500.A15 a 1/376: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson)
27. In the course of a conversation this morning with the British Ambassador he said he had been authorized to state that his Government [Page 73] had no intention of disputing our right to parity with Great Britain. The Ambassador further stated that he received instructions to raise question of reduction in size and extension of life of battleships, as his Government felt that a change in the Washington agreement would not be constituted thereby.
In reply I stated that we did not expect to take up question of Washington agreement at this time and that question of economy in connection with British suggestions did not come up, in reality, until 1931, at which time all the parties would have to meet. I replied to his objections that plans for laying down vessels would have to be made before 1931, by stating that date of Conference could be advanced, by agreement among the parties, to January 1931.
I informed the Ambassador that the Japanese Ambassador had told me that Japanese delegation had been instructed to discuss subject of reduction in size and extension of life of battleships to become effective after 1931, but only to enter upon this discussion after agreement had been reached respecting other classes of vessels and not with view to revising Washington agreement at this time. I said I thought there would be no objection to such a discussion.
I took occasion to point out to the Ambassador that any extension in life of battleships would still further put off time when we could arrive at equality with British Navy. He thought I was mistaken and said he would send me a memorandum on the subject.
I then stated, as my belief, that the Conference was in somewhat critical position owing to very large tonnage demands which the British delegation had made, and I said that a limitation agreement which would have effect of almost doubling Great Britain’s cruiser tonnage would provoke open ridicule and that the United States would never accept it. He remarked that the best thing to do then would be to give up the whole Conference, to which I replied that that might well be the case as we could not sign a treaty embodying any such figures as the British had proposed. The Ambassador said that it was his impression, gained from what the President had said, that the object to be attained was a limitation and that the actual figures were not important. I told him that the matter had been most carefully considered by the President, by the Navy Department, and by the Department of State and that I knew for a certainty that the President had no idea that the British would demand a tonnage so excessive. I went on to ask him against whom this enormous number of cruisers was needed, as only this country and Japan now possessed first-class navies. He mentioned the Mediterranean countries, and I reminded him that any treaty signed by the three powers now in Conference at Geneva would contain a clause empowering any one of parties to it to call for revision of the treaty; [Page 74] should that party feel itself threatened by building program of any power not a signatory.
Do you share with me the opinion that there would be no objection to discussing informally, after agreement has been reached on auxiliary vessels, the reduction in size and extension of life of capital ships on understanding that such discussion should be merely of preparatory nature to clear way for 1931 Conference?