Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

178. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 10, 1987

SUBJECT

• START Instructions on Mobile ICBMs

I believe our ICBM modernization program and arms control positions should be mutually supportive. You have just made an important decision² to proceed with full-scale development of mobiles, and you have just submitted to Congress a budget that includes funding for deployment of Peacekeeper and the small ICBM, both in mobile modes. We should ensure that these programs, which are crucial to a survivable land-based ICBM component of our deterrent forces, with or without an arms control agreement, are adequately funded and enjoy support from the America people. We should move now to establish an arms control position consistent with our modernization plans. Continuing to propose a ban would put our arms control position in conflict with our efforts to ensure a survivable deterrent.

I have discussed this matter with Ron Lehman and differ with his views. Ron argues that now is not the time to decide this issue. He says that if we change our position on mobiles, it will be an unwarranted concession to the Soviets; if we consider a change and do not make it, we will be seen as not serious about arms control.

I believe now is the time to make a change because, having just announced our mobile ICBM programs, we are being looked to now by elements in Congress, the press, and our Allies to restore coherence between our modernization and arms control policies. Since they already expect a change, failing to consider one, as Ron suggests, would be more damaging than making one. In that case, both our arms control position and your modernization decision would be seen as not serious. And we would not be protected from a Soviet propaganda offensive simply because we chose not to consider bringing our arms control position in line with our plans; quite the contrary.

As for the other half of Ron’s argument, the way we propose to modify our position could hardly be considered a concession. To date, we have said we want to ban mobiles due to verification and stability concerns, and we have invited the Soviets to address those concerns. The proposed modification still requires the Soviets to satisfy those same concerns as a condition for allowing mobiles. If anything, it gives us added leverage in getting the Soviets to meet our concerns by providing them a reason to do so. More important than the effect on the Soviets, though, is that we present the coherent policy on mobiles necessary to get support for your programs of ensuring survivability of our land-based deterrent.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret.
2. NSDD–252, “ICBM Modernization,” which Reagan signed on December 24, 1986, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.