211. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
11315. Paris for Dick Moose only. From Low. Subject: Rhodesia: Meeting With Ian Smith.
Summary: Smith maintained his willingness to attend private meeting of principals to “explore the Patriotic Front’s position.” Graham and I outlined the basis of their position along lines set out at Dar.2 Smith asked for a paper on the subject which we agreed to give him to take up with his colleagues on the Executive Council.3 While he gave no concessions, he at least has agreed to enter into discussion with us on the substance of an all parties meeting. End summary.
1. Graham and I met with Ian Smith and Jack Gaylard for about forty-five minutes Monday noon, the meeting was businesslike and friendly. There was a complete absence of any hostility in the atmosphere.
2. Graham noted that we were leaving that evening for London to confer with Secretaries Vance and Owen. After meetings with all the parties including Front Line Presidents, we have concluded that a conference is now possible. Mugabe said he was prepared to attend a meeting in Zambia on the 5th and 6th of August, though Nkomo was concerned about the possibility of failure and wanted to wait. In the meantime he had promised to be in touch with us again. Graham noted the Front Line Presidents’ disposition to assist positively as they had in reaching an agreement between the parties on Namibia. He reviewed the basis on which he thought agreement might be possible and asked Smith whether he had discussed the matter with his colleagues on the Executive Council.
3. Smith said he was waiting for a definite proposal before discussing it with his colleagues. He felt it still would be useful to have a meeting among the six to “see what the others had to offer.” He acknowledged that the present arrangement was not going well but [Page 625] he said that could always change. He said there were some areas where the cease-fire was taking hold.
4. In discussing a settlement the important thing still was to maintain the confidence of the whites. I responded by saying that we had become convinced after talking to many persons over a number of months that the white population’s willingness to remain depended on ending the war and a return of economic prosperity rather than any legal protections in a constitution. Smith added that law and order must be protected which we agreed was part of ending the war. I then added that we know what the Patriotic Front’s position would be at a conference. They approached it as we did on the basis of our proposals as elaborated at Dar. When he asked us what these were we outlined what we thought were the basic points—replacement of the 69 constitution; a council headed by a Resident Commissioner or a neutral chairman who controlled law and order; elections after a brief period which, however, might extend beyond December 31; a revised and agreed independence constitution; and provisions for creation of a new security defense force which included Patriotic Front forces. Smith picked up the last of these which he said he would have difficulty accepting. We noted that there must be some way in which the Patriotic Front’s forces could be incorporated into the new society. We were not asking, as he claimed, that he disband his defence force. They would perform a major function in the new force. Patriotic Front forces would be brought into both the active and reserve forces. We thought that with further study they would find that Lord Carver’s plan was a practical and reasonable solution to the problem which provided a compromise they themselves were moving towards.
5. We pressed Smith on timing noting that consideration of the constitution was moving ahead and he would be forced soon to ask for approval in the Executive Council and go to a referendum with it. It would then be more difficult to consider alternatives. We said we thought the Front Line would be willing to help on the more difficult areas where we had not yet achieved agreement with the Patriotic Front—composition of the Governing Council, the make-up of the police and the security forces. However, they were asking us whether Smith was prepared to “be reasonable” on the five principles stated above. We did not believe that they, any more than we, were prepared to press the Patriotic Front to move on them. Smith took exception to our description of these points as “reasonable.” We accepted they could be characterized as one wished but we believed they were a minimum basis for discussion at a conference. We discussed composition of a Council saying the PF was now asking for a majority as was the Salisbury Group. Analysis but [of?] that would have to be worked out at a conference.
[Page 626]6. Smith said that according to his information Mugabe and Nkomo were drifting further apart. I replied that they may be but whatever one’s assessment of the relation between ZANU and ZAPU, or for that matter the unity of ZANU, a way must be found to take account of and include the ZANLA elements which were now doing so much fighting inside the country if peace were to be assured.
7. Smith asked us for a piece of paper containing the bases for discussion at a meeting which we had described to him. We agreed to furnish them later in the day (transmitted septel).4 He said he did not know what his colleagues view of them would be. I pointed out that they had already accepted them last September. Smith’s retort was “That was before I talked some sense into them” with a slight smile. He undertook to discuss the subject of a meeting and the basis for it as set out in our paper with his colleagues if they returned to the country by next Tuesday the 25th (Sithole and Muzorewa are both abroad).
7. Comment: Smith gave away nothing at the meeting but he did not move backwards. On the country [contrary?] he affirmed his willingness to go to a conference under our auspices of the six principals. Further, for the first time he began focusing on the substance of such a meeting. Thus we feel we have made useful progress in finally getting down to a discussion with Smith on the substantive basis of discussions at an all parties meeting.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 24, 7/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Maputo, and Pretoria. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Documents 204 and 206.↩
- In telegram 11316 from London, July 18, Brewster transmitted the text of the non-paper requested by Smith. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 24, 7/78) For the text, see paragraph 9 of Document 213.↩
- See footnote 3 above.↩