Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, May 13, 1962, 10:24 p.m.

990. Deptel 987¹ and Embtel 1553.²

Comprehensive intention ref Deptel was to move as rapidly as possible denigrate General Phoumi both politically and militarily. Purpose this move would be work toward creation more tractable RLG which would then become nucleus conservative political grouping that would be willing and able cooperate effectively both politically and militarily with Souvanna and other non-Communists in coalition govt and subsequently. We would be fearful that General Phoumi, who has consistently obstructed our policy in Laos, could scuttle coalition and wreck prospects for non-Communist majority harmony in Laos. Also, Phoumi’s widely known past differences with US make it difficult internationally and domestically to support RLG in which he continues prominent. As indicated, ideal result would be General Phoumi’s complete disappearance in one move. Since this patently unfeasible, we proposed, in effect, two-stage operation which would have removed him first from political to military scene and would then have reduced his military stature by bringing him under MAAG wraps. You have therefore misinterpreted our instructions in assuming that we wished him retain ministerial titles as defense minister and deputy prime minister. We would indeed prefer to see him resign from both ministerial positions and function solely as military commander.

If, however, you find this not attainable you authorized attempt reorganization you have suggested with Phoui Sananikone as Prime Minister and other ministers more broadly representative than those drawn primarily from Savannakhet revolutionary committee provided always that you recognize ultimate objective is to bring General Phoumi under control. It would even be permissible, for example, envisage retention Boun Oum as Prime Minister and General Phoumi as Defense Minister if Phoui Sananikone were introduced into this scheme as Deputy Prime Minister with full responsibility for political and civil affairs. In such organization, we would insist that General Phoumi limit his functions exclusively to military realm (although we recognize sad fact para six, ref Embtel that General Phoumi would continue have significant political valence in this capacity).³

As inducement towards achieving desired result, you may let it be known (tailoring your presentation to appropriate audiences) that US would be willing consider reinstituting financial assistance to RLG if Phoui Sananikone undertook position principal responsibility in RLG and had mandate negotiate seriously towards formation coalition government. We would not guarantee that financial support would be re-instituted in form previous monthly check, since we are strongly persuaded it must be provided on much shorter string than previously prevailed. However, presentation this carrot is one which we wish at this stage keep most negotiable, but not niggardly so. FYI Substantial amounts of assistance would be available to tractable RLG if one can be formed, but type and method such assistance must be carefully worked out before USG actually committed. End FYI

In summary, you should move with this carrot obtain best possible government combination, ideal being Phoui Sananikone Prime Ministership with General Phoumi completely removed (i.e., formally resigned) from ministerial posts; and with minimum being retention Boun Oum as Prime Minister, Phoui as Deputy Prime Minister and General Phoumi as Defense Minister even retaining title of Deputy Prime Minister but functioning only in military field.

Re para 13 ref Embtel,⁴ Phoumi should be given understand moves of fleet and other US forces in Thailand are for support of Thailand and not as US coming to his assistance. This interpretation should not be expressed to others such as British, French and Australians since we wish keep motives our military moves ambiguous.

Re para 14,⁵ you will have received Depcirtel on press guidance.

Your previous instructions amended to extent MAAG may assist in bringing FAR elements in Thailand back to Laos, but you should continue withhold offers of re-equipping them pending favorable response from Phoumi.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1362. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Sullivan; cleared by Koren, Cross, Forrestal, and Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to Moscow and to Bangkok and CINCPAC POLAD.
1. Document 361.
2. In telegram 1553, May 13, Brown reported that he interpreted his instructions in Document 361 “that Phoumi must drop his ministerial functions and revert full-time status as military commander” to mean Phoumi must now turn his attention to military matters, but not necessarily resign as Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1362)
3. In paragraph 6 of telegram 1553, Brown stated that as long as Phoumi was a military commander he would inevitably remain a political figure of importance.
4. In paragraph 13, Brown asked what the British, French, and Australians knew of the Washington decision about Phoumi and what could he and should he say to his colleagues in Vientiane.
5. In paragraph 14, Brown asked for guidance on dealing with the press. He received it in circular telegram 1934, May 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1362)