Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

113. Excerpts of a Radio Interview¹

Washington, undated

Excerpts of Radio interview of USIA Director Frank Shakespeare by James Anderson, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., October 20, 1970

Anderson: You no doubt have seen, as others have, a lot of stories—some of them speculative and some of them don’t seem to have the grains of truth that they ought to—that there is developing a USIA line or a USIA policy separate and distinct from the State Department. Is there such?

Shakespeare: Well that’s a complicated question. Firstly, and to make it very clear the policy of the United States is set by the President of the United States and is articulated by the State Department. That is the formal structure of the foreign policy of the United States. Now the USIA carries on a major information program throughout the world which is structured to be in general support of foreign policy interests of the people of this country. We very understandably may have different points of emphasis than the formal diplomat would have, but that’s only to say the obvious. That is to say that an information and communications program is something different and newer than formal and traditional diplomacy.

Anderson: Well how do you understand then your relationship with the State Department? Is it as one executive branch of the State Department or what?

Shakespeare: No. The United States Information Agency was established by the Congress as an independent Agency. We receive the money to run this Agency directly from the Congress of the United States, that is from the House and the Senate. I as the Director of the Agency report directly to the President of the United States not to the Secretary of State. However, we are instructed to take formal foreign policy guidance from the State Department because we in this Agency do not set policy; we implement it and try to support that policy, so that the officers of our Agency and I myself meet frequently with the senior officers of the State Department to receive the specific guidance as to what the foreign policy is. But there is a very considerable leeway and certainly autonomy for us then to carry on a continuing, broad-scale information program throughout the world.

JA: Did, as has been reported, the Secretary of State send a memo to you with—as I understand the thrust of it—the idea that the USIA is subordinate to the State Department as a policy instrument?²

FS: No I think the Secretary simply wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding between the USIA and the State Department as to the formal expression of the foreign policy of the United States, and indeed there is no misunderstanding. The formal expression of the foreign policy of the United States, as I said, is by the President of the United States or by the Secretary of State.

JA: During the Middle East there was also some leak, chiefly in London, of a memo which took a harder line than the apparent line the State Department was taking.³ Is that so, did the USIA take from time to time, using that as an example, does the USIA take a different tactical view of events that are happening in the rest of the world?

FS: During the height, if you could call it that, of the situation in the Middle East when it became very evident that there had been a substantial violation by the Soviets and Egyptians of the standstill agreement,⁴ the United States Information Agency sent to its officers throughout the world a general guidance paper—and I think that’s what you refer to—which described the situation and the implication that we thought that it had. All of our officers take those as a normal matter and use those as a basis for contact with the press, television, radio, government people throughout the world and that was true in this case.

JA: But it did not as I understand you then, it did not differ substantially from what the State Department was saying at that time?

FS: Well it certainly didn’t differ in fact. As I said, in many cases we differ in points of emphasis. Now let me give you an illustration because this point, this matter of points of emphasis in communication, is something I think that needs to be carefully understood. Communications is a whole new force in diplomacy. It’s, in my opinion, having a revolutionary effect on diplomacy. Now let me try to give you an illustration. If in 1938 or in 1939 there had been a USIA (it did not exist at that time) the State Department of the United States Government would have been having formal diplomatic representations to Adolph Hitler and his government and those would have been the official formal statements and papers with which we are all familiar. They would have been couched in diplomatic language and although they could have been and doubtless were fairly stern they were basically formal representations between governments. A USIA at that point might very well have been saying throughout the world “why are you putting Jews in the ovens?” Now both of those were consistent with the facts. They both would have served the objectives in making the world aware of what the Government of Nazi Germany represented, but they would be different styles: the diplomatic style, the formal diplomatic relationships between governments, and the general communication of information throughout the world. Those are different things.

JA: Then to take your thesis a step further, the actual presentation of it, the medium, as it were, can sometimes be as important as the message then by the emphasis, the technical emphasis, that the USIA can give, it can then give substantial flavoring or substantial emphasis to a foreign policy can it not?

FS: Yes very much so, and I think you’re hitting right on it. Today, the attitude of people about an action of their government or about an action of a foreign government can, in fact, be an inhibiting factor in what the governments can make work or can do. To use the most obvious illustrations, in the case of Southeast Asia, the case of Viet-Nam, the attitude of the world people, indeed the attitude of many citizens of the United States about the situation in Southeast Asia has had an inhibiting force on, has reduced the options open to, the United States Government. To take another case, the world’s passions are in many ways intimately involved in what’s going on in the Middle East. Certainly world Jewry is very concerned with Israel. The Arabs, 100,000,000 Arabs, highly involved emotionally as well as rationally with what’s occurring in the Middle East. Now those are psychological factors; those are human factors; they’re not power factors, but they translate . . . with today’s rapid communications, with today’s ability to reach people and to galvanize people, the attitude of people becomes the factor. How do you, how do attitudes of people form? They form through knowledge; and communications is the transmittal of knowledge.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 28, FJS, Speeches, 1970. No classification marking. The United States Information Agency sent the excerpts to all PAOs under an October 28 covering memorandum for information only. (Ibid.) See also “USIA Chief Explains Policy Role,” Washington Post, October 22, 1970, p. A23.
2. On October 19, the Washington Post reported that “on or about Sept. 21” Rogers had sent Shakespeare a memorandum “reminding him that the law provides that USIA is under the authority of the State Department in policy matters” following the USIA release of Info Guide No. 70–46 on September 17 (see Document 108). (“Rogers Warns USIA Chief Not to Set Foreign Policy,” p. A1) See also Tad Szulc, “Tough U.S.I.A. Line Drew A Complaint from Rogers,” New York Times, October 25, 1970, p. 3. Shakespeare met with Nixon on November 25. According to Haldeman’s record of the meeting: “Following Shakespeare’s presentation, the President assured him that the USIA position was very much along the correct lines, and that Shakespeare had the President’s full support—that he should not seek or engage in a direct confrontation with State, but should continue to work as skillfully as he has in the past.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, footnote 22, Document 74)
3. According to the Washington Post, following the dissemination of Info Guide No. 70–46, “a local USIA man passed it on to the London press, apparently in sharpened form. The result was a spate of British press stories to the effect that Washington was equating Suez with Cuba.” (“Rogers Warns USIA Chief Not to Set Foreign Policy,” October 19, 1970, p. A1)
4. See footnote 4, Document 105.