Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

366. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 14, 1962.

Laos

At the off-the-record meeting today on Laos Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Assistant Secretary Harriman, Mr. McCone, Generals Lemnitzer and Taylor will be present.¹

The main purpose of this meeting is to give you recommendations for the immediate future which have been agreed upon between the Departments of State and Defense.

State and Defense recommend that orders be given to land U.S. forces in Thailand around 10 o’clock tomorrow evening (our time). The number and types of these forces is given in the attached schedule; but generally 1800 men plus an Air Force fighter squadron and a Marine air squadron would land tomorrow. Ten to 14 days later additional elements of the existing army battle group would arrive by sea, after which the total American force in Thailand would be between 5,000 and 6,000 men. It is recommended that the Air Force squadron would go to Udorn, approximately 30 miles south of Vientiane, and Ubon, further to the south, about 50 miles from the Lao border opposite Pakse.

The State Department is preparing a joint U.S./Thai communique to be issued simultaneously in Bangkok and Washington.² It will refer to the Manila Pact but not the Rusk/Thanat communique, because the Manila Pact had Senate approval. It may also include some language taken from the announcement at the time of the Lebanese action.

A circular telegram to SEATO capitals is also being prepared by State.³ A SEATO Council discussion is envisaged later, and the introduction of a SEATO presence into the operation is contemplated by calling back the Air Cobra Exercise units. State believes U.K and France may oppose formal SEATO involvement.

The State Department will inform NATO of the operation.

Governor Harriman is opposed to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference at this time on the grounds that it will (a) freeze the Soviet position before we know what it is, and (b) result in a lot of adverse propaganda. The possibility, however, is being contemplated of asking the Indians, because of their interest in the ICC, to discuss the matter in Hanoi.

The State Department is researching the question whether the United Nations must be informed, since it appears that there may be a requirement for this under the Charter and the Manila Treaty. Governor Harriman is meeting with a representative of U Thant.

Secretary Rusk may see Ambassador Dobrynin tomorrow morning simply to inform him of our actions.⁴

Enclosure

(1) Headquarters for JTF 116: approximately 150 men.

(2) Expanding the existing Army battle group from its present strength of 1000 minus, to its full T/O strength of 2000. Includes logistic support. (By sea: 14 days)

(3) Introduction of an Air Force fighter squadron: strength, 800 men.

(4) Introduction of Marine air squadron: strength, 300 men.

(5) Introduction of a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) now on the Valley Forge and accompanying ships: strength, approximately 1800 men.

(6) Logistical support troops for the above, totaling approximately 500 men. (Included in expanded B.G.)

This list would total 5,000–6,000 men. The deployment would be to put the battle group and AF squadron at Udorn and the Marine BLT and air squadron at Ubon.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 5/11/62–5/28/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but the last sentence of the fifth paragraph was added in Forrestal’s handwriting.
1. Forrestal wrote a brief summary of this meeting which took place at 2:30 p.m. at the White House. In addition to the persons mentioned here, McGeorge Bundy and Forrestal attended. McNamara recommended the military moves as outlined below and the President agreed. The President also suggested that the communique be released after discussion with the congressional leadership (see Document 368) and approved the Department of State informing SEATO capitals. The President stated that the purpose of putting forces into Thailand was to allow the United States to take whatever action might be necessary under the Manila Pact, yet no formal SEATO action was contemplated. The President directed the Department of State to “carefully consider the SEATO problem” and asked McNamara if the actual military orders should be held up to avoid leaks. McNamara believed the orders could go out with leaks to the press. (Memorandum of conversation at the White House, May 14, 2:30 p.m.; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/17/62–5/25/62)
2. For texts of statements by the President on Thailand, both May 15, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1093–1094. Both make reference to the Rusk-Thanat communique of March 6, 1962. Additional documentation is included in volume XXIII.
3. Sent to Bangkok as telegram 1756 and repeated to SEATO capitals and CINCPAC POLAD, May 14, 11:24 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1462)
4. See Document 369.