Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914

File No. 800.858/3.

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador.

No. 355.]

Department of State,
Washington, May 19, 1914.

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge your note of March 23, 1914, in which you call attention to the views of your Government regarding the question of jurisdiction over foreign merchant vessels. You state that an “interdepartmental committee has now been appointed to consider the state of the law as regards criminal and civil jurisdiction over foreign vessels and persons on board of the same in British ports and territorial waters; and to advise how far it would be possible or desirable to arrive at an arrangement with foreign countries which would obviate disputes of the nature referred to, and to what extent legislation would be necessary in the United Kingdom in order to render such an arrangement feasible.” You request to be furnished with information to enable you to furnish your Government with” a full report on both the law and practice of the United States in regard to the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction (a) by the United States over foreign ships and persons on board of them in United States waters, and (b) in foreign waters over members of the crew by the master of a private ship, sailing under the United States flag, or by any other person acting under the authority of the United States.”

With a view to furnishing the information desired by your Government the Department takes pleasure in inviting attention to a number of decisions of American courts, certain diplomatic correspondence, treaty stipulations between this Government and other nations, and certain provisions of the municipal legislation of the United States.

In the matter of criminal jurisdiction exercised by the courts of this country over foreign ships in territorial waters of the United States and over persons on board such vessels, the leading case is that known as Wildenhus’s case (120 U. S., 1) in which the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the jurisdiction of the courts of New Jersey where the crime of felonious homicide had been committed by a Belgian subject on the person of another Belgian subject on board of a Belgian vessel lying in the port of Jersey City, New Jersey. The following excerpt from the opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Chief Justice White clearly states the principles underlying the assumption or non-assumption of jurisdiction by the local courts (pp. 11–12):

It is part of the law of civilized nations that when a merchant vessel of one country enters the ports of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of the place to which it goes, unless by treaty or otherwise the two countries have come to some different understanding or agreement; for, as was said by Chief Justice Marshall in The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 144, “it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such … merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.” United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520; 1 Phillimore’s Int. Law, 3d ed. 483, par 351; Twiss’ Law of Rations in Time of Peace, 229, par. 159; Creasy’s Int. Law, 167, par. 176; Halleck’s Int. Law, 1st ed. 171. And the English judges have uniformly recognized the rights of the courts of the country of which the port is part to punish crimes committed by one foreigner on another in a foreign merchant ship. Regina v. Cunningham, Bell C. C. 72; S. C. 8 Cox G. C. 104; Regina v. Anderson, 11 Cox C. C. 198, 204.; S. C. L. R. 1 C. C. 161, 165; Regina v. Keyn, 18 Cox C. C. 403, 486, 525; S. C. 2 Ex. Div. 63, 161, 213. As the owner has voluntarily taken his vessel for his own private purposes to a place within the dominion of a government other than his own, and from which he seeks protection during his stay, he owes that government such allegiance for the time being as is due for the protection to which he becomes entitled.

From experience, however, it was found long ago that it would be beneficial to commerce if the local government would abstain from interfering with the internal discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel or among themselves. And so by comity it came to be generally understood among civilized nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on board which affected only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquillity of the port, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged as the laws of that nation or the interests of its commerce should require. But if crimes are committed on board of a character to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the country to which the vessel has been brought, the offenders have never by comity or usage been entitled to any exemption from the operation of the local laws for their punishment, if the local tribunals see fit to assert their authority. Such being the general public law on this subject, treaties and conventions have been entered into by nations having commercial intercourse, the purpose of which was to settle and define the rights and duties of the contracting parties with respect to each other in these particulars, and thus prevent the inconvenience that might arise from attempts to exercise conflicting jurisdictions.

Attention may be called to a number of decisions in relation to the exercise of civil jurisdiction in cases involving the rights of foreign vessels or of persons connected with such vessels.

In ex parte Newman (14 Wallace, 152), a case where foreign seamen had libeled a foreign boat for wages, the Supreme Court said (pp. 168–169):

Admiralty courts, it is said, will not take jurisdiction in such a case except where it is manifestly necessary to do so to prevent a failure of justice, but the better opinion is that, independent of treaty stipulation, there is no constitutional or legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case. Such courts may, if they see fit, take jurisdiction in such case, but they will not do so as a general rule without the consent of the representative of the country to which the vessel belongs, where it is practicable that the representative should be consulted. His consent, however, is not a condition of jurisdiction, but is regarded as a material fact to aid the court in determining the question of discretion, whether jurisdiction in the case ought or ought not to be exercised.

In The Belgenland (114 U. S., 355), a case where the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of the Federal courts of a libel for damages arising from a collision on the high seas between two foreign vessels, that tribunal said (pp. 363–365):

For circumstances often exist which render it inexpedient for the court to take jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners in cases not arising in the country of the forum; as, where they are governed by the laws of the country to which the parties belong, and there is no difficulty in a resort to its courts; or where they have agreed to resort to no other tribunals. The cases of foreign seamen suing for wages, or because of ill treatment, are often in this category; and the consent of their consul, or minister, is frequently required before the court will proceed to entertain jurisdiction; not on the ground that it has not jurisdiction; but that, from motives of convenience or international comity, it will use its discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction or not; and where the voyage is ended, or the seamen have been dismissed or treated with great cruelty, it will entertain jurisdiction even against the protest of the consul. This branch of the subject will be found discussed in the following cases: The Catherina, 1 Pet. Adm. 104; The Forsoket, 1 Pet. Adm. 197; The St. Oloff, 2 Pet. Adm. 428; The Golubchick, 1 w. Rob. 143; The Nina, L, R. 2 Adm. and Eccl. 44; S. C. on appeal, L. R. 2 Priv. Co. 38; The Leon XIII., 8 Prob. Div. 121; The Havana, 1 Sprague, 402; The Becherdass Ambaidass, 1 Lowell, 569; The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142.

Of course, if any treaty stipulations exist between the United States and the country to which a foreign ship belongs, with regard to the right of the consul of that country to adjudge controversies arising between the master and crew, or other matters occurring on the ship exclusively subject to the foreign law, such stipulations should be fairly and faithfully observed. The Elwin Kreplin, 9 Blatchford, 438, reversing S. C. 4 Ben. 413; see S. C. on application for mandamus, Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall. 152. Many public engagements of this kind have been entered into between our government and foreign States. See Treaties and Conventions, Rev. Ed. 1873, Index, 1238.

In the absence of such treaty stipulations, however, the case of foreign seamen is undoubtedly a special one, when they sue for wages under a contract which is generally strict in its character, and framed according to the laws of the country to which the ship belongs; framed also with a view to secure, in accordance with those laws, the rights and interests of the ship-owners as well as those of master and crew, as well when the ship is abroad as when she is at home. Nor is this special character of the case entirety absent when foreign seamen sue the master, of their ship for ill-treatment. On general principles of comity, Admiralty Courts of other countries will not interfere between the parties in such cases unless there is special reason for doing so, and will require the foreign consul to be notified, and, though not absolutely bound by, will always pay due respect to, his wishes as to taking jurisdiction.

Not alone, however, in cases of complaints made by foreign seamen, but in other cases also, where the subjects of a particular nation invoke the aid of our tribunals to adjudicate between them and their fellow subjects, as to matters of contract or tort, solely affecting themselves and determinable by their own laws, such tribunals will exercise their discretion whether to take cognizance of such matters or not. A salvage case of this kind came before the United States District Court of New York in 1848. The master and crew of a British ship found another British ship near the English coast apparently abandoned (though another vessel was in sight), and took off a portion of her cargo, brought it to New York, and libeled it for salvage. The British consul and some owners of the cargo intervened and protested against the jurisdiction, and Judge Betts discharged the case, delivered the property to the owners upon security given, and left the salvors to pursue their remedy in the English courts. One hundred and ninety-four Shawls, 1 Abbot, Adm. 317.

In the case of The Carolina, a British vessel (14 Fed. Rep. 424), where an action was brought by a foreign seaman in the United States Court for the District of Louisiana to recover damages for assault and battery alleged to have been committed on the high seas, the Court said (pp. 425, 426):

It is undoubtedly true, as a general proposition, that an action for a personal tort follows the person, and may be brought in any foreign court. It is also true that the courts of a nation are established and maintained for the convenience of its own citizens or subjects, and if foreigners are permitted to become actors therein, it is because of what is termed comity between nations. American Law Review, vol. 7, p. 417, and Daniel Webster’s Works (Everett’s Edition), vol. 6, pp. 117, 118. The only ground upon which a foreigner could urge a claim to become a libelant in our courts would be that it was by comity due his government that its subjects should be thus heard, and, so far as this claim could be considered as a right, it could be insisted on only by that government, and, except in cases of inhumanity or gross injustice, would disappear whenever the claimant’s government took a position against it.

There is in this case no circumstance such as the unwarranted termination of the voyage, the discharge of a seaman, or brutality, which might possibly constitute a proper ground for the interposition if the jurisdiction of a foreign court without the request of the representative of libelant’s government. It is a suit brought by a foreigner springing out of a voyage on the ship of a friendly nation, in the midst of that voyage, against the subjects of that nation, on account of alleged grievances. The libelant not only proposes to disconnect himself from the ship, but asks the detention of ship, officers, and crew in a foreign port, in order to settle a dispute which can far better be settled by the tribunals of the country in which, under whose laws, and in connection with whose commerce, he made his contract, and to which he agreed to return. The representative of that country asks this court not to interfere. It is urged, and that fairly, that by the very agreement of the parties—the articles of shipping—the courts of the kingdom of Great Britain have been made the forum for the settlement of this dispute; that they afford adequate redress; and that for courts to entertain this and similar suits during a voyage which the parties had agreed to make at intermediate points at which the vessel might touch, would impose delays which might seriously and uselessly embarrass the commerce of a friendly power. The exercise of jurisdiction in such a case is discretionary, and, until the Congress of the United States controls the subject by legislation, is discretionary with its courts, and should be controlled by precedent if that exist. In this case I am satisfied, by reason and abundant authority, that the court should decline to entertain jurisdiction.

In Patterson v. Bark Eudora (190 U. S., 169), the Supreme Court held that a British vessel and its master were within the provisions of the act of December 31, 1898, prohibiting the payment to seaman of advanced wages. The court, after referring to its previous decision in relation to the question of jurisdiction over foreign vessels, said (p. 178):

It follows from these decisions that it is within the power of Congress to prescribe the penal provisions of section 10, and no one within the jurisdiction of the United States can escape liability for a violation of those provisions on the plea that he is a foreign citizen or an officer of a foreign merchant vessel. It also follows that it is a duty of the courts of the United States to give full force and effect to such provisions. It is hot pretended that this government can control the action of foreign tribunals. In any case presented to them they will be guided by their own views of the law and its scope and effect, but the courts of the United States are bound to accept this legislation and enforce it whenever its provisions are violated. The implied consent of this government to leave jurisdiction over, the internal affairs of foreign merchant vessels in our harbors to the nations to which those vessels belong may be withdrawn. Indeed, the implied consent to permit them to enter our harbors may be withdrawn, and if this implied consent may be wholly withdrawal it may be extended upon such terms and conditions as the government sees fit to impose. And this legislation, as plainly as words can make it, imposes these conditions upon the shipment of sailors in our harbors, and declares that they are applicable to foreign as well as to domestic vessels.

In United States v. Diekelman (92 U. S., 520.) the Supreme Court held that a foreign ship visiting the port of New Orleans during the Civil War was subject to the rules promulgated by the President governing the entry and clearance of foreign vessels and the goods they might carry.

The general principles enunciated in the cases to which attention has been called are concisely summarized in the following quotation from the opinion of the court in the case of The Ester, in which suit was brought against a Swedish steamship by a seaman to recover unpaid wages and damages for personal injury (190 Fed. Rep., 218, 220–221):

(1) The merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purposes of trade subject themselves to the laws which govern the port they visit, so long as they remain. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, 23 L. Ed. 742; Wildenhus’ Case, 120 U. S. 11, 7 Sup. Ct. 385, 30 L. Ed. 565.

(2) In the absence of treaty stipulations, the courts of admiralty have civil jurisdiction in all matters appertaining to the foreign ship while in port, and also in certain cases when the court has the vessel in its territorial jurisdiction, although the cause of action arose on the high seas. The Belgenland, 114, U. S. 855, 5 Sup. Ct. 860, 29 L. Ed. 152; Wildenhus’ Case, 120 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 385, 30 L. Ed. 565.

(3) The exercise of this civil jurisdiction, where those who are concerned are all citizens of the same foreign state and the cause of action occurred on or with regard to the ship, is not imperative, but discretionary, and the courts from motives of convenience or international comity will not take jurisdiction without the assent of the consul of the country to which the ship belongs, where the controversy involves matters arising beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this country, or relates to differences between the master and the crew, or the crew and the ship-owners. In such cases on such general principles of comity, the admiralty courts of this country will not interfere between the parties, unless there is special reason for doing so, and will require the foreign consul to be notified, and although not absolutely bound by, will always pay respect to, his wishes as to taking jurisdiction. Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall. 152, 20 L. Ed, 877; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 860, 29 L. Ed. 152; Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002.

(4) Where, however, special circumstances exist, such as where the voyage is ended, or the seamen have been dismissed or treated with great cruelty, the courts, in the absence of treaty stipulations, will entertain jurisdiction, even against the protest of the consul. The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 860, 29 L. Ed. 152.

(5) Where treaty stipulations exist, however, with regard to the right of the consul of a foreign country to adjudge controversies arising between the master and the crew, or other matters occurring on the ship exclusively subject to the foreign law, such stipulations are the law of the land, and must be fairly and faithfully observed. The Belgenland. 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 860, 29 L. Ed. 152; Wildenhus’ Case, 120 U. S. 17, 7 Sup. Ct. 385, 30 L. Ed. 565.

(6) Congress has power by legislation to regulate matters affecting foreign seamen and foreign vessels and foreigners, generally when within the ports of this country by making their entrance subject to such conditions as Congress may seek to impose or withdrawing its consent to permit them to enter wholly, if it see fit. Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002.

With reference to the question of the jurisdiction over American merchant vessels in foreign territorial waters, it may be stated that the Government of the United States in the past has asserted in behalf of its vessels the rights which, as indicated by the judicial decisions to which attention has been called, are accorded to foreign vessels in waters of the United States. This Government, while conceding on the one hand that, when one of its vessels visits the port of another country for the purposes of trade, it is amenable to the jurisdiction of that country and is subject to the laws which govern the port it visits so long as it remains unless it is otherwise provided by treaty, has, on the other hand, on a number of occasions, made clear its views to the effect that, by comity, matters of discipline and all things done on board which affect only the vessel or those belonging to her and do not involve the peace or dignity of the country or the tranquillity of the port should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belongs, as the laws of that nation or the interests of its commerce may require. Numerous excerpts from diplomatic correspondence indicating the position of this Government on this subject may be found in Moore’s Digest of International Law, Vol. II, pp. 272–362.

Private vessels belonging to this country are deemed parts of its territory. They are accordingly regarded as subject to the jurisdiction of this country, on the high seas, and in foreign ports, even though they admittedly are also temporarily subject generally to the laws of such ports.

In United States v. Rodgers (150 U. S. 249), a case in which the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of courts of the United States to try a person for an assault committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States while such vessel was in the Detroit River and within the limits of the Dominion of Canada, Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion of the court, said (pp. 264–265):

It is true,* * * that, as a general principle, the criminal laws of a nation do not operate beyond its territorial limits, and that to give any government, or its judicial tribunals, the right to punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have occurred within those limits. We accept this doctrine as a general rule, but there are exceptions to it as fully recognized as the doctrine itself. One of those exceptions is that offenses committed upon vessels belonging to citizens of the United States, within their admiralty jurisdiction (that is, within navigable waters), though out of the territorial limits of the United States, may be judicially considered when the vessel and parties are brought within their territorial jurisdiction. As we have before stated, a vessel is deemed part of the territory of the country to which she belongs Upon that subject we quote the language of Mr. Webster, while Secretary of State, in his letter to Lord Ashburton of August, 1842. Speaking for the Government of the United States, he stated with great clearness and force the doctrine which is now recognized by all countries. He said: “It is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of its territory, though at sea, as the State retains its jurisdiction over them; and, according to the commonly received custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion. This is the doctrine of the law of nations, clearly laid down by writers of received authority, and entirely conformable, as it is supposed, with the practice of modern nations. If a murder be committed on board of an American vessel by one of the crew upon another or upon a passenger, or by a passenger on one of the crew or another passenger, while such vessel is lying in a port within the jurisdiction of a foreign State or sovereignty, the offense is cognizable and punishable by the proper court of the United States in the same manner as if such offense had been committed on board the vessel on the high seas. The law of England is supposed to be the same. It is true that the jurisdiction of a nation over a vessel belonging to it, while lying in the port of another, is not necessarily wholly exclusive. We do not so consider or so assert it. For any unlawful acts done by her while thus lying in port, and for all contracts entered into while there, by her master or owners, she and they must, doubtless, be answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if her master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption be claimed for them. But, nevertheless, the law of nations, as I have stated it, and the statutes of governments founded on that law, as I have referred to them, show that enlightened nations, in modern times, do clearly hold that the jurisdiction and laws of a nation accompany her ships not only over the high seas, but into ports and harbors, or wheresoever else they may be water-borne, for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights, duties, and obligations of those on board thereof, and that, to the extent of the exercise of this jurisdiction, they are considered as parts of the territory of the nation herself.” 6 Webster’s Works, 306, 307.

The defendant in this case was indicted under Section 5346 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which is as follows:

Every person who, upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, on board any vessel belonging in whole or part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, with a dangerous weapon, or with intent to perpetrate any felony, commits an assault on another shall be punished by a fine of not more than three thousand dollars and by imprisonment at hard labor not more than three years.

The place of trial in the case was determined by Section 730 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:

The trial of all offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district shall be in the district where the offender is found or into which he is first brought.

A number of treaties concluded by this Government contain provisions vesting in consular officers jurisdiction over questions of wages, shipment and discharge of seamen, and over all transactions occurring on board of vessels lying in foreign ports, whether in the nature of contracts, torts or crimes, so far as they concern only the vessels and their cargoes and the persons on board and do not concern the public peace of the country or the rights of persons not belonging on board. The following articles of the consular convention concluded July 11, 1870, between Austria-Hungary and the United States contain comprehensive provisions of this character:

• Article XI. Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents, shall have exclusive charge of the internal order of the merchant vessels of their nation. They shall have therefore the exclusive power to take cognizance of and to settle all differences which may arise at sea or in port between captains, officers and crews in reference to wages and the execution of mutual contracts, subject in each case to the laws of their own nation. The local authorities shall in no way interfere, except in cases where the differences on board ship are of a nature to disturb the peace and public order in port or on shore, or when persons other than the officers and crew of the vessel are parties to the disturbance, except as aforesaid, the local authorities shall confine themselves to the rendering of forcible assistance if required by the Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents, and shall cause the arrest, temporary imprisonment and removal on board his own vessel of every person whose name is found on the muster-rolls or register of the ship or list of the crew.
• Article XII. Consuls General, Consuls. Vice Consuls or Consular Agents, shall have the power to cause the arrest of all sailors or all other persons belonging to the crews of vessels of their nation who may be guilty of having deserted on the respective territories of the high contracting Powers, and to have them sent on board or back to their native country. To that end they shall make a written application to the competent local authority, supporting it by the exhibition of the ship’s register and list of the crew, or else, should the vessel have sailed previously, by producing an authenticated copy of these documents, showing that the persons claimed really do belong to the ship’s crew. Upon such request the surrender of the deserter shall not be refused. Every aid and assistance shall, moreover, be granted to the said consular authorities for the detection and arrest of deserters, and the latter shall be taken to the prisons of the country and there detained at the request and expense of the consular authority until there may be an opportunity for sending them away. The duration of this imprisonment shall not exceed the term of three months, at the expiration of which time, and upon three days’ notice to the consul, the prisoner shall be set free, and he shall not be liable to rearrest for the same cause. Should, however, the deserter have committed on shore an indictable offense, the local authorities shall be free to postpone his extradition until due sentence shall have been passed and executed. The high contracting parties agree that seamen, or other individuals forming part of the ship’s crew, who are citizens of the country in which the desertion took place, shall not be affected by the provisions of this article.
• Article XIII. In all cases where no other agreement to the contrary exists between owners, freighters and insurers, all damages suffered at sea by the vessels of the two countries, whether they enter the respective ports voluntarily or by stress of weather, shall be settled by the Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents of their respective nation, provided no interests of citizens of the country where the said functionaries reside, nor of citizens of a third Power are concerned. In that case, and in the absence of a friendly compromise between all parties interested, the adjudication shall take place under supervision of the local authorities.
• Article XIV. In the event of a vessel belonging to the Government, or owned by a citizen of one of the two contracting States, being wrecked or cast on shore upon the coast of the other, the local authorities shall inform the Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents of the district of the occurrence, or if such Consular Agency does not exist, they shall communicate with the Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents of the nearest district.

All proceedings relative to the salvage of American vessels wrecked or cast on shore in Austro-Hungarian waters shall be directed by the United States Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents; also all proceedings relative to the salvage of Austro-Hungarian vessels wrecked or cast on shore in American waters, shall be directed by Austro-Hungarian Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents.

An interference of the local authorities in the two countries shall take place for the purpose only of assisting the consular authorities in maintaining order and protecting the rights of salvage not belonging to the crew; also for enforcing the regulations relative to the import or export of the merchandise saved.

In the absence and until the arrival of the Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls or Consular Agents, or their duly appointed delegates, the local authorities shall take all the necessary measures for the protection of persons and preservation of the property saved from the wreck.

No charges shall be made for the interference of the local authorities in such cases, except for expenses incurred through salvage and the preservation of property saved, also for those expenses which, under similar circumstances, vessels belonging to the country where the wreck happens would have to incur.

In case of a doubt concerning the nationality of the wrecks, the local authorities shall have exclusively the management and execution of the provisions laid down in the present article.

As of possible interest, attention may be called to the following cases which are interpretative of treaty stipulations of this nature: Dallemagne v. Moisan (197 U. S., 169); The Marie (49 Fed. Rep., 286); The Welhaven (55 Fed. Rep., 80); The Neck (138 Fed. Rep., 144); The Bound Brook (146 Fed. Rep., 160); Ex parte Anderson (184 Fed. Rep., 114); The Ester (190 Fed. Rep., 216); Tellefsen v. Fee (168 Mass., 188).

With a view to the proper execution of such treaty provisions, the following statutes have been enacted by Congress:

Whenever it is stipulated by treaty or convention between the United States and any foreign nation that the consul general, consuls, vice consuls, or consular or commercial agents of each nation, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of controversies, difficulties, or disorders arising at sea or in the waters or ports of the other nation, between the master or officers and any of the crew, or between any of the crew themselves, of any vessel belonging to the nation represented by such consular officer, such stipulations shall be executed and enforced within the jurisdiction of the United States as hereinafter declared. But before this section shall take effect as to the vessels of any particular nation having such treaty with the United States, the President shall be satisfied that similar provisions have been made for the execution of such treaty by the other contracting party, and shall issue his proclamation to that effect, declaring this section to be in force, as to such nation.

In all cases within the purview of the preceding section the consul general, consul, or other consular or commercial authority of such foreign nation charged with the appropriate duty in the particular case, may make application to any court of record of the United States, or to any judge thereof, or to any commissioner of a district court, setting forth that such controversy, difficulty, or disorder has arisen, briefly stating the nature thereof, and when and where the same occurred, and exhibiting a certified copy or abstract of the shipping articles, roll, or other proper paper of the vessel, to the effect that the person in question is of the crew or ship’s company of such vessel; and further stating and certifying that such person has withdrawn himself, or is believed to be about to withdraw himself, from the control and discipline of the master and officers of the vessel, or that he has refused, or is about to refuse, to submit to and obey the lawful jurisdiction of such consular or commercial authority in the premises; and further stating and certifying that, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the officer certifying, such person is not a citizen of the United States. Such application shall be in writing and duly authenticated by the consular or other sufficient official seal. Thereupon such court, judge, or commissioner shall issue his warrant for the arrest of the person so complained of, directed to the marshal of the United States for the appropriate district, or in his discretion to any person, being a citizen of the United States, whom he may specially depute for the purpose, requiring such person to be brought before him for examination at a certain time and place.

If on such examination, it is made to appear that the person so arrested is a citizen of the United States, he shall be forthwith discharged from arrest, and shall be left to the ordinary course of law. But if this is not made to appear, and such court, judge, or commissioner finds, upon the papers hereinbefore referred to, a sufficient prima: facie case that the matter concerns only the internal order and discipline of such foreign vessels, or, whether in its nature civil or criminal, does not affect directly the execution of the laws of the United States, or the rights and duties of any citizen of the United States, he shall forthwith, by his warrant, commit such person to prison, where prisoners under sentence of a court of the United States may be lawfully committed, or, in his discretion, to the master or chief officer of such foreign vessel, to be subject to the lawful orders, control, and discipline of such master or chief officer, and to the jurisdiction of the consular or commercial authority of the nation to which such vessel belongs, to the exclusion of any authority or jurisdiction in the premises of the United States or any State thereof. No person shall be detained more than two months after his arrest, but at the end of that time shall be set at liberty and shall not again be arrested for the same cause. The expenses of the arrest and the detention of the person so arrested shall be paid by the consular officer making the application.

The district and circuit courts, and the commissioners of the district courts, shall have power to carry into effect, according to the true intent and meaning thereof, the award, or arbitration, or decree of any consul, vice consul, or commercial agent of any foreign nation, made or rendered by Virtue of authority conferred on him as such consul, vice consul, or commercial agent, to sit as judge or arbitrator in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to his charge, application for the exercise of such power being first made to such court or commissioner by petition of such consul, vice consul, or commercial agent. And said courts and commissioners may issue all proper remedial process, mesne and final, to carry into full effect such award, arbitration, or decree, and to enforce obedience thereto, by imprisonment in the jail or other place of confinement in the district in which the United States may lawfully imprison any person arrested under the authority of the United States, until such award, arbitration, or decree is complied with, or the parties are otherwise discharged therefrom, by the consent in writing of such consul, vice consul, or commercial agent, or his successor in office, or by the authority of the foreign government appointing such consul, vice consul, or commercial agent; Provided, however, That the expenses of the said imprisonment and maintenance of the prisoners, and the cost of the proceedings, shall be borne by such foreign government, or by its consul, vice consul, or commercial agent requiring such imprisonment. The marshals of the United States shall serve all such process, and do all other acts necessary and proper to carry into effect the premises, under the authority of the said courts and commissioners. (Revised Statutes of the United States, Sees. 728, 4079–4081.)

As of further possible interest in connection with the subject under consideration, the Department begs to enclose herewith a compilation of laws entitled “Navigation Laws of the United States.” This compilation contains statutes of the United States relating to merchant vessels and merchant seamen.

The Department will be glad to furnish your Government with any further desirable information regarding the matters referred to in your note.

I have [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

Robert Lansing

.