Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

226. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 20, 1984, 1706Z

3325. White House for Vice President Bush and National Security Council Director. Subject: AID Administrator Meeting with UN Secretary General—November 17, 1984.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: At a meeting between the UN Secretary General and the AID Administrator on November 17, the Secretary General agreed to convene a special pledging and coordination session on Ethiopia “within two weeks.”² The Secretary General also agreed to call a similar session in early January to focus on other drought-related emergencies in Africa. End summary.

3. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator, called on the UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, on November 17th to discuss the drought-related emergency in Ethiopia as well as the probability of similar emergencies breaking out in several other African countries. The UN Director General, Jean Ripert, attended the meeting as did Ambassador Alan Keyes of USUN.

4. After referring to their respective visits to Ethiopia earlier this month, McPherson related to the Secretary General the devastating effect the “walking stick figures” had had on him during his tour of food distribution camps in Ethiopia.³ He explained that he had briefed President Reagan, at the White House, just the day before, and the President had been strongly supportive of current efforts to diminish the human misery in Ethiopia as quickly as possible.⁴ According to relief experts in Addis, the Administrator suggested over 1 million metric tons of food aid will be needed between now and September 1985 if the approximately seven million Ethiopians currently at risk are to be saved. This means that 100,000 MT of food will have to be channeled monthly through the local logistical system which is now capable of handling only 50,000 MT per month. If this system is to be upgraded, and deliveries to drought victims assured, the worldwide donor community will have to contribute more generously, and in a more coordinated fashion, than is now the case. One way of achieving these objectives, according to the AID Administrator, would be for the Secretary General to convene a special pledging and coordination session to focus the attention of all possible contributors on the magnitude of the suffering unfolding now in Ethiopia—with the probability of similar emergencies following in a few months in Sudan, Mozambique, Chad and, possibly, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The Administrator then referred to a special meeting of the DAC on the African emergency which will take place in Paris following the December 3 and 4 high level session—at the urging of the U.S.⁵ McPherson solicited the Secretary General’s advice on how we can best stimulate DAC and non-DAC concern about the African tragedy. He concluded his opening remarks by pointing out that the U.S., in the first 45 days of FY 85, committed 215,000 MT of food aid to Africa with a value of $190 million. This compares with a commitment of $172 million for all of last FY—which was the highest amount of food aid programmed to Africa in U.S. history.

5. Perez de Cuellar warmly thanked the AID Administrator for making a special Saturday morning trip to NYC to discuss “matters of mutual concern.” The Sec Gen indicated that he too had been shaken by what he had seen in Ethiopia and was particularly gratified that the AID Administrator was alert to the probability of new disasters breaking out in other African countries. With respect to Ethiopia, matters seemed to be improving a little although the Sec Gen could not be certain because he might have been shielded “from the worst” by the bands of soldiers that surrounded his entourage wherever it went in Ethiopia. He then confided that the Ethiopian Government saw itself “very much on the spot.” Its concerns over the grave food situation were not wholly humanitarian. The regime remembers only too well that the previous administration was toppled in the mid 1970’s largely because it failed to mount an effective drought-relief campaign.⁶ The Mengistu regime also recognizes, according to the Sec Gen, that it will have to turn eventually to the West for development aid since—like many African governments—its flirtation with socialism has had disastrous effects on the Ethiopian economy.

6. Jean Ripert pointed out that the Ethiopian Government already was hoping that some of the emergency assistance it would be receiving could be used for longer-term rehabilitation. During their recent trip, the government had asked for UN assistance in helping to resettle Ethiopians from the highlands into the Ogaden region in the South. Aware of the political implications, the UN team had declined to comment on the proposal. The AID Administrator pointedly referred to the enormous pressure in the U.S. against the provision of development assistance to the Mengistu regime. Indeed our humanitarian response could be seriously jeopardized if any of the U.S. assistance was used in connection with development projects proposed by the current regime. (Both the Sec Gen and Ripert nodded in complete understanding.)

7. The Sec Gen agreed that the AID Administrator’s idea on a special UN pledging and coordinating session was a good one—if held at the Perm Rep level. He then mused about “LDC Governments, being, at times, their own worst enemies.” On several occasions he had felt compelled to advise them “to get their own houses and priorities in order” if they expected him to mount special appeals for outside assistance. Ambassador Keyes underscored the Secretary’s point by alluding to the current General Assembly proposal to allocate $73 million for an unneeded ECA Conference Center in Addis Ababa at a time when starvation ran rampant in the countryside. (All agreed that the Conference Center proposal was indeed unfortunate.)⁷

8. The Director General parenthetically referred to a growing concern among Latin American countries that “all this attention on Africa” will leave L.A. with a shrinking portion of donor assistance. The Secretary General agreed about the concern and confided that it may be necessary “to stage a compensatory event” for the Latin Americans in the not too distant future.

9. The discussion then shifted to Kurt Jansson’s mandate as the UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Assistance in Addis. The Sec Gen reaffirmed that Jansson reports directly to him and has complete authority to make decisions on-the-ground as he deems necessary. (The UNDP Res Rep would not be a “problem,” according to the Sec Gen, because King fully understands the need to focus his energies on “non-emergency assistance matters.”) In keeping with the prevailing frankness, McPherson indicated that the U.S. Government was concerned about the quality of some UN Representatives in the field. Given the fact that the bulk of emergency assistance will flow through bilateral channels, it seems only fitting that bilateral donors have a real say about which UN agency rep (e.g., UNDP, WFP, UNICEF) should assume the role of emergency relief coordinator in a given country. In the same connection, the U.S. Government favors the setting up of a small “executive board of principal donors,” in each disaster country, to make sure that coordination runs smoothly. Perez de Cuellar did not directly address this last point—instead, he softly lamented the fact that “member governments” had eroded the Secretary General’s coordination effectiveness over the UN family by allowing the individual UN agencies to become too autonomous.

10. The AID Administrator then asked the Secretary General’s indulgence to sum up his understanding of what would come out of the meeting. First, the Secretary General will call a special emergency assistance pledging session for Ethiopia at the UN “in two weeks time.” In preparation for that session Kurt Jansson will draw up a logistics plan for the Ethiopia emergency situation—as well as a resource gap analysis which will be distributed to all prospective donors before the pledging session.⁸ At the meeting donors will be expected to clearly spell out the specifics of their contributions. Secondly, before the close of the Special Session on Ethiopia, the Secretary General will announce that there will be a follow-on African-wide emergency appeal session to be held at the UN in early January 1985.⁹ This meeting will set the stage for country-specific pledging sessions. The Sec Gen agreed with the Administrator’s summary of their discussion and promised to set the wheels in motion immediately for the first meeting on Ethiopia.

11. As the meeting was concluded, the UN information unit ushered in an ABC T.V. filming crew which had asked to shoot some “no voice” takes of the Sec Gen and the AID Administrator for the “This Week with David Brinkley Show” (November 18th). During the filming the Administrator reminisced warmly on his days as a Peace Corps volunteer in Lima—to the obvious delight of the Peruvian Secretary General.

Kirkpatrick

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Sent Immediate to the White House, Addis Ababa, Paris, Rome, and Geneva.
2. In telegram 3805 from New York, December 22, USUN reported on the December 18 UN Special Session on Emergency Assistance for Ethiopia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840819–0340)
3. In telegram 5209 from Addis Ababa, November 7, the Embassy reported on McPherson’s November 6 meetings with Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840712–0256)
4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Bush, McPherson, Baker, Meese, McFarlane, and Wettering on November 16, from 9:55 to 10:03 a.m. “to discuss Mr. McPherson’s recent trip to Ethiopia to study food assistance to alleviate effects of the African drought.” (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
5. In telegram 363466 to all African diplomatic posts and all OECD capitals, December 10, the Department reported on the Paris meeting of major donors to the relief effort. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840789–0608)
6. Reference is to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974.
7. In telegram 2875 from New York, October 22, USUN reported on the vote approving the construction of the conference facilities in Addis Ababa. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840674–0768)
8. Not found.
9. In telegram 384 from Geneva, January 16, 1985, USUN reported on the UN meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850034–0612)