Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa¹

Washington, December 30, 1978, 0126Z

327068. For the Ambassador. Subject: Further Nuclear Talks. Ref: Pretoria 7631.²

1. It has now been six months since the Smith talks. While the SAG has come back to us in the meantime for clarifications, which we have supplied, it has avoided giving us a definite response to our proposals for a nuclear settlement.

2. [4 lines not declassified] instituting a safeguards regime with a possible stockpile of HEU of unknown size would present clear political and technical difficulties.

3. In these circumstances, we think it important to determine whether the SAG is serious in entertaining our proposals, or whether it is simply stretching out the negotiations for other purposes. Delay also reduces the credibility of our effort to resolve the uncertainties of SA’s nuclear intentions through negotiation and cooperation.

4. In light of the above, we are contemplating asking the Secretary to approve an early approach to the SAG. The purpose of an approach would be to determine to what extent the SAG is willing to cooperate on the nuclear issue and, hopefully, to obtain a clearer indication of its specific intention to adhere to the NPT and accept safeguards at Valindaba.

5. If the SAG’s response to this approach indicated that our non-proliferation objectives are attainable, we would consider as a second step what steps we might appropriately take to accelerate the settlement process.

6. The approach we contemplate would be along the following lines:

—You will recall that in June both sides stressed the urgency of resolving the nuclear issues set forth in the Joint Minute³ and expressed the hope that the necessary decisions could be taken within two months of that time.

—The communication we received in September was inconclusive, did not lead to the implementation foreseen in the Joint Minute, and in fact raised issues we thought had been clarified earlier.⁴

—Moreover, since September we have provided a team of your legal experts detailed briefings and documentation on all aspects of the Non-Proliferation Act, ancillary procedures, and administrative regulations. We have also supplied a draft text of a revised nuclear cooperation agreement. We have indicated our willingness to discuss further the technical aspects of an interim safeguards development program at Valindaba.

—My government is most concerned that our extensive exchanges over the past year have not brought us to a nuclear agreement.

—Continuing delay compounds uncertainties regarding operation of the Valindaba plant. Our concerns will be shared by others familiar with Dr. Roux’s recent statement in the US press that Valindaba is capable of producing highly enriched uranium. (FYI: Reference is to Washington Post article,⁵ pouched to you earlier.)

—There is serious question under these circumstances as to whether a nuclear settlement reached only after substantial further delay would be in the interests of the US or would resolve continuing international concern regarding South Africa’s nuclear intentions.

—In view of the above and since, as Ambassador Smith pointed out in the June discussions, time is of the essence in our nuclear proposals, we need very soon (FYI: we would have in mind a couple of weeks) your government’s decision on whether to enter the nuclear settlement set forth in the Joint Minute.

7. Reftel reached us as we were preparing the above proposal. In light of your concern regarding timing of further nuclear talks, but also taking into account our concerns enumerated above, we would very much like to have soonest your considered judgment as to whether or not we should go ahead with an approach to the SAG along the lines described in para 6.⁶

Newsom

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 12/15–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 7631 from Pretoria, December 29, Edmondson noted: “With the Namibian question very much up in the air in the next few weeks, I do not believe this is a good time to encourage SAG to begin further talks on the nuclear issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780538–0524)
3. See Document 344.
4. See Document 348.
5. “South Africa’s Pilot Enrichment Plant,” Washington Post, December 5, 1978, p. A16.
6. In telegram 7665 from Pretoria, December 30, Edmonson counseled a delay until at least February. He held: “More fundamentally, even taking into account our nuclear concerns, I believe it would be wisest to make our approach after we have a better idea as to whether we have indeed been successful in getting the SAG to move ahead with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 on Namibia. If we are having difficulty on Namibia, it may be difficult to get the SAG to focus on nuclear matters rationally and it will be much harder for us to be forthcoming on matters necessary to get a nuclear agreement. If Namibian matters appear to be hanging in the balance, it might be best not to press them on the nuclear issue. On the other hand, if Namibia is going badly and we are concerned at the passage of time, we might decide to take a much harder stand on the nuclear issue, clearly indicating that we cannot hold our offer open if they have not committed themselves to accept it in time for approval by the present session of Parliament (which ends in June).” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2128)