Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

35. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 18, 1969

SUBJECT

• USIS Functions in Thailand and Elsewhere

In response to the President’s desire to terminate USIS activities such as the Mobile Information Teams in Thailand, which place the U.S. in the role of pleaders for the local government, you forwarded a memorandum to the President (at Tab A) asking him to approve a study of the alternatives.

You also noted, on Holdridge’s covering memorandum (at Tab A),² that you wanted to implement the President’s directive with a directive to Shakespeare rather than a NSSM (which Holdridge had attached).

The President’s response indicated that he wants all USIS programs of this nature (i.e. in Thailand and elsewhere) cut back.

I was given the action on the comeback and John Holdridge and I have drafted a memorandum to implement the President’s directive for Shakespeare for your signature (at Tab B).³

This memorandum asks Shakespeare to examine USIS programs of the type in question and forward his recommendations on how to terminate them. It also notes that in the case of Thailand, such a study is underway as part of the NSSM 51 program analysis study⁴ and that this will be forwarded as soon as it is available.

In this connection, I should note that USIA is acutely conscious of its inadequately defined role. I understand they would welcome a full review of their policy and program assumptions. This concern explains in part their enthusiastic cooperation with the Thailand (NSSM 51) study. They have given us an excellent analyst to serve as a member of the ad hoc group and have said they expect the study to result in program guidelines and program analysis standards which they consider to be badly needed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum for Shakespeare at Tab B.

Tab A

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon⁵

Washington, August 11, 1969

SUBJECT

• USIS Functions in Thailand

During your visit to Thailand⁶ one of the features of the U.S. presence there which was most strongly criticized by the Thai was the extent to which the U.S. information program is carrying on activities which more properly belong to the Thai and which in effect put the United States in the position of acting as a special pleader on behalf of the Royal Thai Government to the Thai people. In particular, the operations of USIS Mobile Information Teams were cited as a case in point.

I believe it would be a comparatively simple process to withdraw the USIS program in Thailand from operations and activities of the sort which have brought criticism from the Thai. We could anticipate quick dividends in improving U.S.-Thai relations and in making the United States presence in Thailand more tolerable. In addition, we would be responding to your guidelines on giving the Thai the primary responsibility for coping with subversion in Thailand. I have accordingly drafted a NSSM to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, U.S. Information Agency, directing that a Study be prepared on the scope of the USIS program in Thailand which would recommend areas in which U.S. activities in publicizing programs and objectives which are intrinsically the province of the Royal Thai Government would be eliminated.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the issuance of the NSSM at Tab A.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown hand placed a checkmark next to Lynn’s name in the “from” line.
2. Attached but not printed is an August 6 covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger. In it, Holdridge indicated that, in accordance with Kissinger’s instructions, he had prepared a draft NSSM “directing that a Study be prepared which would recommend adjustments in the USIS program in Thailand intended to eliminate its emphasis upon publicizing programs and objectives which are intrinsically the province of the Royal Thai Government rather than of the U.S. Government.” Kissinger noted on the memorandum: “Let the memo to Pres. go. But if he approves it—simply issue directive to Shakespeare.” A notation on the covering memorandum in an unknown hand indicates that it was hand-carried to the President on August 11.
3. Attached but not printed is the October 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Shakespeare, which Kissinger signed. In it, Kissinger indicated that the President had directed that the activities of USIS on behalf of various governments “be terminated as soon as possible” and directed the preparation of a study of the scope of USIS programs in this nature, “of the implications of terminating these activities, and of the most expeditious way to accomplish this objective.” In telegram 14847 from Bangkok, November 1, Unger provided a summary of U.S.-Thai relations, noting various factors that the Thai Government “will take as an indication of acceleration disengagement” on the part of the United States. With regard to the Kissinger instructions, Unger stated: “We have been working steadily for some time now to get the Thai Government to assume more and more informational activities but I have been intent on continuing our support of necessary functions until the Thai were ready and able to take over. The order [the October 9 memorandum] cited appears to foreclose any such orderly handover.” The telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 33.
4. NSSM 51, issued on April 26, indicated that the President had “directed that a program analysis of Thailand” be pursued, including the programs of USIA, the Peace Corps, and the CIA. The NSSM is printed ibid., Document 10. For the summary paper prepared in response to NSSM 51, dated August 5, 1970, see ibid., Document 82.
5. Secret. Sent for action.
6. See footnote 5, Document 32.
7. The President initialed the approval line. Next to his initials he wrote: I believe this is a serious problem in several other countries—I want U.S.I.A. to examine its activities & cut down drastically.” An unknown hand wrote “9–2–69” next to the President’s notation. Kissinger wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Let’s draft instructions for Shakespeare.”