Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 6, 1983

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on START—Tuesday, June 7, 1983

Issue

To what degree should the US negotiation position on START be changed at this time in view of the Scowcroft Commission report and the Cohen-Nunn “mutual build-down” concept? With regard to the Scowcroft Commission, should the US retain, raise, or delete the current 850 limit on deployed missiles, and should we retain, alter, or drop indirect and/or direct limits on throw-weight? Concerning a build-down, what possible alternative options could be implemented or rejected now, which require further study, and what stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option can be developed?

Facts

The Administration needs to address the above issues prior to the resumption of the START negotiations on June 8 and prior to the MX-related Senate vote on the 1984 Authorization Bill during the week of June 13. Following the last NSC meeting on START, on May 7,² you indicated to the appropriate members of Congress that the Administration’s START position would reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission and would seek to develop a flexible approach to the “build-down” concept for START (letter at Tab H).³ Subsequently, the START Interdepartmental Group (IG) undertook an intensive work program on these issues and has produced two papers on Scowcroft Commission implications and options (Tab D)⁴ and on mutual build-down implications (Tab G).⁵

In addition to the IG’s work to be considered at the June 7 NSC meeting, the meeting will also provide an opportunity to hear directly from General Scowcroft (arms control recommendations at Tab E)⁶ and from the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee Arms Control and Disarmament, Dr. William Graham, who has forwarded a separate proposal for a START package (Tab F).⁷

Discussion

We believe the most useful means of framing the discussion of the Scowcroft Commission issues relating to the number of deployed missiles and the issue of direct or indirect limits on throw-weight, would be through a focus on the two charts on: (1) the Agenda and (2) alternative START “packages,” as briefed to you by NSC staff on June 1.

On the deployed missile number, the current 850 missile limit would permit the US to deploy MX and Trident missiles as planned and still field some 300 new small ICBMs or Midgetmen. We feel that it may be prudent to raise the 850 number at this time, but that we should probably not eliminate the number entirely at this time. A number remains an understandable counting and verification principle (although similar to SALT), offers some protection against direct limits on US bomber weapons, and may be necessary if, as is likely, we cannot agree now on the nature of a substitute approach focused entirely on warheads and direct throw-weight limits.

Concerning throw-weight, we believe further discussion and study are probably required before a major shift should be undertaken. In this regard, special consideration should also be given to verification and build-down factors.

Concerning build-down, we do not believe it is possible at this time to define any one or two clear options for our START position. However, the IG believes that, with a comprehensive IG work program currently underway, we will be in a position to brief appropriate members of Congress on possible alternative approaches before the August recess.

NSC Package

For your use at the NSC meeting and for background information, we have prepared the comprehensive package attached with the following items:

Tab A—Agenda;⁸

Tab B—My suggested Talking Points at the NSC meeting inviting discussion of the agenda issues; copies of two IG charts;⁹

Tab C—The Scowcroft Commission-related Talking Points that we provided for your information earlier for your June 1 briefing;¹⁰

Tab D—The IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues;

Tab E—GAC Chairman William Graham’s letter to you proposing a specific START package related to the Scowcroft Commission;

Tab F—The Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control;

Tab G—The IG paper on Mutual Build-Down;

Tab H—Your letter to Senators, Cohen, Nunn, and Percy on a build-down; and

Tab I—The proposed draft text of a START treaty, to be updated on the basis of decisions to be made.¹¹

Following the NSC meeting in the morning, you are scheduled to have consultations with appropriate Senate and House members later, in the afternoon, to be followed by a meeting the next morning with the Congressional leadership. Based on the NSC meeting discussion, we will prepare recommendations and alternative decision memoranda for your consideration prior to your meeting with the leadership.

Recommendation

OK	NO
_________	_________	That you review the attached package, particularly the summary Talking Points and charts for the NSC meeting at Tab B, the comprehensive Talking Points prepared for your June 1 briefing by NSC staff at Tab C, and the START IG papers on Scowcroft Commission at Tab D and on the “Build-Down” at Tab G.12
_________	_________	That you not announce any decisions at the NSC meeting, pending consideration of the afternoon’s Congressional consultations and of alternative decision directives to be prepared by NSC staff.13

Attachment

Letter From the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (Graham) to President Reagan¹⁴

Washington, May 26, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

For several months, the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament has been analyzing the arms control implications of the U.S. strategic modernization program. We have met several times with ACDA Director Adelman; the Chairman of your Commission on Strategic Forces, General Scowcroft; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey; the Vice President; and with other knowledgeable persons both in and out of government. Their views have been invaluable, and while the following opinions and recommendations are those of the General Advisory Committee, we would like to acknowledge the counsel provided by these persons.

For more than a decade, the U.S. has deliberately avoided deploying any ICBM system that would severely threaten Soviet land-based ICBMs, even though such systems were well within our ability to develop. This restraint was exercised in the hope that the Soviet Union would conduct its missile system development activities with equal restraint.

Unfortunately, our unilateral restraint has not been reciprocated. Because of the central role ICBMs have in our strategic policy, the greatest threat to strategic nuclear stability today is the increasing vulnerability of this leg of the triad. This vulnerability has come about not through some inevitable process, but through deliberate, long-term, large-scale Soviet efforts to threaten the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force.

As you have so clearly stated, it would be both irresponsible and dangerous to world peace for the U.S. to further delay responding to this threat.

The recommendations of your Commission on Strategic Forces have major implications for arms control. It is the consensus of your General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, itself a bipartisan body, that the Commission’s arms control recommendations be vigorously pursued. To support and add specificity to your Commission’s recommendations, we suggest that the following be incorporated in our START position.

U.S. START Position

Combine Phase I and Phase II;

Retain the limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads and the 2,500 sublimit on ICBM warheads;

Limit both sides to 1.9 million kilograms of ballistic missile throwweight and a .5 million kilogram sublimit on MIRVed ICBM throwweight;

Limit future ballistic missile warheads to approximately 300 kilograms per warhead (payload) weight;

Bombers should be treated separately; limits on bombers and ALCMs should take into account Soviet air defenses.

1. Retain the 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit. This unit of account and level, when combined with a throw-weight limit, moves both sides toward greater strategic nuclear stability while preserving flexibility for structuring forces.

2. Eliminate the 850 limit on deployed missiles and seek a phased build-down, over a specified period of time, to direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight at 1.9 million kilograms. A direct limit on throwweight is paramount to a sound START agreement. In contrast to limits on deployed missiles or launchers, throwweight limits would move both sides away from less stabilizing deployments of large MIRVed missiles toward more stabilizing deployments of small single warhead missiles. Throwweight remains the key indicator of strategic missile capability and strategic missile potential. As U.S. and Soviet technologies converge, a Soviet throwweight advantage would permit the Soviets to deploy accurate warheads with greater destructive capability than U.S. warheads.

Direct limits on throwweight would also limit Soviet breakout potential, that is, the ability to deploy more warheads clandestinely or following abrogation of an agreement. The 1.9 million kilogram limit would be based on the decision to combine the two phases of START; this level provides negotiating flexibility for seeking this major reduction in throwweight. Finally, a throwweight limit would permit dropping the collateral constraints on Soviet heavy and medium ICBMs, thereby simplifying our approach.

3. Direct limits on throwweight should be accompanied by seeking direct limits on future warhead weight or payload. Such payload limits would prevent the Soviets from deploying missiles having a relatively large amount of throwweight with a relatively small warhead, which could give them a substantial breakout capability with such deployed missiles.

4. A sublimit on MIRVed ICBM throwweight at .5 million kilograms should be sought in order to limit these most destabilizing Soviet weapons as we make the transition from MIRVed missiles to less lucrative targets, single warhead missiles. Such a limit would encourage a transition to smaller missiles as both sides’ forces are reduced.

5. The sublimit of 2,500 ICBM warheads should be retained as this limit makes the important distinction between ICBM and SLBM warheads. It would also aid in the transition to lower warhead levels, and it would bound the Soviet ICBM threat to U.S. ICBMs. In addition, it would limit Soviet counterforce potential, when combined with the throwweight limits.

6. Limit both sides to a 20 per cent margin above the throwweight limit to cover logistics, flight test missiles, and maintenance requirements. This should be the U.S. internal position.

7. Bombers should continue to be treated separately from ballistic missiles. There should be no bomber equivalent payload aggregated in a missile throwweight ceiling. The aggregation of bombers and ballistic missiles would blur the important distinction between first-strike weapons (Soviet ICBMs) and second-strike retaliatory weapons (U.S. bombers).

8. Numerical limits on bombers and ALCMs should be addressed in the context of limits on Soviet air defenses. The Soviets have the most extensive air defense system in the world while the U.S. has minimal air defenses. U.S. bombers and cruise missiles that survive a Soviet attack must be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses. Limits on U.S. bombers and air-launched cruise missiles without corresponding limits on Soviet air defenses would reduce the effectiveness of our bomber force in an inequitable manner.

The General Advisory Committee believes this package of limitations would meet our objectives of seeking deep reductions in strategic forces, equality in capabilities, and greater strategic stability. These limits could be verified with appropriate cooperative measures. And this package preserves flexibility for both sides to design future strategic programs within these constraints. We hope you find this useful in your deliberations concerning the arms control aspects of the strategic modernization program and START.

Respectfully yours,

William R. Graham
Chairman

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–103, NSC 00081 07Jun1983. Secret. Copied to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.
2. Apparent reference to NSC meeting on May 10. See Document 66.
3. Attached but not printed, at Tab H, is Reagan’s letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy.
4. Attached but not printed, at Tab D, is the IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues.
5. Attached but not printed, at Tab G, is the IG paper on Mutual Build-Down.
6. Apparent reference to Tab F. Attached but not printed, at Tab F, is the Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control.
7. Apparent reference to Tab E.
8. Attached but not printed, at Tab A, is the agenda.
9. Attached but not printed, at Tab B, are suggested talking points and copies of two IG charts.
10. Attached but not printed, at Tab C, are Scowcroft-related Talking Points.
11. Attached but not printed, at Tab I, is a proposed draft text of a START treaty.
12. Reagan did not indicate a preference.
13. Reagan did not indicate a preference.
14. Secret.