JCS Reply to Questions related to
the Defense of the Offshore Islands
I have just read the memorandum of 25 June from the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Staff replying to your questions bearing on the defense of
the Offshore Islands.11. See Document 134 and footnotes 1 and 2
thereto.
In their reply, the Joint Staff appear to consider a classic amphibious
operation mounted against the Offshore Islands as the principal threat
from the ChiComs. This thought underlies the estimate in paragraph 1 a
of one to four months as needed to mount a major attack. It also finds
expression in paragraph 1 b, where the anticipated pattern of attack
includes a considerable air and artillery preparation prior to any
attempt to land. The same thought is found in 1 c, where the possibility
of a surprise attack receives a low rating.
Personally, I am not at all sure that this kind of deliberately phased
attack is the most likely or the most dangerous to the defense of the
Offshore Islands. Because of the shallow depth of the water around
Chinmen, it will be impossible to get heavy weapons ashore during the
assault phase. The attack will inevitably depend on masses of lightly
armed infantrymen, supported by air and artillery from the mainland. The
pattern of the assault is likely to resemble that of the ChiComs in 1949 rather than any American
amphibious landings of World War II. The amphibious shipping will
probably consist largely of rafts, sampans and junks employed in large
numbers and with little order.
It seems likely that the ChiComs would make every effort to exploit
surprise in making their attack. Under the cover of the very bad weather
which is common during this season of the year, and utilizing small
craft always in the area, it is entirely possible for the ChiComs to
make a quick jump across the narrow water passage separating Chinmen
from the mainland and establish a substantial beachhead in the course of
a single night. The Defense Intelligence Agency considers that the
landing craft required for an attack on the Chinmens or Matsu could be
marshalled within 24 or 48 hours, and that the ChiComs could launch an
attack on the Offshore Islands with little or no warning.
This or any other major attack will be extremely costly to the ChiComs
and, if they have sensible leadership, the adventure should not prove
attractive. However, we probably do not think like Chinese and their
eventual decision may run counter to what seems sensible to us. The
prize to them would be the elimination of a large part of
Chiang's best troops, a serious blow to ChiNat
and U.S. prestige worldwide, and a great lift to the ChiCom home front.
On the other hand, a reverse for the ChiComs would greatly increase the
already serious internal situation and would exact a heavy price in
military assets.