303. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Laos
I refer to the President’s call to me this morning with respect to the latest Cabinet list introduced by Souvanna Phouma and approved by [Page 643] Souphanouvong (Vientiane’s telegram No. 1248 of March 5).1 Not having seen that message at the time of the President’s call, I was not able to respond in a meaningful way.
I believe that the Department’s telegram No. 784 to Vientiane of March 52 generally meets the points made to me by the President. As a minor point, I would note that, while there were many unacceptable aspects to Souvanna’s proposal, the list did provide that both Souphanouvong and Phoumi would be Vice Prime Ministers rather than Souphanouvong as Deputy Prime Minister and Phoumi as Vice Prime Minister, as understood by the President. Vientiane’s telegram No. 1251, of March 6, responds to the Department’s telegram No. 784, agreeing that Souvanna’s proposal is not acceptable.3 We have been in touch with the U.K. Ambassador on the question and, contrary to the views of the U.K. Ambassador in Vientiane, the Foreign Office agrees with us that the proposal is not acceptable. In the light of this Foreign Office view, it should readily be possible for Brown to work out an agreed reaction with the British and French to be communicated to Souvanna.
With respect to the President’s desire for a further message to Phoumi, to be communicated through Admiral Felt, Admiral Felt had already left Bangkok and is now in Saigon. Phoumi is leaving Bangkok late this afternoon, our time, to return to Vientiane so that there is no possibility of getting in touch with him prior to his return to Vientiane. However, I felt that the President’s desire that Phoumi be impressed with the importance we attach to his being in a Souvanna government, et cetera, should in large part have been met by the approach [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to him before he left Bangkok, offering a substantial “carrot” for his cooperation and support in a Souvanna government. I understand that an approach was made and that a message [Page 644] on this should be in later this afternoon.4 We also have not yet received Admiral Felt’s report of his conversation with Phoumi.5
As soon as these two messages are received I believe we will be better able to judge our next move.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/62. Secret.↩
- The list reported in telegram 1248 had Souvanna as Prime Minister and at Defense, Interior, and Social Action; Souphanouvong as Vice Prime Minister and Information, and Sports and Youth; Phoumi as Vice Prime Minister and Finance; Pheng Phongsavan as Foreign Affairs; Phoumi Vongvichit as Economy and Plan; Leaum Insisiengmay as Education; Quinim as Social Welfare and Labor; Khamsouk Keola as Health; Khoun One Voravong as Justice; Oudom Souvannavong as Posts and Telecommunications; Phangna Pholithat as Cults; Bounthan Songvilay as Public Works and Transport. There would be three Secretaries of State at Defense: Kong Le, General Phoun Sipraseuth, and an unnamed Savannakhet General. Brown’s immediate reaction was that Souphanouvong at Information was unacceptable and the proposed cabinet favored the Pathet Lao and neutrals by giving them the Ministries in closest contact with the Lao people. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/3–562)↩
- In telegram 784, the Department agreed that the slate was unacceptable as it was weighted in favor of the PL and “leftist XK ‘neutrals.’” (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 1251, Brown also reported that the British and French Ambassadors in Laos did not share his view of Souvanna’s list and therefore it was crucial that the three countries present a united front to Souvanna and Souphanouvong. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–662)↩
- See Document 304.↩
- See Document 305.↩