Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, May 19, 1962, 5:15 p.m.

1021. Embtel 1583¹

We continue deeply disturbed by constant evidence Phoumi’s total irresponsibility and his willingness subordinate security his country to his own scheming ambition. His visits to Rangoon and Taipei during current crisis, his projected visit to Manila, his refusal take any action restore situation northeast of Ban Houei Sai, plus CAS reports of his plans abandon north Laos to guerrilla tactics while concentrating in southern redoubt cause us have grave doubts re sincerity his current apparent willingness reach political accommodations with other Laotian forces. In past few years our efforts to pull together stable non-communist grouping have foundered on the rock of Phoumi’s intransigence and personal ambition.²

At same time we recognize dangers leaving him in position potential mischief outside ultimate Laotian settlement. We are, for example, aware that Souphanouvong has continually insisted that coalition would not be valid unless Phoumi embraced in its terms.

Your instructions, which remain in effect, are to seek arrangement by which other, more reliable, anti-communist leaders are introduced into positions of primary responsibility in conservative camp so that negotiations for coalition and coalition itself will have conservative pediment less fractious and more dependable than Phoumi.

Your British and French colleagues seem primarily concerned with pursuing immediate objective off obtaining three Princes meeting and intermediate objective of reaching political agreement for coalition cabinet. We must assume responsibilities of more basic and enduring nature. Specifically we must be certain this coalition will contain elements assuring that natural non-communist majority, composed of conservative and neutralists, will work harmoniously together against communist minority. We cannot therefore place our confidence exclusively in conservative element which is characterized by selfish motivation, regional parochialism, and practice of cunning deception which could materially damage legitimate interest of both Thailand and U.S.

You should, of course, not execute your instructions in manner which will in itself impede progress towards political solution. But you should not jeopardize our long-run interests for some immediate expediencies. Your efforts over past several days have been commendable and should be continued. Particularly we hope you can hold Phoumi to agreements he made with you (Embtel 1580).³ Similarly Gen. Tucker’s forthright pursuit of the problem, especially in connection with restoration of organized FAR presence in northwest Laos should continue unabated.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/54–1862. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan; cleared in draft by Cross and Rice and in substance by Harriman; and approved by Koren. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, London, Geneva, Fecon, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 1583, May 18, Brown reported that Addis viewed Phoumi was not just as a soldier, but a political figure who controlled the National Assembly, the police, the Government’s finances, and the army. As long as he was a military figure he would be a political force and could not be extinguished over night as one turns off a light. Addis believed that a reorganization and the introduction of Phoui into an important position actually would seriously impair the chances for success of a coalition. Although he argued the opposite case to Addis and his other diplomatic colleagues who felt the same way, Brown agreed with Addis. (Ibid.)

2. On May 17, at 12:33 p.m., Rusk and Attorney General Robert Kennedy discussed Phoumi. According to the transcribed notes of the telephone conversation, the discussion went as follows:

   “The AG said someone came in about an hour ago and made several points: The problem as they saw it in Laos was Phoumi and we should make a major effort in that regard. The trouble in Nam Tha was really isolated and brought about by people in the area who got fed up with Phoumi’s troops. This is as far as it is going. Then there was a strong personal message for the President that Khrushchev is very anxious to have a peaceful solution in Laos and is in complete agreement with their understanding reached in Vienna. As far as he is concerned it still remains. The Sec wanted to be sure the Pres knew about this and the AG said he had called. He asked if there were a message to take back. The AG said all agree that Phoumi is a s.o.b. but we have to put pressure on Souvanna vong. The Sec added something about the situation’s not being an easy one.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

3. In telegram 1580, May 18, Brown reported that he had informed Phoumi of the U.S. military moves in Thailand and reminded him that they did not indicate a change in U.S. policy toward Laos nor support for him personally. Brown bluntly told Phoumi that Washington had lost confidence in him. If the United States was to help restore FAR, it required specific assurances of cooperation from him. Brown asked and Phoumi promised to go the Plaine des Jarres for tripartite discussions. He stated that he required only two conditions from Souvanna and Souphanouvong on Defense and Interior Ministries: unanimous tripartite decisions on important matters and an understanding that forces were to remain in tact pending an agreement on integration. Phoumi agreed that restoration of RLG control of Nam Tha should not be a precondition to future tripartite talks and offered full collaboration with MAAG. (Ibid.)