Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/28081: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 19, 1943—noon.
[Received 7:15 p.m.]

311. For the Under Secretary. Albin Johnson spent more than 2 hours with President Ryti yesterday. He said President had given him several oral messages for President Roosevelt and seemed at first inclined to deliver these personally. I said that this was quite unobjectionable from our point of view but that war was moving rapidly and perhaps it would be more useful if he could tell me what President Ryti had in mind to tell President Roosevelt as if anything happened to Johnson en route to Washington or if our strategic plans were activated before his arrival the messages might come too late. Accordingly, here are the oral points made by President Ryti for transmission to President Roosevelt by Albin Johnson:

1. President Ryti sent his most cordial good wishes to President Roosevelt and stressed his satisfaction on seeing the principles and practices of the New Deal continue through the reelection of President Roosevelt to a third term.

2. President Ryti wanted to know what President Roosevelt thought of the Swedish Army taking that portion of Finnish Lapland now under German occupation into protective military custody. In particular, he wanted to know what Soviet Government would think of such an arrangement. He said that Finnish Government was discussing this question at present with Swedish Government. In this connection, I recall first paragraph my 51, January 11.

3. President Ryti said there are now seven German divisions in Finland. Johnson had impression they numbered around 100,000 men in all. Contrary to other reports which have reached us, Ryti insisted they were all first line troops. He confirmed reports mentioned in my 276, February 15 and 310 today⁹³ that Germans were withdrawing forces from Finland and suggested that German army might eventually leave this country entirely for purpose of concentrating military strength “inside the German fortress”. This possibility sharpened President Ryti’s interest in Russian intentions.

4. President asked that President Roosevelt give consideration to following possible armistice terms:

(a). Finnish Army to withdraw to 1939 frontier.

(b). Those areas now under Finnish military occupation—largely eastern Karelia—to remain a demilitarized zone, a sort of no man’s land.

(c). Finland is ready to give up its dreams of a so-called “strategic frontier”.

5. President Ryti gave Johnson a map for President Roosevelt which he said was a Russian map showing the boundaries of the Finland which Soviet Government proposed to establish under its puppet Kuusinen regime in late 1939. Johnson was impressed by fact that this map gave Finland all of Soviet eastern Karelia but did not seem to grasp the point that such a “greater Finland” was to have been organized under Soviet auspices with a Communist government and thus the assimilation of eastern Karelia under such a government would have been merely the extension not of Finland into Soviet Karelia but of Soviet Karelia into Finland.

The foregoing were the oral messages to President Roosevelt. President Ryti apparently has been giving considerable thought to the Atlantic Charter since my conversation with him on January 21 and questioned Johnson about the Charter. The President said that he subscribed entirely to principles of Charter but did not see how Finland could adhere to it without going to war against Germany which would not be “honorable”. I suggested to Johnson that article 1 of Declaration of United Nations provides a way out.

Johnson urged on President Ryti idea suggested in seventh paragraph of my 116, January 12 [21], namely the benefits of a collective peace as contrasted with risks of a separate peace and thought that on this point the President was changing his mind. He said Ryti frankly admitted that his past policy had been mistaken and had impression that President whom he judged to be “a cold fish” was carefully calculating how and when to effect his change in policy. Ryti told Johnson that Finnish Government stood entirely behind declaration of Social Democratic Party as set forth in my 281, February 16,⁹⁴ which of course is not surprising since Tanner, the leader of party, was the man who put Ryti back in office.

President Ryti emphasized question of food but seemed already to be thinking along the lines of previous suggestions that we might be in position to feed the Finns in return for a change in policy. Please see my 179, February 1.⁹⁵ Ryti characteristically added that Finns could have taken Soroka at any time and still could do so.

Johnson said he had distinct impression from President that question of reestablishment of consular relations⁹⁶ with United States and information services had been solved by a “formula” and that possibly Procopé was discussing these matters with you. I may add parenthetically that Johnson himself has been spreading idea here that we are prone to reestablish consular relations and resume publicity activities as a sign of good will toward the Finns. I told Johnson I thought these were details which would have to be worked out after more basic principles were agreed upon and I would add that should we reestablish consular relations before these people have effected a change of policy as well as of heart we should lose a highly effective bargaining point.

During their long conversation Johnson and Ryti discussed Hitler, Ryti recalling the only time he had met the Fuehrer which was on occasion of Hitler’s visit to Finland on June 4 last year.⁹⁷ Ryti said he had asked Hitler why Germans did not make peace with British. Hitler made a wry face and said he would make peace any time but British simply did not want it. Hitler complained to Ryti that he had ordered “Baedeker bombings”⁹⁸ on various historical towns of England only with greatest reluctance and as a reprisal for British bombings of Cologne. Ryti told Johnson that Marshal Mannerheim had arrived in the capital and was to dine with him last night. Mannerheim will have conferences with various leaders here today. I have a strong hunch that Marshal is consulting with Government on what sort of reply to make to memorandum of February 13 as transmitt[ed] in your 31, February 13. The Marshal’s likewise undoubtedly counseling on constitution of a next Cabinet.

McClintock

93. Neither printed.
94. Not printed; this telegram described the declaration published in the press February 16, by the Finnish Social Democratic Party Council, as supporting the concept of “separate war” against the Soviet Union while announcing a policy which aimed at eventual withdrawal from the war when Finland’s security would be guaranteed. The declaration also called for a strengthening of relations with the other Nordic States and with the United States, (860D.00/1141)
95. Not printed.
96. American-Finnish consular relations were broken in 1942 with the closing of United States consular offices in Finland on July 15, and of Finnish Consulates in the United States on August 1. See telegrams No. 142, July 15, 1942, to the Minister in Finland, and No. 596, July 21, 1942, from the Minister in Finland, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 68 and 73, respectively.
97. See the memorandum by Under Secretary of State Welles, June 5, 1942, ibid., p. 63.
98. An expression used to characterize indiscriminate bombings resulting in destruction or damage to cathedrals and other historic buildings, the reference being to the well-known Baedeker guidebooks.