146. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
354. Am in general pleased results of meeting with Daud yesterday on subject Pak-Afghan relations.
It was obvious from choice his advisors present that he thought I had come on subject his request for assistance in lower Helmand Valley. Therefore disposed of subject by saying sorry did not have instructions as yet on that subject.2 Said I assumed delay had been caused by desire have general talks with Prince Naim in Washington and I should be getting word now before too long. He said he had some reports from Naim but was looking forward his return in order find out what transpired in greater detail.
Told him I had come on an old problem but one which appeared more serious as time passed, i.e., the Pushtunistan dispute. Said fact that our President and Secretary had raised subject with Prince Naim indicated importance we attach to seeing this problem settled promptly if at all possible. Told him I knew of the emotions surrounding problem, and realized that compromise and settlement could not come easily. I then developed at some length, with the qualification that I knew these were delicate subjects and I could speak only as friendly observer not as well qualified as he to judge, the following two themes: (A) that regardless of determination and intention of RGA, it would be impossible maintain an even balance on issues of neutrality and independence for Afghanistan if relations with other Moslem states in the area, particularly Pakistan, could not be vastly improved; and (B) if not solved soon, dispute appeared susceptible of getting much worse and perhaps unsolvable. There could be little doubt but that the continuation of this dispute, as many others between nations of the free world, is considered advantageous by the Russians, and I feared the RGA would find foreign hands meddling in matter against their will.
Said I believed there was at present a sincere desire on part of Pakistan to see issue settled. If this true, certainly time seemed ripe and better than heretofore because of strength of Ayub. They had often mentioned progress while other governments were in power in Pakistan and lack of progress with Ayub. I personally thought Ayub could be looked upon as asset, rather than otherwise, as no single figure in previous governments had had power to settle such an issue. [Page 310] Given present situation in Pakistan and his own unquestioned personal strength in Afghanistan, the prospects for settlement did not appear discouraging if two of them could meet and discuss all aspects of problem frankly. Ended my presentation saying we wished very much to be of assistance on this problem and asked, in effect, what could we do.
Daud said he appreciated my frank expression and was pleased to hear an American official voice many of his own fears. To my supprise he did not take exception to any portion of themes A and B described above. He then said (most significant of his remarks) “If this question remains unsolved we will inevitably be drawn to one side” (as between East and West). He said they had always been ready and still are ready for settlement on basis that was just and honorable.
He said he quite willing and eager to have such meeting provided there was basis to hope that something could be accomplished. He felt that if there was anything new [to] be discussed, it should be known on both sides before a public meeting as otherwise meeting with no results might even make matters worse. It is for this reason that he had asked Naim, if the Pakistanis were willing to receive him, to stop briefly in Karachi before returning to Kabul. If these talks produce any hope, as far as he was concerned, he and Ayub could meet in either country.
He said he told Pakistan Ambassador also that causes of present tensions had more foundation than only propaganda from both sides. He then described one current border problem in which tribesmen from Mangai tribe in Paktia region had been lured across border to Peshawar and had received money and ammunition from officials there. This was disturbing and they would deal with it in whatever way necessary. He had dispatched some troops and would [garble] if necessary. He had told Rahman this sort of thing hardly created best atmosphere for high-level talks.
Told Daud my government would be greatly pleased that he had offered to have Naim stop in Karachi and of our hope that he would find it possible take initiative again to arrange meeting with Ayub after Naim returns here.
Comment: The big stumbling block has been doubt in Pakistan and indeed in our own minds, as to whether Daud really wants settlement. While cannot, of course, be certain, I left this meeting with impression that the odds are somewhat better than even that he does. I propose to tell Pakistan Ambassador of this qualified opinion and would not mind it being passed along in Karachi if it can conceivably do any good. From here it appears that it would be helpful if Ayub would discuss problem with Naim as frankly as he would with Daud. I doubt if further progress can be made on arranging Daud–Ayub meeting unless there is some private understanding in advance. Should [Page 311] think, for instance, that Naim should be told of possibility of renaming Pakistan border district and that Ayub should say he prepared to do this if the RGA wishes. If this were done, Daud would know that he could take something away from public meeting that would appear to be concession on part of Pakistan. It would appear that an opportunity might be wasted if he merely tells Naim that he is going to do it anyway.
Daud and Ayub have many characteristics in common and I would expect them to get along well in private talks (much better than Naim and Ayub). Since Naim quite high-ranking, perhaps Ayub could see merit after Naim’s visit to Pakistan to offer to come himself to Kabul as next step.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10–2559. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi.↩
- See Document 149.↩