Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

160. Memorandum From Leslie Janka of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 17, 1972

SUBJECT

• A USIA Problem

Frank Shakespeare has written you an “Eyes Only” memorandum (Tab B) complaining that he cannot respond to your December 17 request² for an action plan to increase foreign understanding of U.S. security policy due to the fact that USIA’s management is not provided with a “full understanding of [our] real objectives. . . .”

He notes, however, that the basic work on your request has been done and can be made available to you. Since we cannot readily solve his lack of understanding of our security objectives and need for better guidance, the attached response requests Shakespeare to take his lead from the impending 1972 Foreign Policy Report³ and build upon the work USIA has already done to develop the action plan you requested, although this would prevent USIA’s using the 1972 Report as the launching point for the action program, as was requested.

Alternatively, you could meet more directly his problem of isolation from the centers of action by inviting him in for a brief discussion of our broad security objectives, but USIA is probably beyond help on this matter, which is State’s responsibility anyway. Your response makes a courtesy offer of such a meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Shakespeare at Tab A.⁴

Tab B

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)⁵

Washington, January 14, 1972

This memo is brief since the point to be made is simple, though critical. We can discuss it further if you wish . . . and I hope you do.

You inform me that Secretary Laird has expressed concern about “serious gaps in the knowledge and understanding of our friends with regard to our foreign policy and national security objectives.” Based on extensive travel and contact, I share the Secretary’s concern.

You request an “action plan . . . based primarily on USIA resources” to address the situation. I respectfully suggest that to submit an operations plan would really mislead both you and the President as to the central and very serious weakness of our foreign information program. It is not lack of plan; it is lack of knowledge.

Full understanding of real objectives . . . both day-to-day and long-term . . . is essential to the creation of effective communications support programs. USIA management is not provided with that understanding, thus the communications support provided to United States foreign policy and national security objectives is much weaker and less imaginative than it should be. No operational action plan will correct that weakness.

The problem of poor management information is so overriding and so inhibits our ability to provide the kind of support which the nation deeply needs that it would be unfair to the President to respond in any other way.

Frank Shakespeare⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2]. Confidential. All brackets are in the original. Kissinger wrote “OBE HK” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Haig wrote “Thru Haig” and drew an arrow from it to Janka’s name in the “from” line. An unknown hand crossed out “Thru Haig.”
2. Attached but not printed. In his December 17, 1971, memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger wrote that Laird had recommended to the President that the administration “increase its efforts to improve our Allies’ understanding of U.S. security policy.” Stating that the President had requested that USIA draft an action plan to increase understanding of the administration’s foreign policy, Kissinger commented: “The plan should be based primarily on USIA resources but should provide for close coordination with State and Defense. USIA resources should be diverted from lower priority programs for this purpose and the plan should indicate the programs to be curtailed as well as new and expanded programs.”
3. The White House released the third annual foreign policy report, entitled U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace; A report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972, on February 9. An excerpt is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 104. The full text of the report is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 194–346.
4. Not attached. In the margin below this recommendation, Haig wrote: “HAK—you should only discuss w/ Frank along w/other problem. Al.” Presumable reference is to an undated memorandum from Shakespeare to Kissinger regarding USIA coverage of the President’s trip to China. In it, Shakespeare noted the capacity of the Voice of America to broadcast in Chinese to China, in addition to the 700 hours broadcast in more than 30 other languages about China to other audiences. As such, he asserted: “It is imperative, therefore, both in terms of credibility for the official information arm of the U.S. Government abroad, and in furtherance of U.S. policy abroad, that a representative of the Voice of America be included in the official party that accompanies the President on this historic journey.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2])
5. Eyes Only. Shakespeare sent the memorandum to Kissinger under an undated handwritten memorandum that reads: “Basic planning work has been done on this matter. It is of course available to you and your staff. However, the attached memo focuses on what I believe to be the real problem. I have not sent copies to State or Defense. F.”
6. Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.