793.94/2713: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 17—7:07 a.m.]
750. From Ambassador Dawes: I am just back from a conference with Simon, who led up to a specific though purely personal and tentative suggestion which he submitted to me for an expression of opinion. His discussion of the situation was from a broad standpoint. Simon feels that little will emerge from the welter of talk now going on until the League recognizes that Japan must be given a consideration which will be valuable from a practical standpoint, the attaining of which will satisfy Japanese public sentiment, and which will comprise an economic as well as a juridical solution of Japan’s problem. Simon has not yet tried out his suggestion on Briand, but has talked briefly about it with Matsudaira, who, however, was cautious in his comment. Simon wishes it to be understood that he is not familiar with all aspects of the situation involving relations in the past of Japan and China in Manchuria.
The tentative and purely personal suggestion which Simon handed to me
reads as follows:32
Simon said in regard to the above that the Chinese Government already has stated it would respect Japan’s treaty rights in Manchuria, and it is his feeling that Japan would be justified in a greater confidence that China would keep this promise if China addressed to the League members and the United States a note guaranteeing to them that this promise would be strictly observed by China. As to paragraph 3, the successful working out of the proposition therein is obviously to the advantage of Japan.
I then pointed out to Simon what you said in your 328, November 11, 5 p.m., that ever since 1915 China has protested that these treaties were obtained under duress and must be canceled, but Japan has argued that they were formally executed and cannot be invalidated; that, furthermore, the United States Government went on record in 1915 to both Japanese and Chinese Governments against the recognition of any treaties if and insofar as there was an impairment of the principles of the Open-Door rights and the integrity of China, a reservation which Secretary Hughes renewed at the Washington Conference in 1922. I said that your statement on the United States Government’s position probably coincided with that of the other signatories, save Japan, of the Nine-Power Treaty and that, if his paragraph 3 were entered into, its utilization would create a situation which would involve an application of the stipulations of this treaty such as is envisaged in its article 7. I pointed out likewise that if from a practical standpoint this arrangement meant eventual Japanese control of the parallel Chinese railroad, then it would give Japan large powers to cause delays and difficulties in handling foreign imports into Manchuria in comparison with shipments from Japan.
There probably are numerous other objections to be taken into account in this connection which would be suggested to one who is more familiar with Manchuria’s actual trade conditions and customs, but it appeared to me at any rate that prior to reaching a conclusion on the wisdom of Simon’s proposal at this juncture there must be weighed the many interests under the Nine-Power Treaty of the other powers. Simon agreed that considerations such as this must be completely thrashed out in our minds to see if they are insurmountable obstacles. We desire to have your observations on the Simon memorandum and please remember that, as he requested, it is put forward [Page 462] by him in the way of a suggestion, as he is not familiar with the past events and agreements leading up through the years to the current difficulty.
As I told you by telephone, Briand sent me, for my approval, a typed copy of what he expected to say concerning my presence in Paris. Briand’s statement was given me only a short time in advance of the meeting, and because it [i. e., my revision] had to be put into French for him it failed to reach him in time for inclusion in his speech. This I rather regret, for Briand afterwards sent word to me that my alterations were satisfactory. Following my changes, the rest of Briand’s statement largely was a quotation from the interview I gave upon arriving here.
Yoshizawa is coming to see me at 9:30 p.m., though I shall probably not cable you about it, for he does not speak English fluently, and I shall be quite guarded in my remarks. He is the son-in-law of the Japanese opposition leader. [Dawes.]
- Quotation not paraphrased.↩