Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

349. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, October 6, 1978, 8:15–9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• • The President
  • The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Chrisotpher

• Treasury

  • Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • USUN
  • Ambassador Andrew Young
  • JCS
  • General David Jones

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron
  • Mr. Hamilton Jordan

• NSC

  • Mr. Thomas P. Thornton

Dr. Brzezinski: This is the first NSC meeting on Africa since March 3, 1977;² it gives us an opportunity to review our approach and test its validity. We will open with a CIA briefing.

Admiral Turner: (Gave general intelligence briefing on southern Africa and Angola.)³

Secretary Vance: Namibia is our principal problem in addition of course to Rhodesia, and it is essential for us to go to Pretoria next week to get the South Africans to rethink their position. I spoke to a South African journalist yesterday who recommends that the Contact Group concentrate on setting a fixed date for the election, perhaps late April.⁴ This might move the South Africans who are afraid the UN will put off elections indefinitely since SWAPO does not want them. Waldheim’s statement on troops helped and he says he would go along with our scenario.⁵ In fact we will probably be unsuccessful and have to go on to sanctions. I believe the other Contact Group members are with us but we have not chosen the sanctions.

The President: What about the issue of force size?

Secretary Vance: Waldheim has scaled things down and it is not a major point now. The South Africans are satisfied with the police arrangements. The issue is whether the new government is prepared to be flexible or whether they have drawn the line.

Dr. Brzezinski: I agree fully with that in the short run but there is a larger issue: This administration has been activist, morally motivated, and urged moderation. The President’s prestige is involved. I do not believe we will be successful because the Soviets and Cubans offer military radical solutions. There are two courses of action open to us. First, if the Soviet and Cuban problem is a long term threat we should make it a major issue in our relations with them. We must demonstrate to the Africans that military solutions are not viable. Second, if we cannot do this we should slowly and subtly lower our level of involvement. We would maintain our moral position but admit that there is little we can do. We are not able to succeed unless we face up to the Soviet and Cuban problem. The African moderates in time might also realize the harm that the Cuban presence brings about.

Secretary Vance: I believe that there is a third way and that is bringing about peaceful solutions. We should continue along that route. The next step is sanctions directed to the Namibia problem.

The President: We will be moving into the UN and not having us and the British up front.

Secretary Vance: We never were in the forefront in Namibia. If we make progress there it will help us in Rhodesia. It would be dangerous to decide now that we are going to confront the Soviets in southern Africa. Andy Young and I discussed two kinds of sanctions: A cut-off of all air transportation to South Africa and a suspension of credits. Both of these would be for three months.

Ambassador Young: We have already thwarted the Soviet and Cuban advance, as can be seen in the Angolan reconciliation with Zaire.⁶ The Soviets want to stir things up but we need stability because of our long range economic interests. The pragmatism of Angola and Mozambique reflects their need for development. Like Sadat, they want the fighting to stop and they know the Soviets cannot help. Namibia is the key; a limited success there will undercut the military option. In the long run the military option leads to situations like Uganda. The present black political leadership in southern Africa is moderate and pragmatic. The military leaders may be different. My greatest fear is that the western-educated leaders will be killed off, leaving people like Amin and Mengistu in charge who are ideologically dependent on the Soviets. On sanctions, the three month period banning air travel is fortunate. Congress will be out of session and it will cover the Christmas season when many South Africans go abroad. It will show the South Africans what it is like to retreat into the laager. They are not a hopeless case; P.W. Botha was elected by a small group of people. Pik Botha’s public following is much larger. Knowing about possible sanctions builds up a counter pressure on the South African Government to offset the pressure from the Right Wing.

The President: How will the other four countries react to air travel suspension?

Secretary Vance: They will agree. On Rhodesia we should have one more try at the Anglo-American Plan and then turn it over to the UN.

Dr. Brzezinski: That will be another way of lowering our involvement.

The Vice President: A Namibian solution on the basis of Resolution 338 would be a major accomplishment.⁷ We nearly made it. Former Ambassador Bowdler told me he was skeptical whether it would make sense for P.W. Botha to come to the United States in return for accepting Resolution 338. Couldn’t we explore with Pik Botha if this would be possible? The South Africans are western-oriented and are hurt by their isolation. They would pay a price to be readmitted to the West—perhaps Namibia. If we threaten them with sanctions publicly it will just become a test of their manhood.

Secretary Vance: It is an idea worth considering.

Ambassador Young: Every time we think of this kind of thing they do something outrageous that makes a visit impossible. We have a lot to talk about with them.

Secretary Vance: [less than 1 line not declassified] We do have positive cards to play.

Ambassador Young: SWAPO recognizes that Namibia will have to have economic ties to South Africa just as Mozambique does. South African economic influence is strong throughout the region.

Secretary Blumenthal: If suspending credits is a possible sanction we should bear in mind that money is the most fungible commodity. Suspending credits would be only symbolic in the short run and South Africa can take countermeasures against our investments there and outstanding bank loans. The sanctions would have to be universal to be effective and this sort of thing has not worked in the past. The embargo on air service sounds like a much better idea. Also we could suspend Exim credits but this would be very small.

Secretary Vance: Credit sanctions would be most effective if the UK and France joined in.

Secretary Brown: We have not even been able to get our allies to cut off credits to the Cubans who are acting badly in Africa.

Secretary Vance: This however is very limited and designed for psychological effect. Even so we must look at it very carefully.

Dr. Brzezinski: We must also consider the impression here. We would be setting up an air blockade while Soviets and Cubans fly troops to Africa; we would be suspending credits while our allies give credits to Cuba. We should put pressure on them.

The President: These are my inclinations but they shouldn’t be taken as final decisions:

1. It would be unwise to espouse sanctions publicly before Cy’s trip.⁸ Botha would stand firm against public pressure.

2. Vance could go with a proposal with a firm date for elections (although I thought they would be required before April); a provision for not more than 3,500 troops and 1,500 other personnel. This is what Waldheim told me and I think SWAPO would accept it.

3. I will send a letter to Botha offering a private meeting.⁹ It will let him know exactly what we want him to do about Smith and Namibia. I am prepared to meet with Botha here.

4. We need a long range projection of South Africa’s relations with the world; Andy should help out on this. They and many Americans have a vision of disaster in the future. We are on shaky ground pressing South Africa too far. Machel would prefer to work harmoniously with South Africa rather than see the region erupt into war.

5. In Rhodesia we will tell all parties concerned that we will make one more attempt and then put the Anglo-American Plan in the hands of the United Nations. Nobody there wants war and Smith may want to get out from under the situation.

6. We will need a substantial public relations effort directed against Smith’s activities in the US, describing what the Anglo-American Plan is and what we are doing.

7. Early next week we will meet again to see how we want to proceed with Botha. Vance should set the scene with Botha pointing out that our intentions towards South Africa are not hostile.

I think a lot of the black nations in Africa would like to see peace; if we can ever get a process started on apartheid the West and the private sector will also support progress.

Secretary Vance: That sounds fine in general outline. The Africans have reacted moderately on the subject of Namibia and our granting of the visa to Smith. They realize that we are trying to do our best.

Dr. Brzezinski: If they think that we may back off if they do not support us, then they may be more inclined to back us now.

Secretary Brown: Would we go ahead with the All-Parties Conference if Nkomo or Mugabe didn’t come?

The President: Nkomo is more important.

Secretary Vance: The Front Line States question whether there is enough common ground to hold a conference. If they think there is they will put pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe.

Dr. Brzezinski: I will prepare minutes of what has just been outlined. If anybody has questions or reservations they should submit a memorandum to me today.

Vice President: We should set up a Crisis Management Operation to deal with the Smith visit.

The President: Jody Powell should be involved and Warren Christopher should lead the team.

Secretary Vance: Andy has already been in touch with some of the media.

The President: We need to brief the press broadly. I talked to Tom Brokaw and David Hartman last night. They thought we made the right decision on the visa but we must be prepared to meet the issue head on.

Secretary Vance: Sithole may be an even more articulate spokesman than Smith.

The President: If Botha just tells us to go to hell then we will go ahead with the sanctions. I would like to see Smith give Rhodesia back to the British even if they don’t want it.

Secretary Vance: I will take that possibility up with Smith. The Front Line States will support almost anything once Smith is out.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #14 Held 10/16/78, 6–9/78, 10/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. See Document 267.
3. Not attached. On October 4, Turner sent Carter an intelligence memoranda on Rhodesia and Angola. The memorandum on Rhodesia summarized developments in the conflict, the status and positions of key players in the negotiations, and the potential for Soviet and Cuban involvement in Rhodesia. The memorandum on Angola summarized Neto’s decision to improve relations with the West, while facing security threats along Angola’s borders with Namibia and Zaire. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #14 Held 10/16/78, 6–9/78, 10/78)
4. In telegram Secto 11032 from New York, October 5, the Secretary provided details of his meeting with South African publisher David DeVilliers in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408–0323)
5. In telegram 3881 from USUN, September 29, the Mission transmitted the text of Waldheim’s statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780397–0224)
6. In July, the Governments of Angola and Zaire announced their intention to establish diplomatic relations.
7. Adopted in 1949, the resolution addressed specific questions concerning the international status of Southwest Africa and South Africa’s responsibilities. For text of UNSC Resolution 338, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–1949, p. 875.
8. See Documents 93, 95, and 96.
9. See Document 94.