500.A15a3/1445
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation97
Mr. Morrow stated that Malkin agrees that as to the London Treaty there is no necessity of any change. The Secretary said he never thought there would be. Mr. Morrow then said that Malkin is in accord with the Secretary’s letter of March 6th. As to the London Treaty, whatever they do as to the auxiliary vessels will be done by declaration or by a separate memorandum or a separate tripartite agreement. He emphasized that what he was telling the Secretary refers only to the British point of view and that they cannot promise France or Italy’s adherence to that point of view. A memorandum [Page 385] on the results of the negotiations with France and Italy was, Mr. Morrow added, on its way to Washington. The Secretary said he already had the basis of agreement.
The Secretary then stated his belief that we can not get away from amending the Washington Treaty. Mr. Morrow agreed and stated that there will be at least a technical change from the Washington Treaty but he does not think it is stated correctly in the basis of agreement. The Secretary did not think so either and asked what was their plan for the amendment of the Washington Treaty so far as it seems to be likely,—an exchange of notes or a formal new supplemental treaty? He (the Secretary) would prefer an exchange of notes. Mr. Morrow thought this could be done. He added that we now have word from the French Ambassador at London coming through Dawes that he had suggested that the whole trouble about battleships could be avoided by delaying the completion of the second ship until 1936. Mr. Morrow said that that was the line along which he was working.
Mr. Morrow then explained in what manner the British memorandum differs from the real meaning of the Washington Treaty. The British White Paper98 assumes that the Washington Treaty limits the French tonnage strictly to 175,000. Mr. Morrow does not agree. He thinks the limit applies only to replacements. The French would build up to a total of eight vessels. In the meanwhile, seven vessels plus the Jean Bart would not be a violation of the Washington Treaty. They had a right to have built 35,000 tons when they lost the France. The France was sunk a long time ago. Instead of building 35,000, they will only build 23,000 tons. So they are doing less rebuilding than they would have a right to do as against the France.
No scrapping is required as a result of building the first 23,000 ton vessel. Then they are going to lay down the second vessel, a year or two later. That is where de Fleuriau’s99 idea comes in. When they finish the second vessel they should technically sink the Jean Bart. Instead of sinking the Jean Bart, which is a 22,000 ton boat, they will sink two of the Diderot class which makes a total of 36,000 tons. Instead of sinking one Jean Bart, they sink two Diderots. That is a substitute for what a rather clumsy treaty would have required them to do. In other words, they sink 36,000 tons of ships that they have a right under the treaty to keep alive. They are allowed to keep forever the three of the Diderot class if they want to under the Washington Treaty.
[Page 386]Thus, what they propose to do is to modify the Treaty in regard to the replacement schedule rather than in regard to the total tonnage. The Washington Treaty does not limit the total tonnage to 175,000, but total replacements to 175,000.
Mr. Morrow and the Secretary again discussed the desirability of effecting this amendment by an interchange of letters. The Secretary authorized Mr. Morrow to go ahead so far as he can during the time he is in London before Saturday to make clear that this view coincides with the Secretary’s. He did not want to send any one there to replace Mr. Morrow, provided he got the Secretary’s views perfectly clear so that the Secretary could stand up to Mr. Morrow’s statements afterwards in diplomatic letters.
Mr. Morrow said that he was seeing Massigli tonight. The Secretary urged him to make our position clear and expressed the hope that the French would not upset the whole thing. There are, he added, still two or three matters in disagreement between the French and Italians. The French are looking at this Treaty as distinctly giving them a break away from parity. The Italians are looking at it as preserving parity. The French want to have an amendment which will give them a break over the Italians.
The Secretary said he knows the Japanese are parallel with us. He has talked with them enough about that and thinks Mr. Morrow has done exactly what he wanted him to do in this respect also. In answer to some remark by Senator Morrow, the Secretary then said that he agreed with him and would follow his and Dawes’ advice on that matter entirely. He said he feels that he is in very good hands in having Mr. Morrow handle it. He asked when the drafting committee would begin work. Mr. Morrow replied, tomorrow morning at ten-thirty, and then read out the text of a statement the French and Italians will give out tomorrow. The Secretary said that he thought it very satisfactory; it meant that when the understanding comes to us we shall have full liberty of action; that was first rate. He concluded by asking Mr. Morrow to tell Dawes that he is very much obliged to him for the part he has played in the negotiations. Ambassador Dawes then took the receiver and the Secretary said: “Hello General. I wanted to tell you how pleased I am with the story of your negotiations which Dwight has just given me. I think it is fine and leaves it just in the right way. After Dwight has to go I shall lean heavily on you to carry on. Thank you very much.”
Upon the conclusion of this telephone conversation, the Secretary told Mr. Marriner that the drafting committee would meet tomorrow at 10:30 a.m. The French and Italians are going to give out a statement in the press which Morrow read to him over the telephone and which is very good as far as he understood. It says that the three [Page 387] who met at Rome are now having their experts put this matter in shape, after which it will be submitted to the United States and Japan with full liberty of action of course. The form of the amendment of the Washington Treaty is a matter not as between them and us but as between France and Italy because it is putting on paper for the first time an understanding which France is claiming definitely breaks parity in their favor and which Italy is publicly claiming definitely preserves parity in their favor.
- Between the Secretary of State in Washington and Senator Morrow in London; Mr. J. Theodore Marriner, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, was present with the Secretary.↩
- Great Britain, Cmd. 3812, Misc. No. 10 (1931): Memorandum on the Results of the Negotiations With France and Italy for the Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments, February–March 1931.↩
- Aimé-Joseph de Fleuriau, French Ambassador in Great Britain.↩