Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

173. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1988, 3:30–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze—Second Small Group Meeting: Arms Control Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor on Arms Control Matters
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
  • John M. Evans, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
  • Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
  • Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Yevgeniy Gusarov, MFA (notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko, USA & Canada Department, Soviet MFA (interpreter)

DEFENSE AND SPACE/ABM TREATY

The Secretary suggested that they begin with strategic arms and invited Shevardnadze to open the discussion. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said there was reason for some satisfaction about the results achieved to date. We not only had completed the INF Treaty but also other useful agreements. Moreover, despite our great differences in START, positive assets were increasing gradually. It would be desirable to make the process more dynamic, but he understood the objective reasons why this was not possible.

Shevardnadze said that the President and Gorbachev had both said many times that it was necessary to use to the maximum the existing opportunities, to make good use of the experience we had gained. The question was what we needed to do to conclude our interaction with real progress. He wanted to begin with the most difficult problems where the prospects were not very bright. He had in mind the situation with regard to the ABM Treaty. Time had shown that the road we mapped together in searching for an agreement on the ABM Treaty was the only possible basis for agreement. This was what the joint statements of the Washington and Moscow Summits made clear. In the future we needed to stick to the same course: the provisions and the language agreed upon in Washington. One of the most important fundamental issues was the relationship between adherence to the ABM Treaty and START. He wanted to reemphasize the Soviet Union’s fundamental approach.

Regarding the specific problems that had emerged, Shevardnadze said he wanted to begin with the problem of sensors. The Soviets had considered very carefully this question and all aspects of the U.S. proposal. They had concluded that unlimited permission of sensors in space would seriously undermine the ABM Treaty. It would not be consistent with our objectives. At the same time the Soviets could agree to discuss the problem in hopes of finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviets proposed that this question be considered in the context of Soviets’ suggestions that had been made earlier with respect to reaching an agreement on a list of devices that would be permitted in space. At the outset the sides would have to agree that the launching of space based sensors would be conducted under conditions of verification with inspections. On this basis the Soviets would be prepared to continue the dialogue in the working group and in the negotiations in Geneva.

The next question, Shevardnadze continued, concerned the sides’ mutual concerns with respect to the ABM treaty. Our two leaders had discussed this question thoroughly. It was very important not to permit our differences to result in an undermining of everything we had achieved through mutual efforts. The U.S., Shevardnadze said, was aware of the most recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk. The U.S. was also aware of the Soviet side’s other suggestions regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets were very sincere in trying to set aside everything that stands in the way of solving this problem. Soviet proposals called for creating on the basis of that radar a center for international cooperation for peaceful space research.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to tell the Secretary frankly that the Soviets had not wanted to make a public statement and would have preferred to address this issue at the working level in private confidential discussions. They had made it public, however, because of certain propagandistic steps by the U.S. with respect to Krasnoyarsk by the Administration (an “uproar of accusations” against the Soviet Union alleging violations and, indeed, statements that Krasnoyarsk was almost a material breach of the Treaty). Because of these statements the Soviet side had to react publicly. Shevardnadze explained that the space center would be included in the system of a world space organization and that it would be possible for many countries to participate in its research efforts. The Soviets were ready for experts from the U.S. and the USSR to lead the way in the process of practically implementing this decision. This would imply visits to Krasnoyarsk and joint work to look at the equipment there.

Shevardnadze added that another Soviet proposal was still on the table. If the sides were able to agree on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the Soviets would dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. This, however, would be a pity because the radar provided a good basis for joint use for peaceful purposes. But he repeated that the old proposal was still in effect. It would be helpful if the U.S. side were to consider Soviet proposals and respond in kind. He had in mind Soviet concerns about the U.S. radar in Greenland as well as the rocket probe launch facility at Shemya Island. He urged that the U.S. let Soviet experts visit these facilities. While he was no expert, Shevardnadze said Soviet specialists were certain that these were clear violations of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets had permitted members of the U.S. Congress and scientists to visit Krasnoyarsk, so it was quite logical to expect the U.S. side to respond similarly with visits to its facilities.

Secretary Shultz replied by saying he was sorry the Soviet delegation had responded negatively to the U.S. sensors proposal. He noted Shevardnadze’s expression of readiness to continue the discussion on this proposal, however, and said the U.S. intended to pursue it further. In the U.S. view, it was impossible to distinguish between the functions of sensors of different kinds. It would lend itself to serious disputes if we tried to differentiate. This was why we thought our proposal would be helpful and fit the situation well. As we had looked at the situation in the defense and space talks it seemed to us that the length of the non-withdrawal period, based on discussions between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, should fall into place without difficulty. The U.S. also felt that the question of what happens after the period of non-withdrawal had been settled at the Washington Summit by Gorbachev’s statement (he had said that, at the end of the period, each side would be free to decide its course, while in the meantime the ABM Treaty would remain in effect). In Geneva, however, disagreement had broken out on this question.

The most difficult question, the Secretary continued, continued to be what would occur during the non-withdrawal period. The sensors proposal was an attempt to address that along with our proposed confidence-building measures. Much good work had been done with respect to the predictability protocol, and we should instruct our negotiators to get that portion of our work completed. Many things already had been agreed, such as data exchange and observation of tests. We did not think mandatory on-site inspection would work, however—we had sensitive facilities and so did the Soviets. But there was a lot of good material in the Protocol and we should get it done to pass along to the next group.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, the Secretary said, was a very troublesome issue. There was a wide bipartisan consensus that the radar, because of its location and orientation, was a violation of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had said this issue had the potential to be a major disruptive force, and he believed the Minister was right. Shevardnadze interjected that he had not said that. The Secretary rejoined that, in that case, he would say it! We had to consider what we would do in the absence of any agreement on this issue. We had studied the General Secretary’s letter² and would like to raise some questions about his proposal.

The problem with the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Secretary said, was that it is one of the critical items identified in the ABM Treaty as representing a long lead-time item for a territorial ABM defense. The ban on LPARs except on the periphery was a sort of insurance policy against ABM breakout. The existence of the radar was the problem. It might be used for other purposes, but it could easily be reconverted to an LPAR. Thus, knowing the origins of the LPAR limits, we had to ask what Gorbachev had in mind:

—Was he proposing to dismantle the radar and establish a space science center in its place? If so, we might “dig into that one.” We didn’t see the location as ideal for such research, but if that was the proposal we could look at it.

—Another variation was that Gorbachev meant the radar would be completed, with additional parts added for space research purposes. For reasons he had already explained, the Secretary said, that would not do the job.

We needed to know whether the plan was to dismantle the radar and put something else useful there, or whether it was something else. The Secretary added that the U.S. had no problem with salvaging equipment from Krasnoyarsk and recovering it for other uses.

There was also a major problem, Secretary Shultz continued, with Soviet activities at Gomel. The movement of radars from a test range to another site was, in itself, a violation. We did visit the site, and the Soviets had explained their plans; now those plans were being carried out. Ambassador Karpov had spoken about a “radical solution” to Gomel during the ABM Treaty review, and we would like to know what was meant by this.

With respect to Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary said, these radars had been grandfathered under the ABM Treaty. We did not regard them as in any way parallel to Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze asked whether the radar in Greenland was a phased-array type. The Secretary said he could not give a description. General Powell intervened to say that this question was irrelevant. The point was that the radar was at a site in existence at the time the ABM Treaty was signed; the Treaty allowed such radars to remain and modernization was permitted under the Treaty.

Shevardnadze asked whether, if it was an LPAR and was outside national territory, it was not a violation. The Secretary replied that it was not a violation as long as the Treaty grandfathered such radars. Shevardnadze said he agreed that modernization was permitted, but using the site for an ABM radar was a violation, in the Soviet view. Karpov added that, after signing the ABM Treaty, the sides were barred from building outside their national territory phased-array radars with a potential greater than 3 million.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. let the Soviet side visit Thule. If there were no violation, the Soviets would take the issue off the agenda. The Secretary replied that “what you see is not as important as what we say.” The radar was there before the Treaty was signed and could be modernized. If the Soviets visited, they would see that it was being modernized. The same thing occurred with the U.S. visit to Krasnoyarsk: the Congressmen took photos; the visit confirmed what we already knew: that an LPAR was being built at that location.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to imagine the Soviet side had violated the ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar. Then, after the two countries had agreed in Washington and Moscow that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a specified period of time, the Soviets put forward a proposal: if that issue was settled, the Soviets would dismantle the radar. This seemed to solve the problem. And now, the Soviets were offering a further step: to transfer the radar to the use of Soviet, U.S., Indian, Japanese and other scientists. If these scientists found elements that confirmed the radar was a violation, those elements would be removed and the building used for scientific purposes. Shevardnadze added that the Soviets could present this case to any audience and it would agree the U.S. position was indefensible. Why destroy the radar if it could be used for science?

The Secretary replied that there was a reason why not: Under the ABM Treaty regime, there were provisions aimed at making it difficult to break out of the Treaty. The chief one was the prohibition on battle management radars inside national boundaries and pointed inwards. Since it took a long time to build such radars, we could see them coming. That was the theory underlying the Treaty and that was why we regard Krasnoyarsk as a serious problem. It was not just a technical violation without real meaning; it had a lot of meaning.

Shevardnadze asked what would be so bad about making the radar into a laboratory for the use of world science or a world space organization, a place for peaceful research, for tracking space objects, to be used collectively not only by Soviet scientists? If there were certain elements of the radar that are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, these could be removed. If not inconsistent, then all other devices and instruments could be used for peaceful purposes. This was a very noble idea and a reasonable solution, taking care of both the political problem and the interests of scientists. Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to please think again about the proposal, as it opened up an interesting prospect. As for the Greenland and UK radars, the Soviets believed they could seriously and earnestly say that these were violations of the ABM Treaty. If LPARs were there, they were violations. If no LPARs were there, then let the Soviets visit to confirm that there were no grounds for complaint.

Karpov said that when the Secretary spoke of modernization, one had to note that there were five radars at Thule and Fylingdales when the ABM Treaty was signed, but not one of them was a phased-array radar. Now LPARs with a potential much greater than 3 million were being built. These could have been built legally in Connecticut or Washington, but they should not have been built at Thule or Fylingdales.

Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev had not conditioned his proposal on the U.S. doing the same thing to its disputed radars as Gorbachev had proposed to do with Krasnoyarsk. Secretary Shultz replied that he had noticed this. We contend that no matter what exists at Thule and Fylingdales, these were permitted, modernized radars. When it came to using Krasnoyarsk as a site for scientific research, however, there was a question as to what existed there. If it was an LPAR, then it was a problem. If there was a significant proportion of what is needed for an LPAR, it was also a problem. If the LPAR was gone, that would be a different story. This was why he had asked whether the Gorbachev proposal entailed dismantlement or substantial alteration of the radar. Whatever the Soviets might say about Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary added, they were far away from U.S. national borders.

Shevardnadze said he had been told that, when scientists met at Krasnoyarsk, they would be able to decide what kind of equipment could be preserved and what should be taken away. If there were elements that represented a violation of the ABM Treaty, then the Soviets would remove them. He reiterated that keeping the radar functioning would be useful for world science. Many countries’ scientists would jointly determine its use as a laboratory. With some emotion, Shevardnadze stressed that he thought this was a good idea. If there were elements of concern, the Soviets would be ready to dismantle them and convert the installation. The aim, he said, was to remove this problem from contention as well as to make the radar available to help implement the plans our countries had for space exploration. This was a mission that could only be accomplished by big countries like the U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan. Shevardnadze noted that there was a big building at Krasnoyarsk, with much costly equipment—all of this could be used. But the Soviets had made a political decision: they were ready to do something useful for world science and were surprised the U.S. had reacted so negatively.

The Secretary said his reaction was not negative, but one of questioning what will be at Krasnoyarsk under the Soviet proposal. If the LPAR were there, in whole or in part, then the problem would not be solved. If something else was implied, then we could work it out. The Working Group should delve further into this idea. But if the idea was to use an LPAR for scientific purposes, this would be a problem.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to confirm the Soviet aim: to preserve at Krasnoyarsk only that equipment needed for scientific purposes. Karpov added that he had told General Burns that various options existed for converting the radar. They had discussed dismantling the transmitter antenna and replacing it with a parabolic antenna. This was a radical solution, one which would remove any concern about the radar’s use for early warning of ballistic missile launch.

The Secretary suggested that the Working Group continue this discussion. He could not say he was very optimistic, but he accepted that it was a good faith effort to resolve the problem. He asked again for the Soviets to explain what would be a “radical solution” at Gomel.

Karpov replied: To eliminate what exists there—to eliminate the base for the antenna. Shevardnadze broke in to say that “Gomel is not a problem; let me assure you of this. Let us not fan that issue into a big problem; it’s a matter that can be taken off the agenda quickly.” As for Krasnoyarsk, Shevardnadze continued, he wanted to ask the U.S. again to take a very careful look at the Soviet proposal—to think of what the U.S. would want to see done so that it was sure Krasnoyarsk was only a research center. Let us allow our experts to work on the problem. Do not dismiss the Soviet proposal out of hand: that would shape public opinion in a way that the U.S. would find difficult to cope with, he warned, since the U.S. would have trouble explaining what was wrong with the Soviet proposal for a genuine scientific research center at Krasnoyarsk. If the U.S. didn’t trust the Soviets, then it could come and see the radar for itself. Let the experts come and decide, Shevardnadze concluded.

The Secretary said that the Soviet proposal would be a great idea if it meant there would be no LPAR at Krasnoyarsk, in whole or in part. There might be ways to change the physical characteristics of the radar such that it would be dismantled in terms of its ability to operate as an LPAR.

Ambassador Ridgway, referring to Shevardnadze’s comment that the Gomel issue should not be allowed to become a major problem, commented that our concerns had been exacerbated by the fact that construction work was continuing at Gomel. This made management of the issue more difficult.

Shevardnadze asked what U.S. experts had found at Gomel. If there was a violation, then why would the Soviets have invited experts? The fact was that they did not find anything. But he repeated that Gomel was not a big problem, since there was not a big structure involved. Krasnoyarsk was much larger. Gomel was a simple matter that could be solved. Karpov noted that at Gomel there was simply a rotating tower on which a mirror antenna had been placed.

Shevardnadze invited U.S. experts to visit Gomel again, and quipped that he was considering visiting Gomel himself. Regarding Krasnoyarsk, he again urged the U.S. to look carefully at the Soviet proposal. It was a serious one presented in good faith. When Krasnoyarsk becomes a facility for space cooperation, perhaps the U.S. could do the same thing at Thule.

Secretary Shultz said that his understanding of the Gomel problem was that, while the sides were allowed to have ABM radars at test ranges for experimental purposes, they were barred from moving them to other locations. So simply moving the radar was a violation. Beyond this, one must ask why the negotiators had made this a violation. The answer was that they did not want lesser radars to proliferate, since a large number of such radars could add up to a significant capability. Therefore, when the radar was moved, it was a technical violation. Now that we were seeing the parts reconstructed, it exacerbated the situation. Karpov said the Soviets were not building at Gomel.

General Powell noted that, in the fall of 1987, we seriously considered whether the Gomel matter constituted a violation. We judged that, on technical grounds, there was no doubt, although we reported to Congress that this was a minor problem. Inspectors subsequently visited Gomel. But the problem had since become more serious with the renewal of assembly activity there. In December we would need to report again to Congress on the status of the issue, and this activity would turn a small problem into a big one.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides decide on the following course: At Gomel, where there was nothing that constituted a violation, the U.S. should come and visit once again and have its experts take another look. The Soviets had a vital interest in removing all irritants in this area. The inspectors could go for 10 days or two weeks, if they wished. In our joint statement, we could note the readiness of the Soviet side to allow this to happen.

The Secretary replied that it was not a secret what was happening at Gomel. When our people visited, they were openly shown the plans, and now we were seeing those plans carried out. It was not as though we were mystified about what was going on. It was the fact that the radar was there that posed the problem. We had no problem verifying what the Soviets had been telling us.

General Powell explained that it was the simple presence of those components that was the issue. The simplest solution would be to remove them to a test range or destroy them. The question was not the purpose of the radar, but its location. And if the work continued, this meant more of a problem for our December compliance report.

The Secretary said that what the Soviets called a van was, in fact, a radar. Shevardnadze said it really was a van. The Soviets may have done something they shouldn’t have, taking it from one place to another. But if they had wanted to violate the Treaty, then why would they have invited U.S. experts to come inspect the facility? Did the Secretary think the Soviets were naïve or trying openly to provoke the U.S.?

The Secretary said he did not think Gomel was a big enough deal to warrant all this trouble. Shevardnadze said: “I have an interest in resolving the issue.” He said he would ask Karpov and the highest authorities to go there to see the site. Removing one van was not going to be a problem. General Powell said it was more than just one van that was involved. Other components that had been moved to Gomel also had to be eliminated. We now knew what’s there based on our experts’ visit. He added that, before we had included Gomel in our compliance report, we had raised this issue with the Soviets privately in an effort to resolve it.

Karpov said he wanted to point out that there was no radar at Gomel of a kind deployed at test ranges, but only a rotating tower on which mirror antennas and other devices had been placed. This was not the same kind of antenna as was located at test ranges.

The Secretary said he would like to tell the Soviets again precisely what we considered a violation. Powell argued that this was surely a problem we could solve. Shevardnadze said he agreed. The Soviets recognized the concerns of the U.S. side and wanted to find a solution. He confirmed the Soviets’ readiness to receive U.S. experts again at Gomel, after which, he joked, they could all go together to Greenland. Secretary Shultz said this should wait until the summer. Shevardnadze said he was ready to go even in winter. The Secretary said they would need to ask Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides think of language on Krasnoyarsk, to see what might be possible here. The Soviets were not sure what the U.S. wanted, what conditions had to be satisfied. He had confirmed the Soviet Government’s readiness to ensure that it becomes a scientific facility. If this approach was acceptable, we could say this in the joint statement.

The Secretary said the U.S. was looking for something that fixed the radar so that, from a physical and operational viewpoint, it was not a phased-array radar in whole or in part. This was the essence of the problem. If, in the process, something useful was created, this was fine—a creative idea. But if what was being proposed was to have scientists use the LPAR, Gorbachev’s proposal would not solve the problem.

The Secretary recalled the Soviets’ Moscow offer that, in connection with a satisfactory arrangement on the ABM Treaty, they would dismantle the radar. Of course, we hadn’t been able to work this out. On the other hand, if we could resolve the problem by accompanying dismantlement with a statement that expressed satsifaction with the ABM Treaty as it stands, leaving aside what we were negotiating in NST, we could do that too. If this idea was of interest, then there were several solutions to explore. But the essence of the question was that we cannot wind up with something that had the physical characteristics of an LPAR in whole or in part.

Shevardnadze said: “We agree on this.” Let us give the task to the experts to find a way to do this. Of course, an inventory would need to be taken of the equipment and structure to see what elements were incompatible with the Treaty. These would need to be dismantled. What was not incompatible could stay in place and be used for science. On the basis of the Secretary’s proposal, Shevardnadze concluded, work could be done.

START

SLCMs

Shevardnadze said he would like to open the discussion of START with one of the most difficult questions: SLCMs. He knew the Secretary didn’t like to discuss the issue, but it could not be avoided. He reminded the Secretary that in the Washington Summit joint statement the sides pledged to reach agreement on quantitative limits on nuclear-armed, long-range SLCMs, and to look for mutually acceptable verification measures to enforce those limits. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation had been trying to avoid any specific discussion of SLCMs and was attempting to remove the subject from the agenda. But he wanted to say that a treaty on strategic offensive arms would not be possible if such a channel for circumvention was not closed. Therefore, the working group should look seriously at the SLCM question.

Shevardnadze said that, in Geneva, the negotiators had on the table a major package of Soviet proposals for SLCM verification. The Soviets had suggested use of NTM, remote verification, inspections, checks at production and arming facilities. He proposed that detailed discussions now begin on these proposals, one-by-one or all together. If any one proposal was unacceptable, the Soviets were prepared to discuss U.S. concerns. But a process of specific discussion had to begin.

Shevardnadze said that while the Soviets wanted to understand U.S. objections to their verification proposals, it was also important to decide what would be the numerical limits. Sooner or later, this must be done. If possible, an agreed limit could be reflected in the joint statement from this ministerial. The Soviets proposed an upper limit of 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs and 600 non-nuclear SLCMs. What did the U.S. have to say? Would the questions be shelved for good or was the U.S. side ready to discuss the question of numerical limits?

Secretary Shultz replied that the U.S. did not have any doubt that SLCMs were important and we were prepared to discuss the subject. Our feeling was that it was very difficult to verify satisfactorily whatever limits might be agreed. The Soviet side has been very energetic and creative. We had examined every proposal and discussed each one with the Soviet side, and we had tried to devise things we might ourselves propose. But we had found the process very frustrating.

The Secretary explained that our problems with SLCMs could be divided into two categories: approaches we did not believe would do the job; and approaches that might do the job but would be so intrusive as to reconfigure our navy and constrain the way our navy operates. This would not be verification, but a change in naval operations. At this point, the Secretary explained, the navy had told him that it did not see a way to solve the SLCM verification problem. We had proposed, as a way of recognizing the verification problem, that the sides make unilateral declarations. We admitted that this approach could not be verified. Rather, each country would declare the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs it intended to deploy; if it became necessary to change the number, a side could do so. If this approach were acceptable to the Soviets, we would name a number.

The Secretary added, in this regard, that we could not accept limits on conventional SLCMs as the Soviets had proposed. We had a fundamental principle that START deals only with nuclear arms. We had made a distinction in our ALCM proposal. As for the Soviet-proposed figure for nuclear-armed SLCMs, our unilaterally-declared figure—if we were to agree on a declaratory approach—would be much higher than 400.

Shevardnadze rejoined that SLCMs were a part of the overall agreement. He thought the question would have to be resolved; it went back to Reykjavik, where it was decided that SLCMs had to be settled. Discussing whether there was to be a solution was pointless. The Soviets could agree, however, that limiting SLCMs was difficult. The Soviets had been looking at various ideas and they knew the U.S. had been looking at some ideas as well. They continued to believe their devices for verifying SLCMs, while not taking care of the whole problem, could serve as a subsidiary element in a verification scheme. In any case, while we might not be able to solve the problem at this meeting, we should agree to proceed step-by-step, starting with agreement on a number even if we do not have agreement on the verification arrangements. We should proceed with joint experiments on verification, but in the meantime agree on a numerical limit as a first step.

The Secretary said he would like to try to rearrange Shevardnadze’s proposal. Recognizing that the SLCM problem had been on the agenda since Reykjavik and that it involved an important class of weapons, the way to proceed should be to start with unilateral declarations. If this were acceptable, then the U.S. could go back and review its thinking and provide a number, while continuing to work on verification. The Secretary added that we recognized that the declaratory approach was not fully satisfactory to either side. Some in the U.S. would criticize the lack of measures to verify Soviet compliance, whereas U.S. compliance would be ensured by the fact that Congress would be looking down our throats. Thus we were not offering the declaratory approach as an ideal solution. Nonetheless, we believed that problems like this “yield to the weight of continued insistence.” We would say to our Navy: You’ve got to resolve this problem; get a fresh batch of Admirals and keep looking; tell us how many new ideas you have looked at in the last month (since they do think of things after a while).

Recapitulating, the Secretary said he was not advocating the declaratory approach, since he accepted it was unsatisfactory. But the Minister was asking for a way to get started. Having heard the CNO and CJCS hold forth on the subject of SLCMs, we were not likely ever to have anything that represented a satisfactory verification regime. Our approach was a way of starting to surround the problem and keep the pressure on it. Shevardnadze had said we should start with the number; in our view, the number had to be fit into something.

Shevardnadze replied that it appeared that it would be very difficult to move forward on SLCMs, as well as on other questions. This was because the U.S. did not seem to have decided the basic questions of verification. Why had we been able to agree on INF? Because we moved boldly on verification with on-site inspection, challenge inspection, suspect-site verification and the like. On SLCMs we were in a kind of impasse because, the U.S. claimed, its naval people did not want to be verified by another country. This applied to the U.S. air force as well. For this reason, Shevardnadze explained, he did not really emphasize SLCM verification: he knew the U.S. was not disposed to allow inspections of its navy, and therefore he thought we could achieve small progress by giving the delegations the boost provided by an agreed number.

General Powell commented that the Secretary’s proposal was a bold one. We were ready to provide the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs we would have. Verification would be brought to you by the U.S. Congress. Just as the Soviets knew our inventory now, so they would be able to get all the information they might need from our Congress. This would not require any of the intrusive on-site inspection that was such a problem for our navy. The Soviet side, for its part, would have the option to build its own required number of SLCMs.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the U.S. was more vulnerable to Soviet SLCMs than vice versa, with so many major cities on our coasts. He urged that Shevardnadze look seriously at the declaratory approach; this was not an inconsequential matter.

Shevardnadze said that if the U.S. could agree to record a numerical limit for SLCMs, this could be reflected in the joint statement. Why have separate unilateral statements when we could record a mutual number (300, 400, 500) in the joint statement?

The Secretary said we had no problem with an equal upper level. But we had to start with the concept that it was in the form of a declaration—a voluntary piece of information, with both sides saying they will have no more than “X” SLCMs. Shevardnadze asked whether this meant no more than a certain level. The Secretary replied that each side would have the right to change its number if circumstances warranted (although he had no doubt that the U.S. would pick a “safe” number at the outset).

Shevardnadze replied that this was not acceptable. The Secretary said he had gone back to the declaratory approach because Shevardnadze had argued that we should at least get started on addressing SLCMs. Even if our idea was not satisfactory—or perhaps because it was not satisfactory—it would, once adopted, put pressure on our people to exercise more creativity. Shevardnadze said, all right, let us have our experts give it another try.

HEAVY BOMBERS/ALCMS

Shevardnadze said the sides should try to find a compromise on heavy bombers and their armaments, as well as on mobile ICBMs and verification. These were items where the delegations could, in short order, draft language for inclusion in the draft Treaty. On ALCMs, he would not run through those provisions already recorded at the Summits. The Soviet position was that:

—All heavy bombers regardless of armament should be counted in the 1600 ceiling.

—For each type of heavy bomber, the maximum number of accountable ALCMs should be determined.

—Short-range missiles and gravity bombs count as one in the 6000 warhead limit.

—Non-nuclear ALCMs are not counted.

—There will be separate basing for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear warheads and those not so equipped.

—Verification of baseline data will be by both NTM and on-site inspection.

Karpov interjected that these were the main elements, without all the details.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to say a few words about the range criterion and the counting of ALCMs on various types of bombers. The Soviets believed the U.S. should modify its position. Soviet arguments against revision of the agreed 600-km range criterion were well known. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation in Geneva, in insisting on revising this threshold, had not even supplied arguments in support of this change.

Shevardnadze also wanted to call attention to the U.S. delegation’s negative approach to the question of counting ALCMs on various types of heavy bombers. Whereas it stated in the summit joint statement that agreement should be reached on counting rules for each type of heavy bomber—i.e. a different number for each type—the U.S. continued to propose the artificial number 10 for all heavy bombers. This would put the USSR in an unequal position. The Soviet proposal for a 600-km range cut-off and for counting the maximum number of ALCMs on each type of heavy bomber has been set forth in detail in Geneva.

Finally, Shevardnadze said, he wanted to raise the question of inspections. This was also of fundamental importance. The Soviets believed there should be inspections of heavy bomber bases. After entry-into-force of the Treaty, but before implementation began, the Soviets proposed that all types of heavy bombers should be shown to the other side (those equipped for ALCMs, those equipped for short-range missiles and gravity bombs, and those not equipped with nuclear missiles). Such a demonstration would help both sides to distinguish (based on functionally-related observable differences) those types of heavy bomber from one another, and to help demonstrate that ALCM carriers cannot carry a greater number of ALCMs than agreed.

The Secretary replied that this might be a promising area. There had been some activity on the U.S. side and it would seem some progress could be made. We too would like to see this issue resolved, along with verification and mobiles. Rather than commenting on all aspects of Shevardnadze’s presentation, he wanted to focus on the question of how to account for the number of ALCMs.

The Secretary recalled that the sides were now agreed on attributing numbers to bombers. The U.S. proposal, he said, was to attribute 10 to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs; these would be distinguishable from non-ALCM-equipped bombers. This number would mean that a B–52 equipped for ALCMs would count just as much as an SS–18, despite the big differences between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. We believed that, in this light, the Soviets should understand why a number like 10 is appropriate.

The Secretary noted that in Geneva, the Soviet side had suggested the possibility of attributing different numbers to different bomber types because their capacities were demonstrably different. The U.S. side was prepared to consider a proposal attributing different numbers to different types so long as the maximum number was no more than 10. Some would count as 10, some at a lower number.

Shevardnadze asked whether some would count at a number greater than 10. The Secretary said the Soviet side had also raised the question of equipping heavy bombers with huge numbers of ALCMs—multiples of 10. We had no plans to do this. We had put forward in Geneva a ban on conversion of aircraft other than heavy bombers into heavy bombers. This, the Secretary said, should help resolve any concern the Soviet side might have about the possibility of converting large aircraft to carry large numbers of ALCMs. We were prepared to find other forms of assurance.

Summing up, the Secretary outlined the following package:

• Attribute 10 ALCMs to existing heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs

• Attribute 10 ALCMs to future bomber types unless the sides agree otherwise

• No 1100 sublimit on ALCMs and bomber weapons

• No limits on ALCM inventories

• No conversion to heavy bombers of aircraft constructed for other purposes.

Under this approach, we would be ready to:

• Consider a proposal to attribute a number smaller than 10 to specific types of existing heavy bombers

• Consider a range cut-off somewhat lower than 1500 km (a figure which he knew bothered Shevardnadze; Shevardnadze replied: “Yes it does”).

• Work with the USSR on ways to meet concerns about very large numbers of ALCMs on future bombers.

This was an effort to come to grips with proposals the Soviet side had made, the Secretary concluded. They reflected quite a lot of give, and we hoped we could get somewhere on this basis.

Shevardnadze said he had one question. What was the U.S. attitude on inspections to check heavy bomber types? The U.S. had proposed a figure of 10, but there were other numbers possible, such as 22 or 28. The Soviets understood a compromise was needed, but they would need to have a look at the heavy bombers.

The Secretary replied that, if the Soviets agreed to the U.S. approach, the sides would assume that each distinguishable type of heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs would count as 10. The only verification needed would be to confirm the bomber type. The actual weapons load might be more or less than 10. But we were prepared to work so that there could be no extravagant number of ALCMs on a heavy bomber. We had no thought of deploying numbers like 60 or 70 which the Soviet delegation had cited. The Secretary added that we were not opposed to on-site inspection—we were doing a lot of it under the INF Treaty. But this was not something either side necessarily relished. Therefore, if there were ways to resolve issues without OSI, this would be better.

Shevardnadze said the problems of verification were really not so terrible as far as bombers were concerned. After all, Secretary of Defense Carlucci had been in the cockpit of the most modern Soviet plane. The Secretary said he had flown on a B–1 and it had scared the daylights out of him. Shevardnadze suggested that the experts look into the new U.S. proposals.

MOBILE ICBMs

Shevardnadze said he thought it was quite possible to take a decision on mobile ICBMs. What was needed was to reach complete agreement on verification. He said the Soviets were prepared to agree to a figure of 100 square kilometers for the restricted area for road-mobiles. This could be recorded in the data MOU. The U.S. side, he noted, had also said it was interested in reaching agreement on tagging mobile ICBMs. In the spirit of this proposal, the Soviets believed agreement should be reached on a system of registration: for all missiles built after entry-into-force, the mobile launchers and associated missiles would be registered. The same registration would also apply to SLBMs, ALCMs and SLCMs.

Shevardnadze said another area where a mutually acceptable position could be found would be to establish sublimits of 800 mobile ICBM launchers and 1600 warheads on such launchers. If the U.S. was not ready to accept these numbers, the Soviets would like to hear a figure that would be acceptable.

The Secretary recalled that mobile ICBM verification was another area in which the two sides had made real progress in Moscow. Agreement had been reached on a large number of elements of common ground. Last week, Ambassador Hanmer had described in Geneva some new proposals which took into account Soviet ideas. In light of the discussions in Moscow and Geneva, the Secretary said, we had also developed some language reflecting further thoughts on mobile ICBM verification and suspect-site inspections. Once we had agreed on verification, we would be prepared to reconsider our proposal to ban mobile ICBMs and to table a number for mobile ICBM warheads. The Secretary added that we thought this number would need to be much lower than the Soviet-proposed 1600.

The Secretary concluded that we had a lot of material for the working group to work on, and it would perhaps be possible to get far enough on mobiles and ALCMs to wrap these up during these talks. If so, it would be very welcome. Shevardnadze suggested that the ministers perhaps give stricter instructions: that the working groups should make substantial progress on mobiles and ALCMs. What the Secretary had said gave him hope. Let us see what the working groups can do in terms of agreements that can be reported to ministers the following afternoon.

ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT

Secretary Shultz said it would be good to wrap up the question of an ICBM warhead sublimit. He recalled Marshal Akhromeyev’s statement that the USSR did not intend to deploy more than 3300 ICBM warheads. Our problem was with heavy missiles, the most destructive and destabilizing ones in the Soviet arsenal. The U.S. proposals would ban new types, modernization and flight-testing of heavy ICBMs. The problem was that the Soviet Union possessed such heavy missiles, but the U.S. did not. One way to solve this problem was to gradually phase them out. If the Soviet side objected to banning flight-testing, the outcome would be one-sided. We would prefer to phase them out, and the technological trends favor that. We were willing, the Secretary said, to consider other outcomes, but not to grant the Soviet Union a permanent monopoly. And we would rather not have heavies ourselves, although that would be one option for us if we needed it.

Shevardnadze said he did not think the Soviet side was prepared to discuss banning modernization. The right approach was to concentrate on sublimits. There were two options here, and the figures were already known to both sides. Within the total of 4900 warheads on ballistic missiles, the sublimit on ICBMs would be 3300, but there would also be a sublimit on SLBMs. If that was not acceptable, the Soviet side would be ready to accept another solution: each side would be free to determine the composition of its warhead mix. This was not new, but the Soviet side had looked at the possibilities. Shevardnadze added that he would like to reach agreement on this soon, even before leaving Washington.

Secretary Shultz observed that ICBMs and SLBMs were very different, and noted that we had been around the circle many times on this question; he did not propose to go around it again.

Shevardnadze said the two sides should also finish up their work on exchange of data. The exchange of baseline data was very important, and should apply to all strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty: ICBMs, heavy bombers, SLBMs, and SLCMs. He suggested that the pace of work on exchange of data be accelerated because of its importance.

The Secretary noted that both sides had already submitted some data. He said he basically agreed with the Foreign Minister that we should proceed with an exchange of data.

SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

Shevardnadze suggested that the working groups be instructed to accelerate their work on this. There was also another issue on which the Foreign Minister recalled he had written a letter, namely that of an agreement on limiting the numbers of warheads on existing missiles. He said it would be possible to exchange letters on this at the present meeting, thus producing a substantive result.

Secretary Shultz recalled Ambassador Dubinin’s having brought the proposal to his attention on September 19th.³ He said the U.S. side had studied it carefully and aggressively, and agreed that breaking elements out of the START agreement would be possible, but we had a number of questions and some additional points to make on the subject. On-site-inspection was a very big undertaking in START, and there was a lot of language that went with the concept. We would have to see how it came out in the working group. Shevardnadze agreed with this approach.

The Secretary added that the problem of the Krasnoyarsk radar intersected with our willingness to do anything in the area of strategic arms. We would have to see that resolved. Shevardnadze agreed that the discussion should continue in the working group. But he thought something should be possible, since there were already thousands of warheads and their numbers should not be increased. Shevardnadze said he had understood that questions would be raised about his proposal. Still, he thought it would be good if we could conclude something. The Secretary told Shevardnadze we had found the suggestion constructive and were studying it in that spirit.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Shevardnadze observed that the Nuclear Testing Talks⁴ seemed to be going well. The Joint Verification Experiments had gone well and were truly unique. The degree of understanding and cooperation achieved by the agencies and scientists of the two sides was impressive. It was very important, however, not to lose momentum. Also, it was important to assess the results of the experiments and to agree, finally, on the verification protocols. Shevardnadze emphasized that it was important to finish the drafting of the new single verification protocol for the 1976 PNE Treaty during the third round of the NTT now in progress, and to submit it for ratification by the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress before the term of President Reagan expired. Shevardnadze said it would be good if the two ministers could review the results of the work, and possibly sign the documents in the concluding moments of the Vienna CSCE Ministerial. Overall, things were going well.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed that things were moving well in nuclear testing. He thought it should be possible to complete promptly the protocols. President Reagan would like very much to send them for ratification, and was anxious to do so. We were close to completing the PNET protocol, and should now try to resolve remaining issues. One of those was the question of on-site activities. We had proposed that they be possible at the 25 kiloton level. The Soviet side had proposed on-site activities at any level. We thought 25 kilotons was a good level and that this was an important issue to resolve. The Secretary thought the nuclear testing people had done an eminently good job, and mused that if anyone had suggested even two years ago that the Joint Verification Experiments would happen, both he and Shevardnadze would have dismissed it out of hand.

Shevardnadze suggested saying something to support the continuity of negotiations. Secretary Shultz countered by saying he wanted the talks on the testing treaties completed.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Shevardnadze said the thing to do with chemical weapons was to destroy them. Secretary Shultz agreed, saying he was all for that, and was more concerned every day, as a human being as well as an official, about the proliferation of chemical weapons. Now the weapons had actually been used. Everyone knew it. Iraq admitted it. We were faced with a dangerous situation, and wanted to work urgently with the Soviet side, the Secretary said. There was work to be done bilaterally and multilaterally at the Conference on Disarmament. The last round of talks was productive, he said, adding that the Soviet delegation had been cooperative.⁵ The key was to make progress on the outstanding issues. We were now into the details. The Secretary said we needed to see more openness on Soviet CW programs and information, on stockpiles. The proposal for visits to CW production facilities should be made concrete, the Secretary said.

The Secretary said he had noted the reference to chemical weapons in Shevardnadze’s speech, and had appreciated it very much. The United States would certainly do everything it could to stem the erosion of international constraints on use of CW. We felt we had to speak out against use of chemical weapons, and hoped others, including the Soviet Union, would do so as well. We were concerned by the evidence that Libya is on the verge of having a full-scale production capacity. Certainly the U.S. worried more about Qadhafi than did the Soviets, but these weapons lent themselves to use not only by states, but by terrorists. This was only one example of the proliferation problem.

The President, the Secretary continued, was very upset by this issue. He planned to make a proposal addressing the problem in his speech at the U.N. on Monday.⁶ The Secretary wanted to inform the Minister of this ahead of time in hopes that he would think about it and support it. The proposal called for convening a conference of the signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other concerned parties, to consider actions they might take to reverse the erosion of the 1925 Treaty. The United States thought this was necessary to strengthen the world norm against CW use. The President’s initiative would not interfere with the efforts in Geneva to negotiate a global ban on CW; rather, it should give an impetus to those efforts. The Secretary noted that there would be a meeting of the Permanent Five Foreign Ministers next week in New York, and thought the President’s initiative should be considered there along with other things that needed to be said on CW.

Secretary Shultz invited Shevardnadze to review with him the evidence of CW use by Iraq on the Kurds. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had acknowledged on July 1st that CW had been used in the war with Iran. As recently as September 15 the Iraqi Minister of Defense had said Iraq believed it had the right to defend itself however it chose—in direct contravention of the Geneva Protocol. Iraq was using this rationale to justify the use of these weapons. A U.N. investigator confirmed their use on March 28, at about the time of Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington, and the Secretary recalled seeing photographs of the carnage that had sickened everyone. There was an attack on Ashrafabad with mustard agents, and Kurdish refugees had testified to other attacks in late August. The eye-witness claims were uniform, even though they originated from different places. Reports had been received by doctors, journalists, and an American Embassy officer. Most of them spoke of quiet, air-dropped bombs that emit a yellow gas. There had been thousands of victims.

For the Minister’s private information, the Secretary added, the U.S. has been able to confirm by national technical means that there has been CW use. The Secretary had personally reviewed the evidence and found it very, very convincing. He added that when the United States had condemned Iraq’s use of CW, it was certainly not to disrupt relations with Baghdad, but because we felt so strongly that the CW problem was getting out of hand. We have had complaints from certain friends in the Arab world who seemed to think we were trying to make up to Iran, but there is nothing to that. CW was an overriding problem that had a big head of steam behind it. The Secretary added that he did not want this information to get into the public domain, especially until the President had made his proposal.

The Secretary asked General Powell if there was anything else. General Powell said there was not.

Shevardnadze said he shared fully the Secretary’s concern. The danger was indeed great, and the possibilities of proliferation were limitless. Many countries now had the ability to produce chemical weapons. Shevardnadze did not know about Libya, but he did see proliferation of CW as a problem and thought the scope could become serious. Frankly, he thought the world had wasted much time: the problem would have been easier to solve fifteen years ago. Still, it was not too late. If we wanted to end the danger, we needed only to conclude our work on a CW ban. Why were chemical arms being used? Because there was no strong mechanism to prevent their use. The world needed a mechanism that facilitated the inspection of any facility that could produce chemical weapons. To recall the 1925 Protocol was not enough. Much depended on the U.S. and the USSR. Recently we had been cooperating quite well. There was good movement at the Conference on Disarmament, where our positions were now much closer. Shevardnadze said he had some suggestions as to how we might move forward.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet side welcomed the fact that the United States had, last July, publicized the locations of its CW facilities. The USSR favored the principle of reciprocity and stood for openness. If the U.S. would make public the volume of its reserves of CW, the USSR would be able to make available data on its facilities, including their location, and to agree on an exchange of visits to CW facilities, Shevardnadze said. CW production in the USSR had been halted, so this step would have the purpose of accelerating progress on the convention. In addition, Shevardnadze said, the Soviet side would like to publicize the location of its storage facilities if the U.S. would declare locations of its storage facilities outside U.S. national territory. The Soviet side assumed U.S. allies would agree to this inasmuch as they had been actively pushing for a CW ban.

Shevardnadze went on to say that though we had a joint document on CW and CW production facilities, before signing a convention there was the question of the timing of a second stage of data exchanges and verification of the data submitted. The Soviet side wanted to make a compromise proposal for an exchange of views to take place right before approval of the convention by the CD (initialing of the text of the convention). As for the arrangements for verification of the data exchange, we needed a system based on updated and precise data that each side has presented. Unlimited verification should not take place without a convention. The Soviet side had other specific proposals that would be explained in the working group. In order to make decisive progress in the multilateral talks, it would be necessary to solve the question of commercial industries.

Shevardnadze also wanted the Secretary to know that the Soviet side had decided not to prohibit laboratory synthesis, for scientific purposes, of small quantities of supertoxic lethal agents that have the properties of military agents or are on List #1 of key precursors. This had been the subject of differences in the past, but the Soviet side had decided to give its permission for the parties to allow synthesis of substances on List #1, contingent on there being a very strong ban on CW production in commercial enterprises. As for a national experiment for procedures for verification, we’ve reached agreement on that. We would name the facility to be used. We wanted to verify production of key precursors. He wanted to lay this out. The Soviets’ new proposals would enable us to move forward quickly.

Shevardnadze added that he had no information on Iraqi use of chemical weapons, but thought there was probably something to it, and that alarm was indeed justified. Some armed groups in Afghanistan had chemical weapons in their possession. Terrorists might have them. The world needed a strong convention and an effective method of verification. It would be good to have the experts look at these proposals and report to ministers on what was possible. For this Washington meeting, it would be good if in the joint statement the two sides could record strong language on CW with specific proposals and understandings.

Secretary Shultz suggested asking the Joint Statement team to work on that, and noted that the working group would have a lot to work with. He acknowledged that Shevardnadze had expended a lot of effort on this subject, and agreed to push hard to complete a treaty at Geneva. In the meantime, it was necessary to dramatize our determination to deal with the problem.

The Secretary recalled Vice President Bush’s speech to the CD in 1984, during which he had presented the U.S. draft CW treaty.⁷ The Vice President had followed the issue closely and would be interested in Shevardnadze’s views at the breakfast the following morning.⁸

Shevardnadze also remembered the Vice President’s statement, and said that if we acted in the spirit of that statement we would be able to complete job.

Secretary Shultz suggested starting with regional issues the following morning (September 23).

BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Shevardnadze said there was still one arms control problem to discuss, namely, that of missile technology. He suggested that it be treated in the working group, as it would be good to have preliminary discussions prior to the meetings scheduled for September 26.⁹

Secretary Shultz confirmed with Ambassador Karpov that he would be meeting with Ambassador Holmes the following Monday.¹⁰ He added that he had spoken to the Chinese about missile technology. The Chinese had gradually been taking an interest in the subject and might eventually be brought along. The Secretary said he had told the Chinese it was ironic that just as the Americans and the Soviets were eliminating missiles in the intermediate-range category, the Chinese were producing and selling them to others. He said the U.S. looked forward to the discussions.

Shevardnadze noted that missile technology was no less a danger than chemical weapons. Some of the Israelis’ neighbors—he would not name names—had acquired such weapons, and the Israelis themselves had missiles that could even strike Soviet territory, not to speak of Arab lands.

The Secretary quipped that in the Middle East he never threw a lighted match on the table.

The Secretary asked if we had received the two extra names for the Blair House dinner, and was assured that we had. As for the breakfast with the Vice President, the Secretary explained that it was intended as a free-wheeling, private, informal discussion of the future, to which the Minister was invited to bring one colleague and an interpreter. Did he intend to bring anyone?

Shevardnadze said he would like to bring Bessmertnykh, with whom he figured he had a relationship characterized by trust.

The Secretary said he would see the group at Blair House at eight o’clock.¹¹

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and Evans; cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for both Evans and Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State.
2. See Document 167.
3. Not further identified.
4. Reference is to the third round of the Nuclear Testing Talks, which began in Geneva on August 29.
5. The Conference on Disarmament met in Geneva July 7–September 20 for its second session of the year.
6. Reagan addressed the United Nations General Assembly on September 26. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1988, Book II, pp. 1219–1226)
7. For Bush’s April 18, 1984, speech before the Conference on Disarmament, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1984, pp. 40–43.
8. See footnote 2, Document 170.
9. See Document 175.
10. September 26.
11. See Document 174.