Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/1301: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 20, 1943—2 p.m.
[Received February 20—1:35 p.m.]

320. Source mentioned my 319 today⁹⁹ had long conversation with Paasikivi whom he found much concerned over immediate necessity of making peace with Soviet Union. Paasikivi said that Finland missed its opportunity when it did not make overtures for peace last autumn when such overtures would have had more tangible value to Russians than now when Soviet armies were winning all along Eastern Front.

Paasikivi who characterized himself as “one of the two percent in Finland who think we can get along with the Russians” said that in his opinion Finland must terminate its war with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within a month or 6 weeks. He said situation was analogous to that in autumn of 1939 when Finland could have remained at peace had it not been so stubborn in negotiations which he and Tanner conducted as plenipotentiaries in Moscow. Paasikivi professed at that time to have counseled a more moderate line but was overruled presumably by Tanner and Erkko. He said so [also?] at present time if Finnish haggled and stuck stubbornly to their demands they had a very good chance of losing everything.

Paasikivi was much interested in Atlantic Charter as providing a way out for Finland and asked the same question as had Ryti (see my 311, yesterday) on how Finland could adhere without going to war with Germany. Johnson who had been provided with a copy of Declaration of United Nations showed Paasikivi possibilities implicit in article 1. Paasikivi said he would take Declaration of United Nations with him when he calls on Ryti today to counsel on foreign policy. I had impression that Finnish Government has at last begun actively to think of implications of Atlantic Charter and Declaration of United Nations as they bear on immediate problem here.

Paasikivi displayed considerable interest in our Lease Lend Act¹ und mentioned Turkey as receiving Lease Lend assistance. He seemed to think however that it was necessary to be one of United Nations in order to get Lease Lend benefits and I do not think Johnson corrected this misapprehension. I shall find occasion however to make it clear that any nation whose defense is determined by the President to be vital to the defense of United States is eligible to Lease Lend aid.

Johnson recalled one additional element of his conversation with President Ryti as reported in my 311 yesterday adding Ryti had said that in any future settlement with USSR Finland would be willing to recognize Russian strategic interests in certain Finnish islands of Gulf of Finland nearest to Kronstadt by which I infer he had in mind Seiskari, Lavansaari and Peninsaari. Johnson even got impression that if pressed Ryti would be willing to relinquish Koivisto Line² although this would seem automatically to make the defense of Viipuri impossible.

McClintock

99. Albin Johnson; telegram not printed.
1. Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.
2. A proposed Finnish-Soviet frontier through Koivisto, or Björkö, suggested by the Soviet Government on October 14, 1939. See telegram No. 288, October 26, 1939, from the Minister in Finland, Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, p. 980; also, John H. Wuorinen (ed.), Finland and World War II, 1939–1944 (New York, Ronald Press Co., 1948), p. 57.