793.94/2743: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 17 (18?)—3:04 a.m.]
758. From Ambassador Dawes: [Paraphrase.] I have been handed a confidential résumé by Sir John Simon on the Manchurian situation as he sees it as follows: [End paraphrase.]
“There is strong reason to fear that unless some new mode of treatment can be suggested this troublesome matter may drag on indefinitely and the prestige of the League will greatly suffer. Up to the present the Council of the League has appealed to both sides in the controversy to exercise restraint and has taken note of Japan’s assurance that she will withdraw her troops as soon as circumstances permit. But as things are going at present Japan will concede that circumstances do not permit for a long time. And the fundamental condition which Japan seeks to lay down that the treaty position between herself and China in reference to Manchuria should first be cleared up gives endless opportunities for delay.
The practical question is whether Japan’s willingness to withdraw could be stimulated by anything which the League could do. Is there any point where she might feel it was in her own interest to withdraw because she will gain something which she has not now?
It seems to me that there is one point of which Japan is at present in a very weak position and where it might be possible to get her withdrawal in view of that position being strengthened. Her juridical position in Manchuria is weak, for her troops are on Chinese soil where on League principles they have no right to be. It may be a very good practical answer that Japanese troops are where they are because Japanese lives and property in Manchuria need protection but on League principles in such a case Japanese forces should not occupy Manchuria first and argue afterwards but should rely in the first instance on an appeal to the League. Japanese policy therefore at present is exposed to the reproach that settlement by acting contrary to the principles of the League whatever may be the practical justification or the excuse which public opinion may make for her [sic]. Presumably Japan would prefer, other things being equal, to act as a faithful member of the League should. Is it possible to devise a solution which Japan might be willing to embrace because she would get out of the juridical weakness of her present position?
Japan is not prepared to withdraw in return for China’s undertaking to respect treaty rights because experience shows that China has sometimes been impotent to fulfill them. But suppose that China at present delivered a note giving such undertakings to the other states and to the United States of America, the result would be that if China disregarded her undertakings in the future she would be disregarding a promise made to the Council of the League and to America, and Japan would be able to point to this fact and urge that China was the wrongdoer and that all the powers to whom China had given assurances should press for compliance. Is it not worth while considering whether such a promise given to the other powers and [Page 470] America is possible and whether Japan would not regard it as valuable for the reason above given?
The immediate origin of the Manchurian trouble in its present critical stage was, I understand, railway competition with the South Manchuria Railway. It may be that there are other railway questions between China and Japan in Manchuria. Would it be possible to urge China, as part of the arrangement, to enter into an agreement with Japan to appoint a technical commission with, say, a neutral chairman, for the purpose of drawing up a ‘working agreement’ with a view to ending unfair competition and securing the operation of Manchurian railways as a combined system? This agreement between China and Japan might also be repeated in the note given by China to the other powers.
If undertakings and arrangements on these lines were practicable, Japan ought to be prepared to withdraw her troops when it is signed, for she would no longer be relying on China’s promise. She would have gained two points of great importance:
- (1)
- The knowledge that if China defaulted Japan could ask the League and America to join in bringing pressure on China in view of China’s promise to them and,
- (2)
- An agreement to reach an adjustment of the railway trouble.
Japan would be quick to note that such a solution as this puts her in a strong legal position for the future whereas she is now in a weak one. China would at any rate be able on these terms to get Japanese troops withdrawn. The League would have taken an effective part in clearing up the situation and would emerge from it without discredit. But if something of this sort is not possible it is difficult to see how, as a practical matter, Japanese can be induced to withdraw or how a severe blow to the moral authority of the League can be avoided.”
- [Dawes.]
- Shaw