374. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Staff to President Kennedy0

Governor Harriman’s Conversation with the Lao Ambassador

The following chronology may help to set the record straight on a number of cables to and from Vientiane and Bangkok which resulted from Averell’s talk with the Lao Ambassador on last Friday, May 18th.

Averell saw Prince Khampan on Friday and told him that we have lost confidence in Phoumi as a result of Nam Tha. Averell said he hoped that the RLG would select some additional political advisers to assist in the 3-Prince negotiations. (Vientiane’s 1020)1 Comment: It is not unlikely [Page 784] that Averell spoke bluntly to the Ambassador, but I am confident that Averell was following the line which he felt had your approval that we should try to get Phoumi out of the political field and into the purely military field in order to minimize the possibility of Phoumi’s breaking up the 3-Prince negotiations on his own.

Ambassador Khampan reported to his Government on May 18th that Harriman had required a “reshuffling on the Royal Government in which Phoumi would not be included” (Vientiane 1585).2 Acting Foreign Minister Sisouk called Brown in on May 20th to ask whether U.S. policy had changed, since “Harriman has more than once stated that Phoumi had a future in the new government.” (Vientiane 1586)3 Comment: Prince Khampan is, apparently, not a great admire of General Phoumi’s and may have contributed to a misunderstanding.

In any event, on May 20th Harriman cabled Brown instructing him to clarify the misreported conversation with Ambassador Khampan saying, “I made no repeat no demand for resignation of cabinet or of Phoumi from Ministry of Defense or even from Deputy Prime Minister.” (Deptel Niact 1022 to Vientiane)4

On May 21st Brown gave Sisouk and Phoumi the substance of Averell’s explanatory cable and reported, “I believe RLG will now go ahead with negotiations on basis Phoumi’s assurances to me.” (Vientiane 1591)5

In the meantime Phoumi had apparently already complained to Marshal Sarit, who called Ambassador Young in on the morning of May 21st to complain (Bangkok’s 1813).6

Last night (May 21) Averell answered Young instructing him to explain the situation to Sarit but cautioning not to give the Thais a story which would deviate from our policy of getting Phoumi to cooperate with us in bringing in new blood to the Government and accepting our advice in military affairs. (Deptel 1816 Niact to Bangkok, attached)7

Comment: Owing to a problem in communication, which I am trying to solve, you only got the foreign side of the story from your morning sources. I think that the net effect of possible bluntness by Averell and distortion by the Lao Ambassador has not been bad. While it may have raised Sarit’s blood pressure a little, it may also have served to impress upon Phoumi again our seriousness. That this impression needs to be given is suggested by the fact that Phoumi has still not given us a concrete [Page 785] demonstration of real cooperation. The last word we have from General Tucker on May 18th suggests he is still having trouble getting Phoumi to settle down (Vientiane 1581, attached).8

I told Averell this morning after talking with you that I believe you felt that we should ease up on blasting at Phoumi and bear down on getting his cooperation on specific military and political moves.9

Averell has a task group, including Defense and the Agency, working on just this matter now, and General Taylor’s office is also giving him a hand on the military side.

You will, no doubt, get a report of their progress at the meeting of your principal officers, which I am trying to arrange as soon as possible.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/17/62–5/25/62. Secret.
  2. Telegram 1020, may 18, contains an account of the Harriman-Khamphan talk. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1862)
  3. Dated May 20, (Ibid., 751J.00/5–2062)
  4. Dated May 20. (Ibid.)
  5. Dated May 20. (Ibid.)
  6. Dated May 21. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–2162)
  7. Dated May 21. (Ibid.)
  8. Dated May 21, not attached. (Ibid.)
  9. Dated May 18, not attached. (Ibid., 752J.00/5–1862)
  10. According to an account of the Daily White House staff meeting on May 21, McGeorge Bundy stated “in very soft terms” that he and the President “were both slightly watchful of Harriman’s views on Phoumi.” At the May 23 meeting, the same account stated that Forrestal reported that the President seemed “a little uneasy about our policy toward Phoumi,” but Forrestal felt it had settled down and was “just about the right approach.” (Memoranda for the record by Ewell, May 21 and 23; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White Houses Daily Staff Meetings)