147. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
1027. Assistant Secretary Jones and I called on President Ayub October 30 in Rawalpindi.2 Virtually entire 50-minute conversation before luncheon was devoted to Afghanistan with President giving no indication wish change subject. Jones’ recent visit Kabul and discussions Ambassador Byroade provided excellent basis for what seemed useful exploration.
After Jones and I had mentioned deep concern over trend in Afghanistan and expressed belief that improvement depended in large measure upon Pakistani statesmanship, President gave us his evaluation of situation. Briefly, he felt Afghanistan had embarked on policy which almost inevitably would lead to total dependence upon Soviet Union and ultimate takeover there by Communists—perhaps quite soon. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He not at all convinced that Daud would be willing adopt policies which would provide adequate resistance Soviet penetration. However, Daud with all of his limitations was only honest and determined leader in royal family. Trouble [Page 312] was he was bull-headed and stupid; his thinking was not subject influence of King or Naim. He found Daud policies re Pushtoonistan difficult to understand; latter knew Pakistan could never yield any vestige of its sovereign rights and yet he permitted this to inflame relations between two countries and open way for increasing Soviet influence. Already Afghanistan’s economy was so tied to USSR that within two years there would possibly be no alternative to greater and perhaps complete subservience to USSR. He discoursed at length on the military and security implications of this for Pakistan and India. He felt best course would be for US, if it would agree, to give Afghanistan “shock treatment” of informing leaders that if their policies remained unchanged US would withdraw all support. He understood from previous talks however that we unprepared pursue this course.
Jones and I responded generally along lines taken by Department officials in Washington discussions with Qadir3 and in CENTO meetings. In substance we emphasized [2½ lines of source text not declassified] that only prospect for reversing present trend which would have ultimately grave consequences for free world would be for Pakistan to take initiative in improving relations with Afghanistan as that latter might take measures and pursue policies vis-à-vis USSR which might safeguard its independence. Means must be found for improving economic relations between the two countries and of permitting Pushtoonistan issue to be shelved or pushed into background. Jones gave effective outline various conversations with Naim in Washington and both of us expressed view now would be most propitious moment for Pakistan to follow up by inviting him to come here. Jones fortunately could also speak of general attitude of Afghans and of Byroade’s opinion that Afghans, including Daud, were susceptible to some friendly gestures which might lead to basic improvement. We therefore inquired whether President did not think it good idea to send cordial invitation to Naim and meanwhile to consider various gestures particularly in economic field which might be made. We also mentioned possibility of some formula along lines of Khattak plan which might give Afghans an out if it developed they were willing to use one in reducing or eliminating Pushtoonistan propaganda. Perhaps later meeting with Daud could be arranged.
President at first seemed only slightly receptive but conversation then took encouraging trend as he spoke of various possibilities. He again set forth his misgivings re Khattak plan (Embtel 523)4 but repeated that implementation basic democracies scheme provided opportunity [Page 313] if desirable for elected representatives among Pushtus to make appropriate statement on their status in Pakistan. This could be done as early as late December. He thought Pakistan could be very helpful to Afghanistan in various economic matters. He said parenthetically that his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] sources indicated Soviets were greatly disturbed over Naim’s visit to US and probably were disturbed over his stopover in Iran. He hoped that this report was well-founded and expressed hope that Embassy Kabul would lose no opportunity maintain close touch with royal family particularly Naim. He had in mind not only Ambassador Byroade personally but officers at other levels as well. He was pleased to learn of Ambassador Byroade’s recently extended contacts with royal family.
After meeting in the President’s office, we later joined him for lunch at his residence. Before departing, President said that he had given further thought to our talks and had decided to instruct Foreign Minister to send invitation for Naim to come to Karachi “of course without any advance political commitment.” He then asked Qadir, who was present at luncheon to join him and in Jones’ presence instructed Foreign Minister to dispatch invitation through Daud. After some discussion it was decided that Naim would be given alternative dates between November 1 and 9, before President’s departure for Iran, or after November 23 following President’s return from Turkey. He and Qadir agreed that President should meet with Naim personally. Jones and I are somewhat encouraged by this development and by our general conversation with President who obviously had subject much on his mind (see Embtel 970).5 While Afghanistan and Pakistan are far way from rapprochement we think our observation to effect Pakistan big enough and secure enough to be generous and comprehending towards their Afghan “poor relations” may have evoked favorable response—particularly in context of this being of service to “Western allies.” After all, Pakistan is geographically only practical alternative to USSR as route outside world. If invitation is extended and accepted in proper spirit it is not impossible that some progress can be made. On other hand we must recognize that if talks go badly relations between the two countries could further deteriorate. In event Naim accepts, I plan continue urge GOP assume constructive attitude and earnestly endeavor formulate suggestions which might find favorable response assuming Afghans are really interested in improving relations.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10–3159. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Kabul, Tehran, and Ankara.↩
- Jones was in Pakistan, October 26–29 and October 31–November 4, as part of a trip to South Asia. He was in Afghanistan, October 29–31. Documentation on his trip is ibid., 110.15–HO.↩
- See Document 141.↩
- In telegram 523, August 29, Rountree reported that Ayub objected to the Khattak plan because it would allow the Afghans a direct interest in the matter of the Pushtun-speaking tribes in Pakistan and might subsequently give them the right to have a voice in tribal affairs. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/8–2959)↩
- Dated October 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/10–2459)↩