He would be very much pleased if you could let him know in time to enable
him to issue the orders today.
[Enclosure]
The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to President Wilson
Washington,
March 9, 1917.
Dear Mr. President: Admiral Benson went
over to New York last night to confer with Admiral Usher, Mr.
Franklin17 and
others looking to carrying out the policy desired. The important
question now seems to be which is the best policy to be adopted to
carry into effect the arming of ships. There were three different
methods outlined in the memorandum submitted to you yesterday.
Briefly summarized, they are:
Policy No. 1
Replies to the German threat to sink neutral vessels in designated
zones of the high seas by assuming all German submarines on the high
seas are attacking United States vessels and that merchant vessels
of the United States consequently may fire upon German submarines
wherever they are met on the high seas.
Policy No. 2
Replies to the German threat to sink neutral vessels in designated
zones of the high seas by assuming that all German submarines within
[Page 619]
those zones are
attacking U. S. vessels and that consequently merchant vessels of
the United States may fire upon German submarines wherever they are
met within those zones, but that merchant vessels must grant to
German submarines the right of visit and search in all other areas
of the high seas.
Policy No. 3
Replies to the German threat to sink neutral vessels in designated
zones of the high seas by continuing to recognize the rights of
German submarines to visit and search American merchant vessels, but
authorizes those vessels to resist by force certain named unlawful
acts of submarines.
I am enclosing redrafted copies of the memorandum submitted to you
yesterday giving in detail the three separate policies
suggested.18 Policy No. one denies
the right of German submarines to search and seizure, and if ships
carrying contraband are to have guns and naval crews on board will
it not be necessary to deny search and seizure? Otherwise,
practically no goods could be transported and the orders from abroad
could not be filled. Would not this practically tie up American
ships from going through the barred zone? To be sure this would deny
the belligerent right of Germany to visit and search anywhere on the
high seas. This would, of course, be a departure from international
law and usage. Germany and the world might say that, demanding
observance of international law, we had ourselves failed to observe
it. Of course, our answer would be that Germany’s note that it would
sink without warning justified our action. This would be sufficient
answer, undoubtedly, if in your message to Congress you had not
expressed the doubt that Germany would be guilty of that
unprecedented act. I am calling your attention to what is involved
in Policy No. 1 before you determine upon which course should be
pursued.
Admiral Benson is strongly of the opinion that the first thing to be
done would be to notify Germany that, in view of the declaration
that she intends to sink our ships without warning in a certain
zone, it is our purpose to arm our ships for protection. He believes
if this information is imparted it is barely possible that Germany
might not carry out her threat. If we deny the right of visit,
Germany would declare that to be a warlike act, and that we were
responsible for bringing on war. It is entirely probable that the
next step would be war. If we must enter it to protect our rights
and the lives of our people, I have felt we ought to do nothing to
put the responsibility for this step upon our Government.
[Page 620]
Last night I conferred with Admiral Palmer about the crews to man the
guns. He has taken action, and sends this note which I thought you
would like to read. It is as follows:
Confidential
March 9, 1917.
From: Bureau of Navigation.
To: Operations.
Subject: Arming merchant vessels with Naval gun crews and a Naval
Officer.
Before any action is taken the Secretary should know that the
presence of U. S. sailors (and an officer) on merchant ships
will probably be considered an act of war from the German
viewpoint.
That it is most probable that a German submarine, knowing an
American merchant vessel is armed, and has armed forces of the
U. S. on board, for the definite and sole purpose of resisting
attack of submarines, will attack without warning.
That the master of the merchant vessel and the Naval officer will
believe the German submarine will attack without warning, and
therefore, for the safety of the vessel, passengers, U. S.
sailors and crew, they will fire at the submarine on sight.
The Secretary should be fully informed on this subject before
final steps are taken to place 50 U. S. sailors and officers on
armed merchant vessels.
(Signed) Leigh C. Palmer
Admiral Benson is to telephone me how soon ships could leave and
whether action can be taken without publicity. My own opinion is
that it would be impossible to take the action without our own
people knowing it for these reasons:
- 1.
- Passengers would not go on these ships unless they knew
they were armed and had competent gun crews. Their families
and friends would know they were going and publicity would
be certain.
- 2.
- Shippers and all their employees would be busy loading the
cargo, and this could not be kept secret.
- 3.
- The sending of the gun crew—40 or 50 on the larger
ships—would be known on the ships or stations from which
they are taken, and experience has shown how impossible such
movements are to be confined to service channels.
The question arises, too, whether it would not be wisest to state
that you had reached the conclusion that you had a right to arm the
ships and would do so, making no statement as to the time or the
method. I cannot resist the feeling that this would be the best
course and meet public approval. If Germany wants war, she will try
to sink in any event. If she wishes to avert war with us, there
would be time to modify her orders to Naval commanders so they would
not commit the overt act.
Admiral Benson will return this afternoon and I will send you tonight
or tomorrow morning a statement from him after his talk with Mr.
Franklin. It will take five days, after notice that ships
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are to be armed, for one
to sail, and until I hear from you I will give no orders to arm
them, but will have guns and crews ready for immediate action.
I suggest whether, when we undertake to arm the ships, it will not be
necessary to secure some co-operation with the English or French to
whose shores the ships are destined. The information comes to us
that when a ship leaves New York, its route and time of arrival are
cabled to the Admiralty and it is met and convoyed into port by
destroyers or other craft through a lane traversed all the time by
Naval craft. Suppose we send out an armed merchant ship, ought we
not to secure some such convoy or protection when she nears port in
the barred zone? This is a big question but is one that we probably
must face. The English also on this side know when a ship is coming
into an American port and keep ships over here to afford protection.
Certain French and English Naval officers here have suggested to
officers in our service that some character of co-operation would be
necessary. Naturally they would expect us to patrol and convoy their
ships coming into our ports if they protect and convoy our ships
going into their ports. Such cooperation would be easy if we were at
war with Germany, but as we are not at war, would not such
co-operation make us regarded as an ally of the entente powers? The
protection of our ships and their reaching ports in safety raises so
many difficult questions, and the consequences are so grave, that I
am trying to present them to you before the final order to arm is
given, though, of course, they have been present in your mind during
the whole controversy.
Sincerely yours,