Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

235. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Foreign Secretary Pym¹

May 6, 1982, 9:28 a.m.

H: How are you this morning?

P: I am okay. How are you?

H: All right. I just called to touch base with you briefly. I talked to Nicko.² We got, as I anticipated, a turndown from Galtieri.

P: I see, you have.

H: He said he has moved it to the UN and that is it.

P: It looked like that this morning.

H: Yes. You know clearly what the efforts are going to be there. A ceasefire period.

P: Yes.

H: Of course, we cannot accept and I have instructed our ambassador that the basic premises of their work must be withdrawal and ceasefire simultaneously.

P: That was in the Secretary General’s proposal which he put to me.³

H: You better read that very carefully.

P: Okay.

H: It is sort of not exactly that, if you look at it carefully.

P: I will have a look at it but, of course, that is absolutely vital.

H: Of course.

P: Right. I absolutely agree, Al, about that.

H: In any event, I think you are not going to be totally negative.

P: No. I cannot afford to be. I think we are going to give a positive response. The part you and I were working on was virtually the same framework with the necessary terms added.

H: Yes. They are going to try for a quick and dirty to get it stopped, knowing you cannot start it up again and that is all they want to do.

P: We must obviously work together there, Al.

Haig intended to wait for a formal answer from Peru and then, if it was negative as he expected, decide how to publicise the British readiness to support this effort. ‘We will have to be sure,’ Henderson suggested, ‘that they do not pull their punches in attributing blame where it belongs for their breakdown.’” (Freedman, Official History, vol. II, p. 329) A British record of the meeting, as sent by Henderson to London, is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

Presumably a reference to Pérez de Cuéllar’s May 2 proposals. See footnote 2, Document 215.

H: Yes and I wanted you to know I talked with Belaunde a few minutes ago.⁴ They are going to have to learn what we have learned in three weeks. That is fine. We are going to cool it here.

P: When are you going to make it public?

H: I don’t think it is a good idea to do that. It is not really as good as the first proposal.

P: The one they have just rejected. You don’t intend to make it public?

H: No.

P: Do you mind if I do?

H: I assumed that you would.

P: You don’t mind?

H: Not at all.

P: It seems to me it would be helpful here and indeed with some of our overseas friends to indicate what it was we were prepared to do. I think it would help us.

H: You go ahead. I think it is not good for us to do it.

P: No. You don’t mind if I do?

H: No.

P: Look at it from our point of view. I think it would help.

H: Yes, remembering it was not as forthcoming as the other.

P: No, not from their point of view.

H: No.

P: I think it is probably helpful to get something out. I might do it later today.⁵

H: All right. We will stay in touch.

P: How do you see things now? Is it inevitable the UN has to get going? There is no further line you can take in the meantime?

H: I think ultimately, for the reasons that you know, that it will have to come back here because I don’t think the UN is going to find it any easier to solve the problem than we did.

P: Our worry is the time it takes discovering that.

H: I think it very important—I talked to Nicko and he will be in touch with you about the situation locally.

P: Apart from this, if you will not publicize the document that has been rejected, when will you say publicly that this latest proposal has been rejected?

H: We are afraid that . . . we are not singling out any particular approach. We have been pursuing every opportunity that could lead to a solution. It will sort of drift out.

P: Can I say the proposal that was put to the Argentines by Peru have been rejected, proposals which we would have accepted have been rejected?

H: Yes, I think so. Sure.

P: Okay.

END TELCON

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; Pym was in London.
2. No U.S. record of Haig’s exchange with Henderson has been found. The British Official History of the conflict states that Haig telephoned Henderson at 2300 hours, May 5, “saying that Argentina was no longer interested in the US/Peruvian plan but was now committed to the UN route. The Argentines considered that they were securing growing international support, for example from Ireland, and that the European Community was cracking. The sinking of the Sheffield had greatly emboldened them, with the result that they were now convinced that they would triumph militarily and politically.
4. See Document 234.
5. In telegram 10174 from London, May 7, the Embassy reported: “In Parliament May 7 Foreign Secretary Pym described the U.S./Peruvian proposals, said that they had been acceptable to HMG, but that Argentina had rejected them and was obstructing progress by asking for a ceasefire without a clear link to withdrawal of Argentine troops. Pym categorically rejected any ceasefire without a timetable for Argentine withdrawal.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820240–0696)