Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

146. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the Director (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, August 16, 1971

SUBJECT

• The President’s Trip to Peking: Psychological Initiatives

The current climate between the U.S. and the PRC is one that seems to benefit both the U.S. and China, although the President has candidly said that his forthcoming meeting with PRC leaders is not a discussion that is going to lead to “instant detente.”² Premier Chou En-lai in his recent interview with New York Times’ Reston also indicated a degree of realism by saying that “we do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke . . . but we may be able to find out from where we should start in solving these questions.”³

The President’s projected visit to Peking presents us with opportunities to build what is now a temporary psychological asset into a long-range one. Hence, we propose the following initiatives which may enhance the overall impact of the President’s “journey for peace”:

—that the President take along with him a sample of moon rock specimens and a special autographed color photo album of U.S. moon exploration for presentation to the Chinese premier⁴

—that the President consider taking an astronaut with him for the trip who, by virtue of immense Chinese interest and curiosity about space, could generate favorable opinion toward the U.S. and its scientific accomplishments

—that the President offer technical assistance to the Chinese in building a ground station on the mainland capable of linking with Intelsat

—that the President offer to establish a “hot-line” comparable to the Washington-Moscow hot line⁵

—that the President present to the National Peking University through Premier Chou a prestige collection of books on American life, which would bring Chou up-to-date on contemporary America.

We feel that these initiatives as well as other phases of the President’s trip should be supported by a comprehensive program of fast and accurate reporting via VOA, the Wireless File, and other USIA media and techniques to key audiences throughout the world, and where possible through similar facilities owned and operated by allies.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 21, OGA—The President’s Trip to China and all documents relating to USIA/State coverage. Secret. Copies were sent to Loomis and White. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum twice.
2. During his August 4 news conference, the President remarked: “I will only say that as the joint announcement indicated, this will be a wide-ranging discussion of issues concerning both governments. It is not a discussion that is going to lead to instant détente.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 850)
3. See “Official Transcript of the Wide-Ranging Interview With Premier Chou in Peking,” New York Times, August 10, 1971, pp. 14–15. Reston interviewed Chou in the Fukien Room of the Great Hall of the People. Chou’s full statement reads: “We do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke. That is not possible. That would not be practicable. But by contacting each other, we may be able to find out from where we should start in solving these questions.” (Ibid., p. 15)
4. Loomis placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this and the subsequent points.
5. In 1963, U.S. and Soviet officials signed an agreement authorizing the establishment of a communications link between Washington and Moscow. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Document 333. The first message received over the hotline was a June 5, 1967, message from Kosygin to Johnson following the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East; see ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 217.