500.A15 a 1/380: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
63. This morning, accompanied by Admiral Jones and Dulles, I saw Bridgeman, who was most desirous for an interview. With Bridgeman were Cecil and Admiral Field; and the cruiser question was debated at length, somewhat tensely by the British delegation. In answer to Cecil’s heated inquiry whether the statement delivered to the technical committee (my telegram No. 60, July 5) was an ultimatum, I replied that our negotiations were not carried on by ultimata but that Admiral Field had requested Admiral Jones for his reaction to the British proposals during the debate on the cruiser question in the technical committee.
Following this, Cecil reiterated the well-known arguments concerning the British need for protection of food lines and Admiral Field outlined the reaction of the British Navy to the American proposals. Stressing the Empire’s vital necessity for numbers in the matter of cruisers, he interpreted the American proposal of 400,000 tons to mean that Britain could only construct fifteen 10,000-ton ships to our twenty-five and that the remainder of their tonnage would be used in vessels too small to be of value, that is, about sixty ships of about 7,800 tons each. This he said would make them only equal to the Japanese in 10,000-ton cruisers and far below the United States in combat strength, and any further decrease in larger cruisers to permit more smaller vessels would actually leave the Japanese superior to them in this regard.
We were then pointedly questioned as to our real aims in pressing for the building of 10,000-ton 8-inch-gun cruisers, which they criticized as constituting the large offensive type. It was our insistence [Page 75] upon this type of cruiser, which they claimed they eventually wished to eliminate, that compelled them to demand such high tonnage levels as were imputed to them. In conclusion, we were closely interrogated as to our reasons for mentioning this type of cruiser and they warned us that the result of our suggestions would either be to give the United States an absolute supremacy in offensive cruisers or compel the British to abandon construction of the small defensive type, which in view of the Empire’s needs were in their opinion essential.
They held that the reduction of the offensive power of fleets was the basic object of the parley; and minimized the importance of reduction of total tonnages as not going to fundamentals. Total tonnage thesis, they said, would only inspire each country to construct the greatest number of maximum-sized ships and increase fleet offensive power.
It is my desire in the foregoing to outline the views of the British and give them in the tone in which they were rendered. The wisest course to pursue, I thought, was to give the British the floor, and in answer to their questions as to the need of 10,000-ton cruisers, Admiral Jones merely emphasized the view of the United States Navy, with which you are entirely conversant.
As a compromise and to satisfy the necessity of the British for a great number of cruisers, Admiral Field launched the idea of limiting only cruisers under the age of 20 years and permitting the retention of all cruisers exceeding 20 years.
We dispersed without a solution having been reached, but decided that we should all review the entire question with great care. The meeting lasted an hour and a half, towards the end of which the atmosphere had brightened considerably and Bridgeman on leaving remarked in a friendly way that our general attitude was clear to him and only time was needed to solve matters. His demeanor, which throughout had been good-natured, formed a marked contrast to Cecil’s.
On Friday, the executive committee will meet to hear the report of the technical committee outlining tentative agreements reached in reference to destroyers and submarines, such agreements being of course dependent upon the outcome of the cruiser problem.
In the meantime, the British proposal for the retention without limitation of cruisers over 20 years old will be considered and we shall also discuss privately and technically with the English the proposal that cruiser-building programs up to 1936 should be dealt with by the treaty.
- Telegram in two sections.↩