893.00/8300: Telegram

The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

164. For the Secretary, Under Secretary and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. My 627, December 19, 10 a.m., paragraph 4;67 Department’s 307, December 23, 11 a.m.;68 my 32, January 15, 2 p.m.; Department’s 32, January 28, 5 p.m.; Department’s 35, January 31, 1 p.m., first paragraph.

[Paraphrase]

In radiogram 0004–2300 sent to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Williams, commander in chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, submitted report that he had stated at conference of British, French, Japanese, Italian, and American naval commanders at Shanghai that his instructions were to protect Americans but he was not ordered to assist in protecting integrity of the Settlement against Nationalist Army, and said that, in carrying out his mission, he would cooperate and give protection to all foreigners up to such time when the Cantonese should demand to take control of the city. He stated further in a later section of same radiogram that if the Cantonese should demand surrender of the Settlement, or should attack without a demand for its surrender, while our landing party was ashore, the withdrawal of our men would be necessary and that the only effective protection we would provide Americans would be the evacuation of them.

[Page 76]
2.
There can be, from the standpoint of practical necessity, I venture to repeat, no distinction between defending lives and property of residents and defending the Settlement. In case need arises, the defending forces must defend what they are able to without regard to any question of a boundary. To distinguish between concerted attack made by organized forces and violence from a mob would also prove impossible. In their recent campaigns the Nationalists’ characteristic tactics have been to infiltrate their men into hostile territory to assemble there later as an organized armed force. In the midst of dealing with mob violence it is altogether likely that foreign forces would suddenly find themselves confronted within the Settlement with such Nationalist units. Therefore the scope of defensive measures to be taken to safeguard American and other foreign lives and property should be left to discretion of those having military command.
3.
Moreover, my feeling is that a question of our good faith or our honor is involved. If the other powers should come into conflict with organized Chinese forces while protecting foreigners in Shanghai, I believe we in honor could not withdraw under fire, as it appears the instructions to the commander in chief require, leaving the other foreign powers to meet the emergency without support from us and relinquishing to them responsibility for protection of American lives while they defend their own nationals.
4.
I understand fully and I concur in paragraph 1, Department’s number 35, January 31. The views I have reiterated in this telegram are, I submit, entirely consonant therewith. And I am the more hopeful, considering the implications of both the second and the first paragraphs of that telegram, that the Department will see fit to have authorization given to the commander in chief to exercise full discretion in regard to employing his forces at Shanghai in conjunction with other foreign forces similarly engaged to protect American lives and property from attack, whether by organized Chinese forces or by mob. In the circumstances of the strike situation at Shanghai and Sun Ch’uan’s defeat I beg the Department most respectfully and urgently to take action immediately in this matter.
MacMurray