763.72/3469½a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I know that you are giving constant and anxious thought to the course of action we should take in regard to arming merchant vessels, but I feel it my duty to express to you my personal views on the subject knowing that you will understand my motives in doing so.
It seems to me that we must proceed upon one of two hypotheses and should regulate our policy accordingly. These hypotheses are that we will ultimately be at war with Germany or that we will continue the present state of unfriendly peace.
[Page 617]As to the second hypothesis I can see no satisfactory outcome. Suppose we continue as we are, then Germany will have gained all she seeks by preventing American vessels from visiting the waters of the “danger zone” and meanwhile our people will become more and more incensed at German activities and intrigues until they turn against our own Government for failure to act under the greatest provocation. If delay in action is in the expectation or hope that Germany will declare war upon this country and relieve us of that grave responsibility, I am convinced that both expectation and hope will be vain unless we do something very definite which may be interpreted to be a casus belli. I think the German Government will be entirely satisfied to let the present situation continue and will do everything possible to avoid hostilities, feeling that by so doing this Government will be seriously embarrassed and placed in a very undesirable position before the American people. But can we afford to let matters stand as they are? If we do, what possibility is there for an improvement in conditions by continued inaction? I confess that I can see nothing to gain by a continuance of this situation so satisfactory to Germany and so unsatisfactory to us. I have considered the matter very carefully and endeavored to construct some result which will warrant a continuance, but I have failed.
Feeling the present state of affairs is hopeless for ultimate peace and being convinced of the impossibility of founding a policy on the hypothesis that we can remain at peace, it seems to me that we ought to proceed on the theory that we will in a short time be openly at war with Germany. If we assume that hypothesis our course is largely a matter of expediency taking chiefly into account what actions will appeal most strongly to the sense of justice and right of the American people and will most firmly unite them in support of the Government. I think that to be of first consideration at the present time.
My own belief is that prompt and vigorous action will do more than anything else to crystallize public support and unite the people behind the Government. As I read the public mind there is an impatient desire to go forward. The people will follow readily and whole-heartedly if a policy of action is adopted and pressed with vigor. I am firmly convinced that expediency as well as duty lies in action.
In view of the conclusion, which I have reached—and reached reluctantly in view of the great issue at stake—, I think that our merchant vessels should be sent out under armed guards, that announcement of this policy should be made immediately and the guns and men placed on the vessels as soon as possible.
I would not advise this course if I could see any possible benefit from delay, but I do not. On the contrary I think that delay is causing a wrong impression of the Government among the people, [Page 618] which, in view of the certainty of war at no distant day, ought to be avoided.
It is with hesitation I have written this letter, because I know that you are devoting your time to this greatest question of your Administration, but I felt that I would be derelict in my duty not to state frankly my views to you.
Faithfully yours,