Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

364. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Negroponte) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 29, 1987

SUBJECT

• Ozone Negotiations: Letter to Attorney General Meese

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to write to Attorney General Meese, in his capacity as Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council (DPC), expressing your strong support for the current U.S. position in the international negotiations on protection of the ozone layer, and to propose making a decision from the President, if necessary, in order to avoid further delay caused by opposition from certain DPC agencies.

BACKGROUND

After several months of negotiation under auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme, an international accord on protection of the stratospheric ozone layer is within reach, largely on U.S. terms.² Many regard this issue as the most important priority on the global environmental agenda. Due mainly to efforts by the Department, USIA, and Lee Thomas, many nations have changed their positions and followed the U.S. lead in considering a freeze in production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), followed by significant reductions. A Conference of Plenipotentiaries is scheduled for mid-September in Montreal to complete the negotiation and sign the protocol.

The U.S. position in this negotiation was developed through intensive interagency deliberations (which included the Justice Department) leading up to, and following, the approval by Allen Wallis of a Circular 175 authority last November.³ Recently, however, some agencies in the DPC—primarily Interior and OSTP—have raised questions both about the underlying science and about the effects of CFC reductions on US industry.⁴ Interior argues that since European Community (EC) countries and Japan did not follow the US near-total ban of CFCs as aerosol propellants in 1978, they should be required to do so before further reductions are scheduled. The US in fact proposed this four years ago,⁵ and it was rejected on the grounds that, even with the aerosol ban, US per capita use of CFCs exceeds the EC, and that most of the long-lived CFCs which will continue for decades to damage the ozone layer originated from US production.

Positions proposed by Interior and OSTP would undo the progress achieved to date and make the Administration appear less serious about protecting the ozone layer than the EC and many other countries (see articles at Tab B from the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal).⁶ Such a U.S. policy reversal would damage our international credibility, unleash major domestic criticism, and probably result in unilateral U.S. control actions.

Lee Thomas and I believe that the U.S. position is responsible and pragmatic, prudently addressing the environmental risks while providing a market stimulus and a reasonable time-frame for industry to develop alternative products. We believe that the DPC process is not functioning well, and could cause needless embarrassment to the Administration on an issue which is attracting growing attention from Congress and public interest groups. We therefore propose that you write directly to Meese in an effort to re-establish a credible U.S. negotiating position. The National Security Council staff concurs in this judgment.

Under Secretary Wallis approved this letter before he left today. I would be pleased to discuss further details if you wish.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Mr. Meese at Tab A.

Tab A

Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to Attorney General Meese⁷

Washington, June 1, 1987

Dear Ed:

I wanted you to know of my strong personal interest in the early and successful completion of an effective international treaty to protect the stratospheric ozone layer through reducing use of certain chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons. This is a subject which has attracted intense Congressional and media interest, and which many regard as the highest priority environmental issue on the global agenda.

International agreement is now within reach, largely on U.S. terms. The U.S. position was developed through intensive interagency deliberations leading up to, and following, the authority to negotiate (Circular 175) which was approved on my behalf by Under Secretary Allen Wallis last November. Implementing that authority, the U.S. delegation has succeeded through three difficult negotiating rounds in turning aside control proposals which would have been disadvantageous to the United States, and in gaining wide acceptance of the U.S. position.

I am now concerned, however, that within the Domestic Policy Council process, a few agencies are advocating positions which would, in effect, reopen the entire international negotiation, which is scheduled for completion in September at a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Montreal.

I understand, and sympathize with, concerns over both scientific uncertainties and the possible economic impact of controls. However, Lee Thomas, who is charged with environmental protection by the President as well as by legislative mandate, has concluded, after over two years of analysis, that the U.S. position is a prudent approach to risk management. I agree with him. Although scientific certitude is probably unattainable, I am impressed by the growing international consensus on the threat to the ozone layer, largely due to research by our own NASA and NOAA. This consensus is manifest in the changed positions of both U.S. industry, which now officially advocates at least a global freeze on production of CFCs, and the European Community, which has proposed a freeze followed by a 20 percent automatic reduction, and which last month agreed to consider a further 30 percent reduction.⁸

Based on contacts with industry, it appears that the 20 percent reduction (which would not come into effect until 1992–94) could be absorbed by U.S. industry utilizing existing alternative products and processes. While the additional 30 percent cut would require substitute products, the additional time frame for such reduction (8 to 12 years from now) would be within the “comfort zone” for the market system to provide incentives for the needed R & D.

I believe it would be inadvisable for us to delay the negotiations, or to appear now less concerned over protecting the ozone layer than the European Community and others who have followed our leadership. John Whitehead, Lee Thomas and I, American Ambassadors abroad, and senior officials on my staff, have all advocated the U.S. position in contacts with senior foreign officials. This has contributed to the evolution of policy in many countries. A perceived reversal by the U.S. risks an embarrassing loss of international credibility, as well as domestic political backlash. Moreover, it would risk the worst possible outcome from the standpoint of U.S. industry and consumers: namely, unilateral U.S. controls (added to our 1978 ban on CFCs for aerosol use) forced by the Clean Air Act, by court order, or by new legislation. There are already growing rumors in Congress and among public interest groups that the Administration is “backsliding” from its previously much-praised commitment to protect the ozone layer.

In order not to jeopardize the progress we have made in this major international negotiation, and following consultation with Lee Thomas, I propose to instruct the U.S. Representative to continue to negotiate in conformance with the existing Circular 175 authority. The objective is a strong and effective international agreement by September, containing provisions as summarized in the enclosure, which is consistent with the interagency position developed prior to the most recent negotiating round, in April.⁹

I hope you will agree that this is a reasonable position. Only a protocol which provides for significant reductions in CFC’s can prudently address the environmental risks, avert needless criticism of the Administration and probable unilateral domestic controls, and provide the needed stimulus for industrial research into alternative products over a reasonable time period. The Administration will have the opportunity to review the negotiated protocol text before signature by our Government. If you have any questions concerning these provisions, I would be pleased to ask Assistant Secretary Negroponte to provide further details.

I propose to proceed on this basis unless you feel that this course of action is not feasible because of compelling objections from some members of the Domestic Policy Council. In that case, I propose that we, together with Lee Thomas, take this matter to the President without further delay.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz¹⁰

1. Source: Reagan Library, Papers of George P. Shultz, Environment—CFC’s. Confidential. Drafted by Butcher and Benedick and cleared in D, E, L, EB, EPA, and NSC. Smith signed for Negroponte. A typed notation under the dateline reads: “(Copy of Original Signed Letter Given to Scott Thayer, 6/1/87, 10:30 a.m.—BKK.”
2. See Document 362.
3. See Document 355.
4. See Document 363.
5. See Document 349.
6. See Cass Peterson, “Administration Ozone Policy May Favor Sunglasses, Hats,” Washington Post, May 29, 1987, and Robert E. Taylor, “Advice on Ozone May Be: ‘Wear Hats And Stand in Shade,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1987. Attached but not printed.
7. Confidential. Drafted by Butcher and Benedick on May 29 and cleared in D, E, L, EB, EPA, and NSC. A typed notation in the upper left-hand margin reads: “COPY GIVEN TO SCOTT THAYER, 6/1, 10:30 a.m. by S/S.”
8. See Document 362.
9. Undated, attached but not printed is a summary of the protocol.
10. Shultz signed “George” above his typed name.