85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Trade-Offs in START
I recommend we quickly follow up Vice President Bush’s meeting with Chernenko2 through further high-level discussions on START.
The purpose of such discussions should be to inform the Soviets that we are prepared to discuss alternative approaches to trade-offs at resumed START negotiations in Geneva. We should indicate to them that these approaches are based on codifying asymmetrical and off-setting limits between US and Soviet forces. Further, and more specifically, we should state that we are prepared to trade off limits on ALCMs [Page 301] we could deploy for limits on the destructive capability of Soviet ballistic missiles. The concept of trade-offs will appeal to the Soviets because of its simplicity and because it meets many of their concerns. I believe their failure to engage in a serious discussion of trade-offs at the last START round was related to their tactic of responding to INF deployments and did not reflect a disinterest in trade-offs.
Recent interagency work in Washington has focused on changes to the “framework” of the US position. This is a US fixation, based on the erroneous theory that the Soviets are more concerned about the framework of an agreement than the forces themselves. The Soviets are realists. We should deal in trade-offs and let the framework accommodate trade-offs and not vice versa.
The three specific approaches I would like to explore with the Soviets, summarized below, are described in greater detail in the attached memo.3
Approach I maintains the principal features of the current US position: reductions to 5000 warheads and separate limits on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Tradeoffs are accomplished by allowing the US more ALCM-carrying bombers and the Soviets more throw-weight.
Approach II combines one element of the Soviet position: an implicit ceiling of 1800 delivery vehicles, and one element of the US position; a separate ceiling of ballistic missile RVs—set at 6000. In contrast to the Soviet approach, however, ballistic missiles and heavy bombers would continue to be limited separately, with the US being allowed more of the latter and the Soviets more of the former. Trade-offs would be accomplished through a combined subceiling of 200 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs, which would result in offsetting asymmetries in these systems.
Approach III is similar to Approach II, except that aggregation of the 1800 delivery vehicles would be allowed. As in Approach II, trade-offs would be accomplished through a combined subceiling of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs.
From a negotiating point of view there is considerable merit in initially presenting only Approach I, since it is consistent with our current position. Therefore, in contacts with the Soviets prior to resuming negotiations I recommend that we present Approach I as an illustrative example of how the concept of trade-offs might be applied to the US position. However, in order to draw the Soviets into a dialogue on trade-offs, we will also need to make it clear that we understand their problems with our present position and are prepared to move forward [Page 302] provided the Soviets are prepared to move with regard to our concerns. If the Soviets say they could not accept the deep reductions of Approach I, I would explore Approaches II and III with them, but, of course, again, only after evidence that they would move toward us.
The Soviets have said that P–II and GLCM have strategic significance for them. A major question—which cannot be answered definitely until we discuss the matter with the Soviets—is whether they will be attracted to trade-offs made purely within the START context, without some solution to the INF problem. The Soviets will most likely strive to incorporate P–II and GLCM into START as a result of their reassessment. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that attempting to introduce INF issues into START would pose some tricky problems for them. It is possible that drawing them into a substantive discussion of START tradeoffs could actually preempt possible Soviet moves to fold INF issues into START.
There is increasing talk around town about appointing a special emissary to open up a dialogue with the Soviets. I think bringing in someone from outside the established framework would be shortsighted and would hurt us in the long-run. The Soviets will come back to the negotiating table when they calculate it is in their interest to do so and not simply because of a dialogue in a new channel.
I would appreciate discussing this matter with you at an early date.
- Source: Department of State, S/S–I Files: Lot 92D52, Box 9, 1984 Super Sensitive [CHRON]. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Dam and Adelman. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Shultz wrote a note that he affixed to the memorandum: “Jon Howe, Rick Burt, I would like to discuss this—with you two + Larry,—then with ER. G.” (Ibid.)↩
- Reference is to Bush’s February 15 meeting with Chernenko at Andropov’s funeral. A memorandum of conversation for this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.↩
- Attached but not printed is Rowny’s February 17 memorandum elaborating on his three proposals.↩