500.A15 a 1/379: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 7—1:15 a.m.]
65. My No. 64, July 6, 9 p.m. At the conclusion of the statement by Saito, I said that it was gratifying to learn that the proposals made by the Japanese called for low figures for surface craft falling generally within the tonnages originally proposed by the American delegation and that we thought the most careful consideration should be given them. Immediately Lord Cecil, Bridgeman, and Admiral Field began an attack upon the proposals of the Japanese, giving the impression that they deemed it impossible for Great Britain to consider the tonnage advocated by the Japanese. It was pointed out by them that a destroyer tonnage of 220,000 tons had been tentatively agreed upon by the technical committee for the United States and Great Britain and that under the Japanese proposals only 230,000 tons of cruisers would be allowed them.
Viscount Ishii, in a most emphatic manner, said that the Japanese delegation had come to Geneva to lower naval armaments, and not to increase them, and that he trusted that the Japanese proposals would be accepted as a basis for future discussion by the Conference.
As evidently being too remote from the cruiser requirements to merit consideration, the British appeared to be unwilling to participate in any discussion of the Japanese proposals. The idea of a possible treaty to define and limit cruiser-building programs until 1936 was again brought forward by them and it was also suggested by Bridgeman that the possibility of permitting retention without limitation of cruisers exceeding 20 years in age be made the subject of further study. It was agreed that these proposals should be informally considered by experts, but the discussion was not completely finished. The Japanese, both informally and formally, have insisted upon tonnage levels which would represent genuine limitation; and the American delegation is firmly convinced of their sincerity in this regard. It is true their memorandum intimates a desire for an extension of the 5–3 ratio, but it is not far removed from that ratio and it is believed that their figures might be scaled down through appropriate negotiation.
Through their fear as to their position in resisting the American and Japanese proposals for low tonnage, the British are attempting to cloud the issue by emphasizing that it is extremely difficult for them to reduce their total tonnage levels when considering our demand for [Page 78] a large number of cruisers of the 10,000-ton class. They endeavored, with some success, several times during this afternoon’s conversation to obtain the Japanese support to their opposition to continued construction of the bigger cruisers. It is evident that the British have no intention of accepting anything along the lines of the Japanese proposals, but it may be the means of making them more reasonable to learn that they stand alone in their demands for a large cruiser tonnage and, with this idea in view, I propose on Friday at the meeting of the executive committee to make a statement that the American delegation is entirely in agreement with the Japanese delegation concerning the general lines to be followed if we expect to achieve any real naval limitation at the present conference.