Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2016: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, October 8, 1931—1 p.m.
[Received 7:45 p.m.¹⁰]

727. Following from Hanson and Salisbury at Changchun:

“October 6, 2 p.m.

1. There was fighting between Chinese and Japanese at Nanling, 3 miles south of Changchun, at Kuanchengtze, 3 kilometres northeast Changchun, and at the main station of the Kirin-Changchun Railway at Changchun.

2. Local Japanese officials have informed us that they learned of the clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers at Mukden at 12:15 a.m. on September 19th. The Japanese military commander at Changchun sent 200 of his troops at 3 a.m. toward the barracks at Nanling where there were about 3,500 Chinese soldiers. The Japanese attacked the barracks at about 5 a.m. Later they were reenforced by 200 South Manchuria railway guards, brought from Kungchuling, a few miles south of Changchun. Fighting ceased early in the afternoon after most of the Chinese soldiers had fled. The Japanese casualties amounted to 43 killed and 52 wounded. The Chinese casualties were 180 dead, number of wounded unknown. The Japanese commenced the fighting by delivering a surprise attack. The Japanese officials justified the action on the grounds that they were afraid that the Chinese soldiers at Nanling, where there were 36 field pieces, upon learning in regard to the Mukden incident, would shell the Japanese settlement at Changchun, and the Japanese attacked to forestall such an attempt. We believe possible Chinese soldiers in question had no intention of shelling nor the audacity to shell the Japanese settlement, so that the Japanese Government were not justified in making the attack unless for military reasons. The Japanese troops withdrew from Nanling on the 20th. According to the Japanese military, the next day, Chinese started to steal what articles were left behind in the partially ruined barracks and a guard of 25 Japanese soldiers was sent to protect the property. The guard is still located there.

3. It is evident that the Japanese do not intend for the time being to occupy these much-ruined barracks. The Japanese military do not permit Chinese or Russians to visit the barracks but the Japanese civilians and schoolboys are daily making excursions to the “battlefield”.

4. The same time the Japanese military command at Changchun sent the Japanese detachment toward Nanling, 3 a.m. on September 19, it ordered 300 Japanese troops from Changchun to attack the Chinese barracks at Kuanchengtze, the southern terminal of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These barracks contained about five or six hundred Chinese regular troops, a few village police and some Chinese Eastern Railway Chinese police. The village and railway police surrendered as soon as the attack, which was concentrated on the building where the regular soldiers slept, was made in the dark by the Japanese. The Chinese soldiers resisted until 11 a.m. when the Japanese put into action a 3-inch gun which fired four or five shots causing the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese casualties were 23 killed and 33 wounded. Chinese reports indicate that about 35 Chinese were killed.

5. The Japanese authorities very vaguely expressed to us the fear that the troops in these barracks might make an attack on the Japanese forces. We believe that the attack on these regular soldiers, whose duty it was to guard the Chinese Eastern Railway; the village police, whose duty it was to safeguard Chinese and Russian residents of Kuanchengtze; and the railway police, whose duty it was to guard the stations of the railway, was unjustifiable from the standpoint of international law. These barracks, now empty and partially destroyed, are still under control of Japanese soldiers, 20 of whom are stationed in the headquarters formerly occupied by the Chinese Eastern Railway police.

6. The Japanese have given no evidence that they intend to withdraw their troops at Kuanchengtze, whose presence is not needed to protect any Japanese lives or property, which are nonexistent here and whose presence most likely acts as an irritant to Soviet Russia. Chinese Railway police could afford the necessary protection to Chinese Eastern Railway property but the Japanese military refuse to allow Chinese Railway police on duty at Kuanchengtze station to carry weapons of any sort. In the morning of October 6th about 200 young Japanese employees of the South Manchuria Railway, in military formation, apparently volunteers accompanied by Regular Japanese Army officers, marched through the village of Kuanchengtze in the direction of station Ichienpo, 9 kilometres north from Kuanchengtze on the Chinese Eastern Railway. They carried spades and sticks only. The reason for this march could not be learned locally.

7. At 5 a.m. on September 30th Japanese troops burned the barracks of the railway guards of the Kirin Chinese [-Changchun?] Railway powerhouse, main station of this railway at Changchun, during the operations to secure control of this railway’s telegraph and telephone lines to facilitate the advance of Japanese troops toward Kirin city.

8. The Japanese and Chinese officials interviewed by us stated that the three actions mentioned above were started by the Japanese military.

9. The Changchun Chief of Police informed us that the Japanese have shown no evidence that they intend soon to abandon the airplane landing field constructed by them outside the South Manchuria Railway zone since the clash.

10. As far as Changchun is concerned, the Japanese have not inaugurated a civil administration. However, the Japanese gendarmes are exercising control over the Changchun city police and is [are?] flying the Japanese flag over the headquarters police station in the native city. Japanese military are exercising control over the Chinese telephone and telegraph stations in the native city. This military control is causing much loss to merchants of all nationalities, but the Japanese military show no inclination to relinquish this control. They do not interfere otherwise with the civil administration [of the] city nor with the Chinese passport officials.

11. The thinking classes of Chinese at Changchun feel against the Japanese while the larger unthinking masses are indifferent in regard to the recent events except as they affect them financially. It has been stated that the most of the Chinese population fears the Japanese military.

12. The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Nanling, Kuanchengtze, the airplanes passing over and [sic] telephone and telegraph offices in the native city and [withdrawal?] of Japanese gendarmes from supervision over the Chinese police would not result in injury of Japanese lives or property or danger from banditry.

13. According to the Chinese Chief of Police the Japanese military have not damaged the Chinese radio station at Changchun but have dismantled the principal parts of its machinery.

14. The failure of the local Japanese military to withdraw their troops from the places above mentioned would indicate a lack of desire to return to the status quo ante.

15. We are planning to leave Changchun for Kirin 8:30 a.m. October 7th.

Repeat to Tokyo. Repeat to Department.”

Johnson

10. Telegram in nine sections.