302. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Ambassador to Laos (Brown)0
Dear Win: There are a couple of things that I would like to have you bear in mind. One is that our job is not to confront the President with a situation requiring a decision on whether to permit Laos to be overrun by the Commies, or introduce American combat forces. A President cannot be asked to make such a decision in advance. We have got to start skating, even though we don’t know how firm the ice may be in the center of the pond. The problem is to work out how—and not whether—a coalition government under Souvanna’s leadership with a reasonable chance of success is formed. This requires a strong element from Vientiane on the political side, as well as strong elements of the FAR on the military. There is no way that Washington can give you instructions on how to do this. When we have attempted to second-guess the situation from here, we find frequently that you, with your special knowledge on the spot, have pointed out the inadvisability of the steps suggested. I fully understand the responsibility that is being placed on you, but the facts are that you and your colleagues on the country team are the only ones who are close enough to the situation to find ways to achieve the President’s objectives.
Another point is that I have gained the impression that you want to complete your negotiations with Souvanna before making any moves in [Page 642] talking to Vientiane political and military individuals, overtly or covertly. From this distance, it looks to me as if you are close enough to an agreement with Souvanna that some steps should be taken at once, as time will not permit contacts to be developed after every detail has been swept and dusted. Discussions of the type that we have in mind may well indicate some suggestions that could be negotiated out with Souvanna as a price for gaining support of Vientiane individuals and groups.
A third point is the prestige of the American Ambassador in Vientiane. I recognize that events have developed so rapidly that Phoumi has been able to get away with affronts to you. Although up to now I have nothing but admiration for the dignity and firmness with which you have conducted yourself, I think the time has come when you may have to be more assertive and make issues with Phoumi and the government, particularly when they fail to ask for your advice, or disregard it. In the present situation, action, even though it may not be fully successful, is a better alternative than to let the situation get out of hand by failure to act. In any event, I want you to know that I will support fully any action that you may take to achieve the clear goal that the President has laid down for us.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,