66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China ^SourceSource: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-461. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text. Drafted at the White House and approved by Manfull. Repeated to USUN for Stevenson. Notes by Phyllis Bernau of a telephone conversation that day between Rusk and Bundy indicate that the telegram was drafted by Bundy and cleared by Rusk and Kennedy. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Washington, October 5, 1961.

225. Your 287¹1. See footnote 3, Document 65. and 289.²2. Telegram 289, October 4, reported a conversation between Drumright and Acting Foreign Minister Hsu Shao-chang, who told Drumright that President Chiang's senior foreign policy advisers had been informed of Rusk's responses to Chiang's questions and that their consensus was that a message from Kennedy to Chiang would be most effective in influencing him not to veto Outer Mongolian admission. (Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-461) Following message from President Kennedy to President Chiang should be delivered soonest:

“October 5, 1961.

“I have sent you separately my warm congratulations on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution,³3. For text of the message, dated October 5, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 650. and I hope by now you will also have received my informal message to you delivered by my assistant Bundy to Ambassador Yeh.⁴4. See Document 65. I want to take this one more opportunity, however, to state in the strongest terms my regard for your statesmanship, my support for the alliance that binds our two countries, my personal approval of the reassurances recently conveyed by Ambassador Drumright in response to your seven questions, and my appreciation for your understanding of the importance to me of the need to keep Communist China out of the United Nations.

“In particular I want to make it clear that while Secretary Rusk spoke for me in outlining the difficulties we might face if we met defeat on the issue of Communist China in the United Nations after a veto of Outer Mongolia, neither he nor I would ever intend to state such a concern to a trusted ally in tones of threat; we have meant rather to indicate clearly how forces beyond our control might bring trouble to both our countries in such an event. I believe that we can bridge our honorable differences on this matter of Outer Mongolia—you by avoiding a veto, and we by avoiding any new diplomatic initiative toward that country in the existing circumstances—and if we can do these things in the light of the common needs of the free people, we shall be fairly on the way to increased effectiveness together, an effectiveness based on personal trust and understanding as well as on the true interests of our nations.

“John F. Kennedy”

Rusk