Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

115. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

New York, March 21, 1979, 0100Z

Secto 3015. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Contact Group Ministerial Meeting With South African Foreign Minister Botha March 20.

1. (C–Entire text).

2. Western Contact Group met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, with each delegation restricted to Ministers plus three participants, for two and one half hours March 20 to discuss outstanding Namibia issues. Botha, who insisted he had no instructions to go beyond South African interpretation of implementation of the settlement proposal, repeated firm SAG insistence on need for UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia and opposition to establishment of such bases inside. After lengthy discussion, during which he evaded a request to continue the discussions at the working level, Botha announced that he must return to South Africa tonight to report to his Prime Minister. Detailed report of meeting follows:

3. Vance—Pik, we had a chance yesterday during a very full day to meet with the Front Line and all the other internal parties as well as SWAPO.² We discussed with each group their positions on paragraphs 11 and 12 of the SYG’s Feb 26 report which concerned the monitoring of SWAPO forces inside Namibia and in neighboring states. We did not get into composition because we knew that you would be talking with the SYG on this. I guess we would like to know how you want to proceed, Pik.

Botha—Well Cy, I think we should immediately proceed to the question of what is to be implemented. Do the Five want to implement the original settlement proposal or the latest Waldheim report? I have no instructions to discuss deviations from the original proposal. The South African position is clear, there should be no deviation. SWAPO should be restricted to base wherever the bases exist and there are no SWAPO bases in Namibia. I must ask why the Five advised Waldheim that SWAPO bases outside Namibia need not be monitored without even coming to us or consulting us? This, if I may submit respectfully, is contrary to the whole thrust of the proposal. We cannot support the concept of the establishment of SWAPO bases inside Namibia. This is not the proposal, was never discussed, never raised. Furthermore we informed the SYG on Dec 22 that we wanted elections in Namibia before September 30, 1979.³ We cannot go on like this. South Africa wants to withdraw from Namibia. The financial responsibility of our presence there weighs heavily on my government. There are one or two other minor points to be cleared up. We are consulting with Waldheim on composition but this is not an insurmountable problem. But the problems posed by paragraphs 11 and 12, where the West gave Waldheim bad advice, may be insurmountable and we should discuss them right away.

Vance—Let’s start then with paragraph 12. In our view this is the simplest to deal with and if we can settle this then we would isolate the problem posed by paragraph 11. Since issuance of Waldheim’s Feb 26 report, we have obtained from the Front Line their assurance to scrupulously observe the ceasefire. This is a useful step, and they reaffirmed their position in this regard to us yesterday, because it shows that they would cooperate. Yesterday they indicated that their own people, probably military, would get involved in assuring the observance of the ceasefire and would liase with UNTAG to see that there is no unauthorized border crossing.

Van Well—We should be careful not to cling to certain words or notions but ask what is meant by them. We used the word monitoring with reference to UNTAG monitoring and so its repetition with regard to the SWAPO bases outside Namibia may have produced concern within the Front Line. But if we look behind the words to see what is meant by them, we may find room for agreement. The Front Line indicated that they will cooperate with UNTAG in the maintenance of the ceasefire and therefore I suggest that we concentrate not on the words used here, but on the performance of tasks. It never was suggested by us that UNTAG should monitor SWAPO outside Namibia. But if we look at what the Front Line have promised to do and find ways to describe their promise in a concrete and detailed fashion I think there is something we could achieve. We announced in our talks yesterday the need for more details on the Front Line pledge on what they are going to do. We ought to concentrate on that.

Botha—May I just ask, what is your interpretation of Waldheim’s report of 29 August⁴ when it refers to the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO forces and the restriction of those forces to base? What does this mean, particularly when read in the clear language of item 3 of the annex to the settlement proposal?

Vance—As I read it it says that border monitoring is the responsibility of UNTAG, although UNTAG is not specifically mentioned, but that this cannot be done without the cooperation of neighboring states to prevent unauthorized SWAPO infiltration.

Botha—On Dec 22 I wrote a letter to Waldheim which included the word “with a view to the monitoring of SWAPO forces in neighboring states.” He replied in January that certainly paragraph 12 is an important element of his report and that neighboring states have responded that they would cooperate fully with the United Nations in ensuring that UNTAG is able to carry out its mandate.⁵ We never had any doubt as to the meaning of these words. I submit that these documents mean, and can only mean, that SWAPO forces should be restricted to their bases wherever they exist. I discussed this with Ahtisaari in Cape Town in January. At no time did he contradict this. In fact he said he would be proceeding to the Front Line States to discuss these matters. Then the Five gave Waldheim their unfortunate advice but there is no provision in the documents on which to base this advice. This has brought on an impasse.

Vance—I can only point to paragraph 12 of the SYG’s report. In furtherance and implementation of the terms of that paragraph we now have the statement of the Frontline that they will scrupulously observe and see that the ceasefire is observed. Yesterday they restated that position. It seems to me that this is wholly consistent with paragraph 12 and the other documents to which you refer.

Botha—It is good to know that the Front Line are willing to cooperate, but I must ask if Angola has accepted the concept of UN liaison offices.

Vance—To the best of my knowledge they have not. As you know Pik, this situation has been complicated by your recent raids into Angolan territory.

Botha—The conflict as I see it, Cy, is that Waldheim had assured me that he had the assurance of cooperation from the Front Line. Then he received that bad advice from the Five.

Vance—I am not familiar with the advice which you mention. I must defer to one of my colleagues on this.

McHenry—At no time did the Five suggest to Waldheim that there is no need of monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. We told him that the proposal does not call for the monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia by UNTAG. There is a difference. We never gave 17 clarifications to Waldheim. I know the letter you mean, but it did not originate with us.

Owen—The problem here is that for two years we have been trying to negotiate the best monitoring situation for Namibia. Ahtisaari took your offer for the monitoring of South African forces inside South Africa as a quid pro quo for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO forces outside Namibia but the issue of sovereignty caused the Front Line to reject this suggestion. You have a fair point when you say that Zambia and Botswana have accepted liaison offices but that Angola has not. SWAPO informed us yesterday that it would have no problem with the establishment of civilian liaison offices in Angola. We might well get Angolan agreement to this. Of course you have been kept informed of developments on this question all along.

Botha—I was told that we needed less troops in Namibia because after the Security Council had passed its resolutions neighboring states would accept their terms as curbs on their sovereignty. Waldheim reaffirmed this in his letter to me through his reference to the assurances of cooperation by neighboring states. I find it incomprehensible that I should have to argue this point at all.

Vance—What does monitoring mean? Must it be by UNTAG or could the neighboring state itself monitor and maintain appropriate contact and liaison with UNTAG? As long as the job gets done I don’t see what difference it makes.

Botha—Apart from the clear language on this subject which such an arrangement would contradict, there is the question of effectiveness. I suggest that the Front Line are incapable of monitoring SWAPO’s bases effectively at the present stage of their history. I have proof. We have lost four locomotives on the line running through Zambia to Zaire. It is in the interest of President Kenneth Kaunda that this line continue to function but he has informed us that he has no control over the activities of those who destroyed the locomotives. The same would certainly be the case in Angola and will soon be true of Botswana.

Vance—But the question of your railroad lines and conditions inside Zambia are all tied up with Rhodesia.

Botha—Nevertheless the fact remains that neither Angola or Zambia could do it. Why should our integrity on monitoring be questioned? Once we deviate from the language of the proposal, we run into trouble.

Vance—Where do we deviate?

Botha—The proposal was written by the Five, not by us. In its annex, it states that at the beginning of the transitional period, the South African Government has the duty to observe the ceasefire, it mentions the restriction to base of all hostile forces including SWAPO. It notes that as soon as possible UNTAG arrives and UN military personnel begin monitoring of South African and SWAPO troops restriction.

Vance—That is all in Namibia.

Botha—If SWAPO has no bases in Namibia where then must the monitoring take place?

Vance—The plan says nothing about bases outside of Namibia. You can monitor the border and restriction to base in Namibia. There is nothing that says that monitoring of SWAPO outside Namibia should be done by UN troops.

Botha—Of course, it says UN forces commence monitoring of troop restrictions, and what troop restrictions? The restriction to base.

Vance—Quite frankly, I would read that differently.

Owen—As I remember it, the argument was that SWAPO said that it had bases in Namibia. The agreement was that if SWAPO could show it had a base in Namibia that base would be monitored.

Botha—But no one here can show me a SWAPO base in Namibia. They are all outside and if not monitored, they can be moved right up to the frontier.

Stirn—I think there has been a misunderstanding having to do with the term base. SWAPO has bases outside Namibia but not inside. Inside, it is merely a question of getting together the armed SWAPO people to avoid disruption of elections. This site would be located near the border and some such action has been requested by some of the internal parties. This would not be a base, which is a site from which military operations can be launched. There is a vocabulary problem here which we must get around.

Botha—I agree with the need to overcome the vocabulary problem. We all know that SWAPO has bases and that they launch attacks from these bases. The individual SWAPO guerrillas know where their bases are located. The language of the proposal clearly requires restriction to base of both SWAPO and South African forces on the monitoring. There is no possibility of any other interpretation.

Owen—There is no dispute that we should try to get the best arrangement for monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia. Let us leave this aside and try to identify what sort of monitoring procedures you think would be helpful to have.

Botha—The same as are applied to South African units. There should be one UN command which monitors or restricts troops wherever the bases are. That is the way to achieve tranquility, to ensure the tranquility of the northern border.

Owen—What is the mechanism inside Namibia for the monitoring of South African troops?

Botha—This is to be decided by the military experts. As far as we are concerned, this has been clarified during the Ahtisaari visit to my country. Gen. Philipp worked this out with Gen. Geldenhuys point by point according to the terms of the settlement proposal. I admit that Ahtisaari did not agree with the results of Philipp’s efforts but while we did not really like the document, we could live with it to facilitate implementation.

Van Well—It is not fair to compare the restriction of South African and SWAPO forces because the needs are different in each case. Inside Namibia one needs to prevent disruption of elections. In the Frontline it is necessary to prevent border-crossing. We should identify substance and not waste time on semantics. Outside of Namibia monitoring is intended to prevent border-crossing and here we have received very solemn promises from the Frontline States. I agree that these provisions will have to be clarified as confidence has not grown to such an extent that promises could be accepted at face value. They must be made more concrete. But the objectives of monitoring inside Namibia and inside the Frontline States are different.

Botha—If the leader of one of the democratic parties of the territory asked you for a guarantee, with South African troops reduced to 1500 to two sites, with SWAPO established in bases in Namibia and no monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia, with General Philipp claiming that his troops would be withdrawn if opposed by violence, if under these circumstances a Democratic Party leader asked what security would be left to him if a major border crossing should be made—what would be your answer?

Van Well—We are ready to talk about ways to maintain the border. There are technical means, liaison, and concrete detailed clarification of liaison agreements. You have a point on the size of SWAPO forces in Namibia but I repeat let’s deal with substance and not words.

Botha—I am dealing with substance and fact. You may not recognize it but the people who live inside are human beings. If you can convince them of the rightness of your position I will be guided by their views.

Vance—The mandate for UNTAG says that they could use force in self-defense which is defined to include attempts to prevent them from carrying out their assigned tasks. This is what should guide UNTAG action and not Gen. Philipp’s comments.

Owen—We are at the old dilemma of specificity versus flexibility. We should concentrate on the substance of the border arrangements.

Botha—You have stated your positions and I have stated mine. I can’t carry it further and I think I am wasting your time.

Owen—We need to bring things closer to what you, we, and the Frontline all want. We agree that there must be monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. There is a need to flesh out the details of the monitoring in practical language. People have been reluctant to do this hitherto and I understand why this is so but we may now have to look at this.

Botha—If SWAPO genuinely wants to participate in a settlement, why will they not submit themselves to UNTAG monitoring? Why, once we have decided on all the situations and structure, included more UN troops than were ever used in any other plebescite, and a budget for UNTAG larger than that of the Namibian territory for a whole year, why should SWAPO not submit itself to monitoring as we will?

Owen—We have been talking about this for some time. Whether we can do something with civilians as well as with the UNTAG military is a legitimate question. We are dealing as practical politicians with what is negotiable.

Jamieson—We come down to the extent of your confidence in the willingness and capability of the Frontline to carry out monitoring. If this is truly the problem then it is only a question of whether we can develop an acceptable supervisory mechanism through the UN liaison offices.

Botha—We are becoming a more reluctant partner in these negotiations. We are beginning to get demands from the parties to permit them to form their own armies because apparently one must have a gun to get anything in Namibia. If you can convince the parties, many of the problems we have would be solved immediately. Waldheim mentioned to me a growing suspicion that we are not really interested in this settlement. If I reflect on developments in Namibia, the removal of most of apartheid, the development of conditions permitting one man, one vote elections, the development of policies diametrically opposed to those practiced in South Africa while one party with guns refuses to be monitored, then the whole question becomes too technical for me. I cannot give the internal party any assurance that SWAPO will not wait across the border to continue the war once they lose the election. If this keeps up I will have to give the internal parties the right to form their own armies. Nkomo in Rhodesia developed an army in three years. DTA could [do] so in three months. Would these internal armies then be given their own bases to be restricted to as is proposed with SWAPO?

Jamieson—I don’t question your bona fides and I think you raise an important point. We want to get through the remaining issues before such a situation develops. We have been categorical in our support for the monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. The question is one of mechanism. We must reinforce our own convictions to determine if there is a way this can be done. If UNTAG were going to do it some of your internal parties would be saying that they could not do it effectively either. It is not a question only of semantics but as my German colleague has said we must find a way to make progress on substance.

Vance—Pik, I don’t question your bona fides either. But we must cut through this and find a way to move toward a settlement. This may be our last chance and if we don’t succeed we may face a Rhodesia situation where the whole thing will deteriorate and go to hell in a hand basket.

Young—We started these negotiations with the need for the Frontline to respect the results of a free election. We still have their agreement. We recognize your fears regarding Frontline monitoring of SWAPO. However the Angolan experience with the Katagans on the Zaire border is relevant here. If SWAPO loses I think you would have no trouble in getting Angola and Zambia, with a little support from us, to move SWAPO forces away from the border. The Frontline is interested in political stability in Namibia and in their own territories and the Frontline surely will guarantee that there would be no massive infusion of arms from the USSR to a SWAPO which lost a UN supervised election. Western military guarantees to the newly elected Namibian Government would have to take this into account. We have had a similar experience with the Palestinians, whose existence depends upon the UN, and who have been very cooperative with the UN in Lebanon. We can get similar guarantees from the Frontline in Namibia, which was one reason we insisted on so many UN troops. Finally we can get guarantees from the Five to ensure that the results of the elections are respected.

Owen—There is a problem with confidence here. We realize that you have the internal parties in Namibia and that you must take account of their views and to some extent so must we. What we must do is get language to enable everyone to be confident that the seven month electoral process is satisfactory. It is important that the UN remain in Namibia after the elections to ensure confidence. All the arguments made here today have convinced me of the essential rightness of the size of the UN force. We have that and now we must produce satisfactory language on the monitoring of SWAPO forces inside and outside Namibia, which would be the Secretary General’s language but which we can all accept. This is going to take a little time but we must keep on until we do it.

Botha—We have reached the crux of the matter. We would not be able to reduce any South African troops with unmonitored SWAPO troops across the border. The potential for war would exist and the UN would give us no assurances through monitoring. We must have such assurances from the UN military commander and SWAPO must have the same assurances regarding the monitoring of South African forces or they won’t return. We cannot overcome this problem and get to monitoring unless we have a tranquil situation and you cannot have that with unmonitored SWAPO troops across the border. Also there is a difference of opinion here. I don’t want to quarrel with you. Over these long negotiations I have gotten to know you well. My problem is, I’ve gotten to like you. But I can’t take this further. I have instructions only to discuss the implementation of the proposal. I have taken note of the views expressed here but I can do no more than report back and consult with the internal parties.

Vance—Do you want also to talk about paragraph 11 and then consult with your government and representatives of the parties? What do you suggest be done after that?

Botha—I will have to return to South Africa after this discussion. I have no control over the internal parties. They can stay and you may wish to have further discussions with them but I have to go back and report to my government.

Owen—We all have other arrangements and perhaps we can reassemble. But we should agree that our officials all get together to define monitoring in a way consistent with the UNTAG mandate. One way would be to trust the word of the Frontline. You have made some fair points, there are problems here. Another way would be to have UNTAG on the ground in the Frontline states, but we tell you that this is not negotiable. But is there not some middle way to define the monitoring of the bases and the surveillance border in such a way as to meet the concerns of all the parties? We must create some language for the Secretary General to deal with this problem. A go was had at this in Cape Town but there were some problems at that time. No one is making a commitment that the end result of the work of our experts would be acceptable but let us make a commitment that our officials will look at this problem. We all could leave people here and for the next three or four days they should bed down and work on this. We can then assemble later.

Botha—I agree that the Frontline would prefer good monitoring arrangements. To some extent they are being held hostage themselves. Isn’t there some way of getting one or two UN people, isolated from the Frontline capitals and way out in the bush, at each SWAPO base to assure UNTAG that the SWAPO forces stay in their bases and do not misbehave? We will tell you just where all the bases are within two or three days of their establishment.

Owen—I think we can get UN civilian liaison offices in the Frontline capitals. There can be visits to bases and communication with UNTAG. One of the advantages to a UN operation is that we can blur the distinction between civilian and military. We did this to your advantage in describing the number of military in UNTAG. The point is that the UN must not put itself in a position where it gets itself into trouble during the transition.

Botha—That is my point. There is no sense in bluffing ourselves and I would be lying to you if I said there is any chance of my government accepting anything which does not include a monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia.

Owen—We agree that the SWAPO forces must be monitored. We must find a half way house between the two poles of Front Line monitoring and UNTAG monitoring. The question is the definition of the mechanism.

Botha—It is not a question of not accepting the Front Line assurances. It is that we believe that the Front Line lacks the capability.

Van Well—It is important to determine the correct starting point. I agree that the Front Line want an improvement of the situation but their point of departure is their own sovereignty in their own territory and not UN control. If you start talking in terms which do not make it clear what monitoring means, there is a problem. We must say that we accept their assurances and then work out the details of how the Front Line is to cooperate with the UN liaison offices in terms of these assurances and how they maintain cooperation and communication along the border. I am fearful that if we return to simple undefined monitoring of bases we will be in trouble. We have reached a crucial point. The Front Line wants to go ahead but we have little time left. This is a larger question than Namibia. It includes our relations [with] South Africa and with African states. We will continue talking with the internal groups but need an understanding with you or talks with internal groups won’t help. It is important when you leave here that we part on a constructive note. This might also influence the course of the Security Council debate.

Botha—What is the relevance of your remark on relations with South Africa?

Van Well—If the Namibia effort succeeds, it will have a salutory effect on our relations. If it fails, it will start a very lively debate in all our countries.

Botha—I have taken note and will report to my government.

Vance—We should turn to paragraph 11, but before doing so I note that time is short and if we do break up without a mechanism for trying to find a half way house, as David described it, the opportunity for resolution of the Namibia question may be lost, which could lead to serious consequences with escalating violence in Namibia and so forth. Now, on paragraph 11, if one were talking about a base, no strike base, because we have had too much border, away from population centers, into which any SWAPO personnel under arms will be placed on the day of the ceasefire and if the SWAPO personnel could be limited in numbers would this be a solution to your problem? I raise this because it seemed that, in the paper which you and Philipp drew up, this is a political problem to be dealt with.

Botha—Let me begin by saying that I don’t like the implication of what the Five were saying a minute ago. We take into account the tremendous consequences for our bilateral relations of the Namibia effort as well as possible Security Council action. If we are going to discuss the Security Council, then I will have to ask you to excuse me so that I can go and state our case before that body. But I don’t think that this is the place to discuss our bilateral relations, I just wanted to get that off my chest. The problem is the impression that this would make internally if any member of SWAPO could come armed to base, they would acquire a status which they had not achieved before the ceasefire. Even if we limit the number of these to 200–300, what if 3000 show up? There is no way to know how many could come. Do we put 300 in a camp? What about the remaining 2700? The problem is that we would be departing from what we consider to be the terms of the proposal. It is clear that all parties should go to their established bases. This is a term that was first used by the Five. We are going to run into the awful situation, if we continue in this vein, of my party having to consider demands by the internal parties that their armed personnel be restricted to base to match the political and military advantage accruing to SWAPO. Further, the plan makes provisions for the peaceful return of SWAPO personnel to participate in the political process. I assure you we never discussed the concept that SWAPO personnel in Namibia would have the right to their bases. I know that you see this as facilitating the establishment of tranquility, but my problem is that this was never negotiated and there is severe fear among the internal parties that this is a ploy on SWAPO’s part. There is no way to ensure that 10,000 SWAPO followers might not come forward. Our concern is based on the attitude of the parties and that SWAPO not achieve something as a result of the ceasefire which they had never achieved in practice. Apart from random terrorism, there has been no effective SWAPO campaign in Namibia which makes it different from Rhodesia. Basing SWAPO internally would alter that situation by giving them an unearned military advantage. I have just received a message that Andreas Shanika, a member of the Ovambo Provincial Assembly, was murdered yesterday by SWAPO. Moreover, the Security Council session on Namibia is underway. If we agree under these circumstances, there would be increased confusion among the parties in Namibia. I am prepared to take you there if you ever have the time, so that you can see for yourself. We spend a lot of time and effort on maintaining stability among the sensibilities of the Namibian people. If we reach an agreement which does not take these sensibilities into account, the agreement will fall apart, and sanctions will be imposed against us. We have accepted that sanctions will be imposed on us, on Rhodesia, or South West Africa or apartheid and we are making our plans accordingly.

Vance—We listened to the other parties for seven hours yesterday and as a result we have a better understanding of their fears and concerns. As far as the matter of a location where SWAPO people might go on the day of the ceasefire, however, this originated in the session between Philipp and your people.

Stirn—I believe that the way Pik has introduced the problem is the right way to set about it. The practical problems must be addressed. We agree that armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia during the transitional period could have a disruptive effect on the elections. It would be difficult to chase them out of Namibia. The practical solution is to find a place where these people could be put, where their arms could be taken away from them if necessary. To avoid the appearance of an entrenched base, it could be sited in some no man’s land near the border.

Botha—I have taken note of your view. I cannot take it any further. I will have to discuss this with the SAG and the parties. However, on the matter of the origin of the question of the internal bases for SWAPO forces I have consulted with General Geldenhuys. You are correct that in his discussions with General Philipp, this point came up. Apparently, General Philipp said that SWAPO claimed that they have bases in Namibia. This is explained further by the section of the document which refers to restriction to base and closure of bases and which would not make sense unless it also referred to any SWAPO bases which might exist in Namibia. Therefore, if such bases exist, they will also come under UNTAG monitoring. This also refers to other SWAPO bases outside Namibia which should be subject to monitoring.

Vance—I understand, perhaps incorrectly, that the question came up in discussions as to what we should do with SWAPO personnel whom we find in Namibia with arms after the ceasefire. And the solution reached was to put them in some camp.

Botha—This is not a difficult problem. Each guerrilla knows where his base is. It was to give them time to get back to those bases that Waldheim provided for the ten day period of delay in his original ceasefire letter. Otherwise, the guerrillas would have every incentive to remain in Namibia.

Vance—We thought the intent of the ten day period was to give SWAPO time to inform its commanders of the ceasefire so that their troops could in fact stop fighting.

Botha—If this is the case it is an open invitation to SWAPO to cross the border in large numbers.

Owen—There will be a practical problem if SWAPO gathers in groups of 20 in houses on ceasefire day and claims those houses as bases. No one has been able to accept the February 26 document but the problems that it addresses are problems which will face all of us in the implementation of the proposal. All that is necessary is for us to make a commitment to see if there is a mechanism to address these problems to produce some form of workable agreement. Ultimately this must come under the Secretary General’s authority and we cannot infringe on this but we must get an arrangement which all parties can live with which would be sensitive to the problems of the national sovereignty of states but within the mandate of UNTAG.

Botha—Whenever we talk about sovereignty, we are overrun, overruled, and ignored by these same Front Line States. Why not talk about elections in Angola? I don’t think we should make too much of this sovereignty question. We want to find a way out of this impasse but my government must also deal with the internal parties. Concerning the operational implementation documents, much of this was drafted by Philipp himself. It was not a question of his agreement to something which we had prepared.

Jamieson—When we went to Namibia there was a general assumption among us that there should be no SWAPO monitoring or bases inside Namibia, but inside the territory people were concerned that the issue of armed SWAPO personnel in country would arise and they did not know what should be done with them. This problem is addressed by the solution of internal bases. It is not my intent that simply anyone could appear and claim to be a guerrilla and be included in the SWAPO bases. But the alternative to basing seems to be taking your chances on SWAPO personnel in Namibia causing disruption during the elections.

Botha—There was another option which we discussed, which was either they hand over their arms and participate peacefully, or return to their established bases.

Jamieson—I agree that this should be an option, but I was playing back to you the comments of some of the democratic parties in Namibia. What do you do if they don’t lay down their arms or return to their established bases?

Botha—We would respect the ceasefire only if there is a real ceasefire. If they want to return to Angola then there is a real question which you could fairly put to me if we should shoot the SWAPO personnel after they have laid down their arms and are simply returning to their bases. The police would still be there. The fact is that the ten day period would give SWAPO plenty of time to return to their bases. I should like to thank you for having received the parties at these discussions. I don’t know the extent to which any progress was achieved with them as I have seen only the NNF and plan to leave later this afternoon which would get me back to South Africa on Friday. I cannot take this farther, now I simply must go back. This is not a walkout on my part since, after all, we did not envisage that the talks would go on longer than two days. Now I will talk to my government and the parties and will inform you of my government’s position.

Owen—Wouldn’t it be possible to leave General Geldenhuys behind with our people, the representatives of SWAPO, the Front Line, and possibly the internal parties to see if we can work out an implementation arrangement which has the confidence of everyone? If we can’t we can’t, but we have got to work out the appropriate detailed guidance for the parties in the field at some point. If we succeed, your government will have something rather more concrete, as will we all, on which to base our decisions. If not, we will just be talking to one another, things will slip, we will lose time, fall afoul of winter weather for the elections and will begin talking about elections in 1980 rather than in 1979. This will be frustrating for everyone.

Botha—I appreciate the spirit in which your suggestion is made. The problem is that I must consult personally and very thoroughly with my government. This cannot be done by phone or cable as we might be listened into by the Russians who have a very good deciphering capability. [omission in the original] Foreign Ministers with much more power than I have. Also we haven’t got as many people as you. You have armies of experts and we are a small country. I myself do some of our drafting late at night; that’s why you may not like it all. But I have to speak personally to my Prime Minister.

Van Well—Let us be clear about what situation we leave here. We all have to report back to our governments. But I share Dr. Owen’s concern for a follow-up on our problems so as to avoid leaving the impression that this meeting was a failure. It was called to bridge a complicated situation; to improve that situation and avoid slippage. This is why I endorse Dr. Owen’s suggestion for keeping our governments engaged in discussion on matters of principle that were raised here. It is, however, my impression that the question of internal bases is the principal concern of the internal groups. Various statements on five bases, the number of SWAPO troops to be based in Namibia. And so forth, have aroused concern and we have to deal with this concern. From our discussion with SWAPO, it seems that this has become a point of prestige. I think they have no ulterior motive on the use of these bases. They just want to make the point that they can have them. We all agree that there must be careful restriction on these troops to prevent disruptive incidents. I would welcome it if we could stay in touch, and, ad referendum and without commitment, we could elaborate a structure to work out a commitment on what to do with armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia.

Botha—I appreciate your sentiments.

Vance—I support Dr. Owen’s suggestion and hope that you will convey this support to your government. I think it makes sense to try to do this and hope it might be possible. When do you plan to say something to the press and what to you expect to say?

Botha—Very little. It would really depend upon the questions which the press puts to me. I hope they won’t be too severe.

Vance—What do we say about where we go from here?

Botha—Every side must decide what it wants to say to the press, but I won’t close any doors. My major thrust would be that we have had discussions, exchanges of views, and that I feel it to be in all our interests that I report back to my government. Something like that.

Owen—It would be helpful if we could add that in light of your discussions with the Prime Minister it might be possible to meet at the technical level along the lines that we suggested or that the Ministers might get together again.

Botha—Yes certainly.

Owen—Also some Front Line Foreign Ministers will be coming and Waldheim has agreed to meet with some of them. SWAPO will still be here and we might be able to build something on this.

Vance—In any case we will be waiting until you have talked by phone to your Prime Minister before we say anything to the press.

Botha—Yes I will not say anything to the press until after I have talked to the Prime Minister. Cy, I will call you immediately after I have spoken to P.W.

Jamieson—One thing we will not say is that we are all returning to our respective bases.

Correction: para 12, para 1, line 10, should read “the monitoring of the bases and the surveillance of the border. . . . .”

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790129–0867. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, USUN, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.
2. See Documents 112 and 113.
3. In telegram Tosec 150061/322951 to Pretoria, December 23, 1978, the Department transmitted the text of the December 22 letter from Botha to Waldheim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780531–0126)
4. See footnote 2, Document 91.
5. See footnote 4, Document 113.