Some corrections would be needed, concerning things like roads and distances. But those were corrigenda. What the Soviet side was suggesting would change obligations, and reduce the area that could be inspected from what the world saw. He had dealt with the Senate for some months. It had been critical. And the treaty said there would be no change in boundaries or obligations.

Chervov said that when Obukhov had transmitted the diagrams indicating which premises were open for inspection, there had been agreement on inspection for those areas marked and indicated by coordinates. Thus the U.S. side was trying to change, to break an agreement made by the two ambassadors. It was also understood that the U.S. and Soviet sides would be making amendments in the diagrams. The Soviet side was ready to make some by specifying the areas to be inspected.

Chervov addressed the Secretary. Pifer had given the Soviets a proposal in Moscow for a number of changes in the Soviet and American diagrams. ( Matlock explained to the Secretary that Pifer was the Embassy political-military specialist.) Chervov continued that the changes proposed were not only corrigenda, but required consideration, to the point where new negotiations were necessary. The two sides’ agreement to resolve these issues by May 16 was made technically and substantively impossible to implement. The U.S. proposals required further consideration. The sides should introduce as few amendments and corrigenda as possible in order to finish by May 16. Pifer had submitted these proposals in Moscow; he had not yet discussed them with Glitman.

Glitman commented that there was quite a difference between the corrections we felt were needed and the drastic changes in obligations put forward by the Soviet side. Ours concerned issues like page size; how a title reads; making a site name clear; whether a direction arrow was true or magnetic north; how to make boundaries distinct; how to make scales uniform. These were nowhere the same type of issue as reducing by eighty percent or more what was shown to be available for inspection. A solution was needed before the treaty entered into force, because thereafter there could be no more changes.

Karpov said that some of Pifer’s proposals were technical, but others were more than that. He said there was a need for a brief listing of every building on a given piece of territory; for site changes, for changes of roads; for agreeing on the principles of movement between parts of facilities. Glitman interjected that such changes would not change obligations under the treaty. Karpov said he was not at all sure that the changes proposed by Pifer did not change obligations. That was a question that needed to be examined.

The Secretary said he was more and more depressed.

Glitman said the next issue was the smallest item that could be inspected. On the Soviet side this was the first stage of the SS–12, the stage of the SS–23 and the SS–CX–4, and the SS–4 launchstand. On the U.S. side it was the Pershing-II and the DGM 109 cruise missile launchstand. Agreement had been reached on these, and that was what the treaty provided for. But now the Soviets had linked this to an issue not discussed in the treaty, the location in transit of the second stage of the Pershing-II. That was not in the treaty, and this could be documented. The treaty did permit the Soviets to look for Pershing-II second stages when they came on bases. We had gone beyond that, and said that when they came on bases we would tell them how many there were and where they were. This was beyond what was required by the treaty, but we would do it. But there was no requirement to notify transit. There was a provision in the MOU for both sides to list the aggregates of second stages, but nowhere was there a requirement to list second stages at facilities. This had been discussed in the negotiations, and rejected by the U.S. The Soviet side had accepted that. If the Soviets could accept what the treaty said, we could take a step forward.

Chervov said that in principle, as Glitman correctly noted, there had been discussion in the negotiations of a package wherein it was envisaged that the U.S. could give information about PII stages at facilities, their numbers and the changes in their numbers. Within that package the Soviets were ready to accept the Glitman approach. Otherwise the solution would not be consistent with what had been worked out in the process of negotiation.

Glitman said the U.S. could accept that. That meant that one important issue had been resolved.

Another issue had come up the night before, Glitman continued. The treaty specified procedures for use of equipment for inspections. The inspecting party could bring in its own equipment, and if it considered that an ambiguity existed, it could ask the inspected party to take a photograph, and that had to be done, according to the inspection protocol. We had thought that was agreed.

Chervov said it was agreed.

Glitman said it had also been agreed that at an elimination site each side could verify the technical characteristics of inspected items, by selecting eight to twelve items at random from samples of each item to be inspected, and subjecting them to measurements and weighing.

Chervov said the Soviet side agreed.

Glitman said they had also agreed to confirm the type of missiles to be eliminated, especially for missiles in canisters, by opening the front and back ends and looking through access ports, using the type of visual equipment in use at Votkinsk. The U.S. side was prepared to accept such an outcome.

Chervov said the Soviet side agreed.

Glitman said they had also reached agreement on the Soviet proposal concerning SS–12 and SS–23 stage length: there should be a corrigendum in the MOU for the 23, but none was required for the 12.

Chervov said the Soviet side agreed.

With regard to photographs, Glitman went on, although Chervov had to make one more check, the Soviet side had been shown the U.S. photographs, and in return it had agreed to give the U.S. photographs of the SS–12 and SS–23 with their front ends. We had agreed to accept a photo of the front section of the SS–20, which did not need to be attached. The only question was how to arrange the exchange of pictures. We had ours, and the Soviet side did not have theirs. We suggested that the exchange take place in Moscow. We needed the Soviet photos, including that of the front section of the SS–20, and it was important to have them Friday or Saturday (May 14–15), so that the Senate debate could begin on Monday. He did not need to remind the Soviets of previous problems with Senators concerning photographs.

Chervov said the situation was as Ambassador Glitman reported. It was desirable to effect the exchange as soon as possible through the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He had told Glitman about the photo of the front section of the SS–20. He asked to be allowed to think about it through lunch and report back. For the others it was as Glitman had said.

Shevardnadze joked that after lunch he might be in a better mood. The Secretary said it was therefore not a question of whether the Soviets would provide the photo, but only of how fast. Chervov said it would be soon.

Glitman continued that they had agreed on the specificity of intermediate transit points. This was a technical question. The parties agreed to provide the coordinates of the nearest city to the point where the missile was at the moment the transit was made. If the points were all railway stations, their coordinates would be given. If they were not at railway stations, the notification would be by coordinates for the nearest city and the distance and compass bearing from the city to the location.

Chervov said on that issue a little more discussion was required. It had not been resolved to mutual satisfaction. It needed more discussion. The problem was not only about coordinates, but also about the U.S. position that went beyond them. Glitman said direction and distances were needed; otherwise the Soviets could notify “somewhere in the vicinity of Moscow.” Chervov repeated that more discussion was needed.

Glitman continued that two other issues raised by the Soviets should be easier to resolve.

First, Glitman said, the Soviets had asked the U.S. to specify elimination sites. They were Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona for cruise missiles, and we were looking at three sites for the Pershings, including our old friend Longhorn in Texas. We had told the Soviets that informally. The problem had to do with state laws on the environment and lengthy procedures under those laws. We would be on the phone, and might have more to report. Chervov said that was fine.

The second issue, Glitman reported, concerning PIa’s belonging to the FRG located in the U.S. Here discussion had been difficult. In our view they were subject to a U.S.–FRG bilateral agreement. The ministers had had long discussions on this issue. We had believed that it had been resolved and that we would hear no more of it. Those in the U.S. fell under the same program of cooperation as those in the FRG. They were not American systems. The fact that some were in the U.S. did not make them American. They were German. We had checked the language of Chancellor Kohl’s statement, in which he said that these missiles would be eliminated, and it referred to all of them, not just those in the FRG.²

Glitman continued that we thought the Soviets had raised the issue because we told them that when they came to inspect our facilities they would find some of these German missiles. According to the inspection protocol and within the boundaries of some site diagrams, there were structures large enough to hold Pershing missiles that housed German missiles, guarded by German soldiers. Under the treaty the Soviet side had the right to say it wanted to see them. They would be opened, and Soviet inspectors could look inside. This was covered by the treaty. But the treaty did not say that these missiles were American, and should be listed with their locations as American. By this logic U.S. missiles in Europe would be Belgian, Italian or German. It seemed to us that this issue had been resolved long ago in a practical way. The Kohl statement applied, and the Soviet right to inspect at such facilities was also protected.

The Secretary said the Soviet Union had the right under the treaty to assure itself that these missiles were German and not American. Perhaps there was a practical solution to the problem.

Chervov said the issue was complex. They had had a long discussion the day before. There was no need to go through it all. One thing that was confusing was why these missiles had not come to light during the negotiation. It had emerged in the previous few days. He was sure that if it had come up earlier it would have been resolved. But it was natural that it had assumed another coloration for having come up late. The day before they had discussed not only looking at the missiles but also inside them. Observing them through a window or door was not inspection.

The Secretary repeated that perhaps there was a practical way to resolve the issue. As the Soviet side inspected in the U.S., and saw missiles said by the U.S. to be German, then it had the right to inspect them to make sure they belonged to Germany and not to the U.S. If he understood it, that was what the Soviets were after. Perhaps the issue was under control.

Shevardnadze said he still could not resist expressing concern. Why had this not been discussed before during the negotiations?, he asked. He remembered their discussions in September.³ They had discussed the final determination of Chancellor Kohl. The world knew there were 72 warheads on FRG missiles. Now it turned out there were more. In any matter there had to be elementary honesty. It aggravated him that the matter had not been raised before at foreign minister level. The Soviets did not know how many there were. Perhaps the Germans had them in Japan. Kohl and Genscher had not mentioned them.

Shevardnadze asked about formal confirmation. If the situation was as Glitman described it—if these missiles belonged to the FRG—where was the legal proof? This was not a simple question. Were there launchers on U.S. territory that belonged to the FRG? If so, how many were there? This was a curiosity, an oddity, but it had to be taken into account in the future. The implications were serious. If they were not able to clarify it completely, as they had with the 72 warheads in September, the treaty would fail of ratification in the Supreme Soviet. The West German factor was special for the Soviets. It had not only a military aspect, but a political-moral aspect that was even more important, as he had said in the past.

The Secretary recalled that at a certain point Chancellor Kohl had made a unilateral statement that the FRG would destroy the Pershings that it owned. We had said that when it did, the cooperation agreement would be terminated. At that point the warheads would be unencumbered, and would have the same status as those that belonged to the U.S., and would be dealt with as the treaty provided for those similar warheads. That had solved the problem.

If one had a certain number of deployed missiles, the Secretary continued, one trained with such missiles to support the workability of the system. Both the Soviets and the Americans did that. It should not be surprising—it did not constitute a failure—to discover that such activity took place with regard to German missiles. With respect to the treaty, the Soviet side had the right to inspect the inventory, so to speak, of U.S. Pershing missiles. And, as Ambassador Glitman had said, as the Soviet side saw similar missiles that we said belonged to the Germans it could see by their characteristics that they were German and not ours. In the end, according to the Kohl statement, those missiles would disappear.

General Powell stressed that they would disappear.

The Secretary continued that the situation was thus entirely consistent with their discussion. The only question raised by the Soviet side was what they might see about these missiles, and we recognized that it had the right to satisfy itself that they were not ours. The Secretary read the passage from Chancellor Kohl’s statement, pointing out that it covered all these missiles.

Shevardnadze asked where else we had such missiles. Glitman responded that as far as we were aware such missiles were only in the FRG and the U.S. As the Secretary had suggested, most were training systems, and inert. There were some launchers. Shevardnadze commented that we were negotiating partners, and asked again why the Soviet side had not known about these missiles. The Secretary said we had not been negotiating about them. They came under a U.S.-FRG agreement. The issue had been resolved by the Kohl unilateral statement and the information we had provided about what would happen when they were unencumbered, what we would do then. But we would not negotiate with the Soviets about our agreement with the FRG. The Kohl statement had been comprehensive in its coverage, and had been made in good faith.

Shevardnadze asked how it could be proved that these missiles were German. The presence of German soldiers would not be enough. The Secretary said he assumed there were various ways to do so, marks of ownership and the like.

Glitman said the Soviets could assume that the situation was the same as in the FRG itself. The concern should be the same as with the 72. If the Soviets had been satisfied that they were not ours, the same should hold for those in the U.S. The location had nothing to do with what they looked like. Those in the U.S. should be less of a problem, in terms of geography, than those in the FRG.

Shevardnadze asked how the Soviets were going to look around on U.S. territory. Glitman said this was provided for in the protocol and our site diagrams; the Soviets would be able to look. Shevardnadze asked if the U.S. side would provide the Soviets with locations. The Secretary said that was not subject to negotiation between the Soviet and U.S. sides. They had discussed this principle at great length. Glitman said that when the Soviets got to a site and went around it, they would have the right to go into any structure that could house a Pershing, including German Pershings. Shevardnadze asked if they were not stored elsewhere. Glitman replied that they were not, as far as we were aware. He was being frank in saying that the Soviets would find them.

Shevardnadze asked if the U.S. side could tell the Soviets the number, how many of these missiles there were. It had said that they existed. They were not toys, but weapons.

Bessmertnykh explained that the problem for the Soviets was that there was no difference between a Pershing that was German and any other Pershing. The question was whether Pershings on U.S. territory were U.S. or not U.S. This was not the same as the problem of Pershings on German territory. The Soviets needed to know what was U.S. on U.S. territory and what was not. If U.S. inspectors came to Soviet territory and found hundreds of missiles guarded by GDR soldiers, it would not be satisfied if it were told they belonged to the GDR.

The Secretary asked if there were GDR missiles on Soviet territory. Bessmertnykh said no, his example had been hypothetical. But it explained the Soviet concern.

Karpov asked if the U.S. side knew the number of such missiles. Glitman said that we did. Karpov asked him to state it. Glitman said he did not believe he was authorized to do so. The Secretary said that was not a matter for U.S.-Soviet discussion.

Karpov said the problem was that for three years the FRG would have 72 missiles in the FRG and an unknown number in the U.S. The Soviet side would not know whether these latter were being prepared to replace eliminated U.S. Pershings. It would not have a way to verify this. The Secretary said the Soviets did know that Kohl had made a statement that the FRG would dismantle these missiles.

Shevardnadze said the issue should not be left unresolved. If it were, there would be no ratification of the treaty. The U.S. had the Senate, but the Soviets had a senate too. The Soviet side had to know how many of these missiles there were, including the legal aspect. Kampelman, as a lawyer, would know how important that [was]. The Secretary advised him not to enlist Kampelman.

Chervov asked whether Congress knew about this problem. Shevardnadze said he did not know how people would describe it when it became public knowledge.

The Secretary said that the situation was as it had been worked out as a result of the Chancellor’s statement. The Soviets had the ability to see these missiles, to see and check that they were not ours. Kohl’s statement applied to all such missiles. There were no German warheads associated with such missiles; all the warheads belonged to us, and would be dealt with under the treaty provisions.

Shevardnadze said he was sure the Bundestag did not know about this issue. The Secretary said someone there knew about it, because they paid the bill.

Glitman pointed out that during the baseline inspection during the first 90 days, Soviet inspectors at all the U.S. declared facilities would see these German missiles and launchers; they would do an inventory of their numbers and location.

Shevardnadze asked how many they would look for, how many there were. They would not know how many to look for.

The Secretary noted that the negotiators had gone through the lists of issues, and some issues had been resolved, and three were left to resolve. He suggested that they should be able to resolve them before noon. Glitman said they would seek to reduce their agreements to writing. Shevardnadze reaffirmed that if there were no clarity on the Pershing issue, there would be no treaty. The Secretary said there should be clarity on all issues, not just the Pershing.

(A 5-minute break was called at 10:30. Kampelman, Glitman, Chervov and Nagradov left, and Shevardnadze’s personal assistant Teymuraz Stepanov joined the group.)

The Secretary said he had one suggestion to make for the summit, for something that might be agreed to and set out there. When Secretary Carlucci had met with Minister Yazov, they had discussed a confidence-building measure concerning notifications of ICBM and SLBM launches. He had the impression that Yazov had found the suggestion useful. He saw that in the START drafts, both sides had called for advance notification of ICBM and SLBM launches, and their formulations had only minor differences. So the U.S. side would be ready, if Shevardnadze thought it a good idea, to take this out of the package and make a separate agreement of it. This fitted with the concept of the nuclear risk reduction centers we had established. It was not a major thing, but it was doable without disrupting the basic START negotiations. If Shevardnadze was interested, they could instruct their negotiators to draft an agreement that could be signed at the summit.

Shevardnadze said he knew the question had been raised during the meeting of the defense ministers. He said the Soviet side would examine it. Probably a week or ten days would be enough time to examine it, and they would reply. He knew their people had been assigned the task of looking at it. There was enough time before the summit.

The Secretary said that if the Geneva negotiators were told to complete such an agreement, it would be ready for conclusion, if that was the Soviet decision. But if they did not work on language until the Soviets made a decision, it would then be too late. Shevardnadze said they should be told to work out such language.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if he had additional points to make.

Shevardnadze noted that at that day’s second session they would listen to the reports of the working group on nuclear matters. At their level they had not yet discussed these matters, but Obukhov had told him there were some points of convergence. If they accumulated enough, a good document could be adopted at the level of the President and the General Secretary.

Shevardnadze recalled that at their last Moscow consultations he had raised the issue of restricting naval activities. It seemed that the Secretary had not objected in principle. He said he would like to outline again what had been discussed.

What they had in mind, Shevardnadze went on, was a broad discussion of mutual concerns, not just with regard to their two countries, but with regard to other countries as well. This could begin with a discussion of the naval balance between the Soviet Union and the U.S. They could seek mutually acceptable approaches on restricting activities in seas and oceans contiguous to Europe: the North, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean.

Shevardnadze said he understood that these questions were not simple. Perhaps such questions were not convenient; perhaps the U.S. side was not comfortable with them. But sooner or later the two countries would have to deal with them. Perhaps at first this discussion should not be at the foreign minister level. But groundwork should be laid. He wanted to remind the Secretary of that.

The Secretary said Shevardnadze could consider him reminded. It was not a question of our being comfortable. Our naval people were thinking about it. General Powell said they were considering how a dialogue might be opened, but it would not include restrictions on naval activity.

The Secretary recalled that the INCSEA agreement involving direct navy-to-navy contacts had proved one of our most useful and longlasting agreements; it had survived many ups and downs. Perhaps that could be considered a building block. The General Secretary had suggested this topic in public. We would be making a response.

Shevardnadze said that if one looked at the general area of nuclear weapons, in most fields there had been some movement, even if not everywhere as much as one wanted. Talks on conventional arms were now emerging. Nuclear testing was moving forward. Only naval activities were untouched by the process. But the level of activities was such that this area needed to be dealt with.

The issue would be raised in Moscow, Shevardnadze went on. The leaders could make a decision in principle. It should not be left hanging, open. If the two countries were serious about stopping the nuclear arms race, they should leave any channel for it open. They had found ways to limit other channels. He also knew there were many countries that had an interest in this area. The Soviets had raised the question bilaterally. The sooner the two countries began consultations the better. He had meant to say he knew U.S. naval people were uncomfortable with the issue. So were Soviet naval people. Powell would know that military men were uncomfortable with limits on them.

Powell joked that ours were interested in limits on theirs.

Shevardnadze recalled that the day before they had discussed Vienna problems. The working group had defined language which, if acceptable to both the ministers, could be transmitted to the Soviet delegation in Vienna, and presumably to the American delegation too. His delegation had instructions to contact the Secretary’s. At the summit they could state that taking into account discussions with their allies and others they had been able to reach agreement on a position.

The Secretary said he would describe his understanding of what had been done. He had heard the language that had been worked out, and thought it could be agreed on. But there were important procedural considerations. Ambassador Ledogar had been instructed to be in touch with his Soviet counterpart, and he expected to hear the results during the luncheon break. Perhaps they would be informed in the afternoon that the problem was being worked in Vienna. The U.S. side would welcome development of an outcome that the sides could identify at the summit. It would be necessary to agree on a mandate, and there were also the human rights aspects. Shevardnadze had made some comments the day before that we thought helpful. He had told Ambassador Zimmermann to start stirring the pot as well. The ministers should use their meetings to stimulate the multinational negotiating process, as they had for Stockholm. We would be in touch with our delegations at noon, and the ministers could exchange views on status in the afternoon.

Shevardnadze said they had given the same instructions to their people in Vienna. They were engaged in parallel activity.

Shevardnadze asked where things stood on the document to be adopted in Moscow. He thought it would have to include Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, Central America, southern Africa, indeed the whole of Africa, Cambodia, Korea. The Soviet side had suggested Cyprus, and the U.S. side seemed to have reacted negatively. But the Soviet side would like to discuss it, and it would have to be mentioned. Perhaps the Pacific region should also be mentioned. That was a list of problems for the officials working on the document.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze’s listing of areas put him in a position to say all had been mentioned in this ministerial. He believed they would have to decide in general how to deal with regional issues. As he had said the day before, it could pose difficulties to mention a single topic; it raised the question of why one and not another. One alternative was to work out an understanding of how to deal with a single topic in briefing the press. In general it might be well to agree to follow the approach taken by the President and the General Secretary at Geneva: to note that tensions in various regions are a key source of tension in our relationship, and that to the extent we can help reduce them our dialogue has shown some results. We would have to consider how to reflect that in summit documentation.

The Secretary continued that he wished to touch upon a few regional topics. On most the situation was much as it had been.

Turning to Afghanistan, the Secretary said that we urged the Soviets, as they withdrew, to remove the mines they had laid. These mines tended to blow up civilians. We also urged them to provide maps of these minefields to the UN monitors.

Shevardnadze said he did not think that would be a major problem if what the Secretary meant was in connection with the flow of refugees. Mines would not prevent them from returning. The Soviets had not mined roads and main tracks. Some had been laid outside these, as happens in any military operation, but they were mostly on the paths of insurgents and those bringing weapons into Afghanistan, and they self-destructed some time after they were laid.

The Secretary asked how long before they self-destructed. Shevardnadze replied in three or four days.

The Secretary said he had heard Shevardnadze make two statements: that the major arteries were free of mines, and that the others destroyed themselves in a matter of days. Powell said we had more permanent fields in mind; for those maps would be genuinely useful. Shevardnadze said the Soviets were not hiding anything. They would discuss this with the Afghan authorities and the UN. More than 110,000 refugees had already returned. Mines had not arisen as a problem.

Since the Secretary had mentioned it, Shevardnadze continued, he thought Afghanistan should be worthily reflected in the summit document, as a good example of our cooperation, our understanding. He was not suggesting that the U.S. take up relations with Najibullah. But he was asking for a more realistic assessment of the people the U.S. supported. Take Hekmatyar, for instance. His views were well-known. He was reactionary and aggressively minded, and precisely because of this, he had no serious support in Afghanistan. But the U.S. had supplied him with weapons. And he was now thinking that, because his bases would gradually be removed, dismantled, fundamentalists should plan a move to Iran. Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary was comfortable from the point of view of U.S. interests at having groups with American weapons on Iranian territory. He thought the matter deserved attention.

The Secretary recalled that the General Secretary had mentioned this aspect at their last meeting in Moscow. The U.S. had no desire to supply weapons to people in Iran.

Turning to Ethiopia, the Secretary said that both sides had given considerable help to people who were starving there. According to our information things were getting worse. Mengistu⁴ was ignoring the fate of his own people. The Secretary said he knew that both the Soviets and the U.S. were trying to supply them. But Mengistu continued to be a major problem.

Shevardnadze replied that the situation in Ethiopia was complicated. Problems had emerged in the objective situation. The problem was not Mengistu; it was mostly activation of the separatist movement. The Soviets had spoken to Mengistu. He himself understood that relatively better conditions for assistance had to be created. He had created such conditions for the UN. Shevardnadze said he did not know how this would work out in specific areas. Perhaps hostilities would interfere. But given the difficulties Mengistu was doing his best to try to improve food assistance. The Soviets would continue to work on him. They had allocated large assistance; so had the U.S. They were interested in having it delivered to the people. They would use their capabilities, like aircraft, to get assistance to the people.

The Secretary said he welcomed Shevardnadze’s statement. However, as far as we could see Mengistu was not doing what he could to make it as easy as possible to get food to people, on the contrary. Any additional efforts the Soviets could undertake would be very good.

Shevardnadze said he could not fully agree that Mengistu was being obstructionist. Mengistu understood that the situation was difficult. There had been drought. The people needed help. But it appeared that separatist activity compelled him to take extraordinary steps. There was a danger that Ethiopia would split apart. Shevardnadze said he thought both the U.S. and the Soviet Union wanted it to remain a single country.

The Secretary said he wished to make one remark about Central America. They had talked about supporting peace negotiations. But we did not see Nicaraguan government behavior as consistent with the movement toward open, democratic government they had agreed to. We continued to feel that one source of this was the unwarranted arms buildup, the enormous supplies they had received and continued to receive from the Soviets and their allies. Their forces were twice those of their neighbors. We had noticed that supply flows were lower in March than they had been in January or February, and we would like to interpret that as a good sign. But with stockpiles at the level they were at, there was no need of any more military supplies. The U.S. was not supplying the resistance. It would consider it a constructive step if the Soviets stopped.

Shevardnadze asked if the U.S. were ready to stop supplying other Central American countries. The Secretary replied that other countries were fighting their own insurgencies. This was especially true of El Salvador, where insurgents were still receiving arms from Nicaragua. In assisting El Salvador the U.S. had that in mind. Shevardnadze said it appeared that with regard to El Salvador the U.S. answer was not good. The Secretary repeated that with regard to Nicaragua no arms were going to the resistance from us, and our assistance to other countries was moderate given the size of the Nicaraguan armed forces.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets had suggested reductions in arms supplies on a reciprocal basis. Then it had suggested a moratorium. The U.S. had not accepted that either. There were interesting trends underway, if both countries supported them. The trend toward national reconciliation was more and more evident. It could be encouraged. The Soviet Union had no special interests in the area. It had a relationship with the government of Nicaragua. That was a legitimate government, elected by the people, and the Soviets had to take that into account in their actions. With regard to support for the Guatemala process, he thought the two countries could support it more by reducing their supplies to Nicaragua and the other countries of the area.

Shevardnadze said he wished to raise a second point. The Nicaraguans had been ready for a dialogue with the U.S. for a long time.

The Secretary rejoined that the trouble with Nicaragua is that the government said and did different things. They did not follow through on what they said with actions. They had said they wanted a dialogue with us. We had started one, and they then went around saying that since they were talking to us there was no need for a direct dialogue with the resistance. So we had stopped. We have said we would be willing to engage in a direct dialogue in a regional setting, as soon as the national reconciliation process became fruitful. A dialogue had started with the resistance, but we could not say it was very productive. Meanwhile the Nicaraguan government was doing things at odds with what it had agreed to. That undermined confidence on its willingness to follow through. But we were ready for a dialogue in a regional setting if the national reconciliation process was fruitful.

Shevardnadze said he thought the dialogue between the government and the opposition should be encouraged. It had not been fruitless; some positive points had emerged. It might not have had big results, but the fact of dialogue was important. The trouble was that in recent weeks there had been no unity in the opposition. Ortega was saying that it was hard to see whom he should have dialogue with.

The Secretary asked if there were anything else Shevardnadze wished to bring up.

Shevardnadze said he thought there should be a substantial place in the overall summit document for the Middle East, following the Secretary’s trips and the Soviet side’s observations on the problems there. He thought the two sides had more in common than they had in the past. Both recognized that an international conference was necessary. Both were for a comprehensive solution. Both accepted a step-by-step approach. They could prepare substantial material for the joint statement. Perhaps it should not be a separate document, but it should be a major component.

The Secretary said they would have to work their way along. The more he worked at it, the more difficult it seemed. He was a little discouraged, but it was important to keep working. The idea was alive, because there was an interest in peace in the area.

Shevardnadze noted that they had been discussing reducing or stopping supplies of weapons to Central America. No solution had been found, but they had been discussing it. He thought they should give thought to the same approach for the Middle East. Of course the countries of the area had their own production lines; such a thing would be hard to verify; but restraint could be envisioned.

The Secretary said he doubted it. They would just have to keep working.

Shevardnadze said they had often discussed the Iran-Iraq war, and set forth their positions. He did not see new elements there. He thought the main effort, at this stage at least, should be to support the mission of the Secretary General.

The Secretary agreed that the Secretary General was engaged, but said we thought it would be better if he got stronger support. Iran had suffered a series of setbacks recently. Perhaps that would affect its attitude. Shevardnadze said that was true. But the Secretary General seemed to be in a mood for more active work. The Soviet side had never rejected a second resolution. He could confirm that the Soviets thought it needed to be adopted when the time came. But the Secretary General was of a spirit to work, seemed ready to intensify work on implementation of the first resolution.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Ambassador’s Office at the U.S. Mission.
2. See footnote 2, Document 71.
3. See Documents 66–76.
4. Reference is to Mengistu Haile Mariam, President of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia.