500.A15 a 1/381: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 7—10:05 a.m.]
156. Department’s No. 147, July 5, 11 a.m. Nothing could be gained at this time, in my opinion, by approaching either Baldwin or Chamberlain along the lines indicated.
I do not know whether the figures given at Geneva do really disclose the minimum demand of the British in cruisers, but I am convinced that once that minimum is made known, no considerations of economy will be permitted to interfere with carrying it into effect; in that respect Bridgeman undoubtedly voices the policy of the Cabinet.
I doubt, moreover, if any pressure here will prove effective; but if you want me to try I suggest that I emphasize following points in event that no agreement is in sight: (1) American people will look upon the very material sacrifices they made to achieve the Washington treaties as having been made in vain; (2) they would assume with reason that the British, instead of seeking limitation, were simply attempting to substitute multitude of small naval units in place of fewer and larger units; (3) American interests, by reason of our lack of naval bases, would be better served through use of larger battle cruisers; (4) in all probability this means scrapping of the Washington treaties in 1931; (5) extent of ill feeling aroused will be incalculable and will no doubt have world-wide effect; (6) among other results [Page 79] any possibility which now exists of debt settlement revision as far as Great Britain is concerned would be definitely and finally ended. Of course I should merely indicate such arguments as outlined and keep my interview as personal as possible, and I should endeavor to give impression that interview came about because of my personal anxiety over situation. If you approve please advise.
As I have said, it is my own belief that the British are working towards a well-matured plan which both Cabinet and Admiralty have already approved and the essentials of which will not be modified. It seems to me that under these circumstances we have but two alternatives: either accept British proposal and content ourselves with insisting upon parity, or try to postpone all action until 1931 when the entire question of naval armament can once again be brought up. If first alternative be chosen I suppose the larger the British demands are the more reasonable will our position appear before the world.
I have no doubt that at present the British Government can put the matter before their people in such a way as to obtain acceptance of their program.
If you wish, I shall repeat to Geneva.