793.94/2812: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
773. From Ambassador Dawes: [Paraphrase.] Concerning the private meeting yesterday of the 12 Council members, exclusive of the parties, Sweetser reports the following: [End paraphrase.]
“Briand gave a report of the discussion he had had at the request of the other members with Yoshizawa, Sze and General Dawes.
The latter he said had expressed the desire of the United States to continue its collaboration and support of the League but its belief that it should not change the present basis thereof. If, however, at any time it could make any gesture which would help in the present difficult position it would be glad to consider it. In the special case of the commission the American attitude seemed to be entirely favorable.
Mr. Yoshizawa, as the other members knew, had submitted the detailed explanation the Council had requested as to the relation of [Page 524] evacuation to security while Dr. Sze had taken a stiff line as to any discussion before evacuation, or any price to be paid for evacuation. He was optimistic, however, that the parties could be brought to the acceptance of the commission idea which represented to him a decidedly constructive step.
Cecil drew attention to the Japanese statement as to a cessation of hostilities pending the report of the commission. This unfortunately had been promised ever since September 18 but had not eventuated. It was impossible to say finally who was responsible; the fact that the breaches of the peace took place on Chinese soil however left the inference that it was the Japanese. Should the Council not then have some measure of control? Should not some regular system of information on such points be a part of the settlement? Unless some such precaution were taken it would be impossible either to prevent further breaches or to know who was responsible. Another point also he would like to mention. Mr. Yoshizawa stated that the original conditions of evacuation are still valid but since their promulgation the Council had received very great amplifications bringing in in fact all the various treaties. The Chinese, however, hotly declined to accept such conditions which would mean the occupation would become permanent. He had searched the record and could find no such conditions suggested before September 30 which in effect meant that entirely new terms have been brought forward. In the circumstances he felt it essential to have a public meeting tomorrow; it cannot be postponed any longer.
Briand agreed to this last suggestion, fixing the afternoon as allowing the parties more time to receive instructions. He also agreed that some kind of control was highly desirable, also a more solemn engagement on both sides against aggravating the situation. He would then call a public meeting at 4 when Yoshizawa could make his statement including the proposal for a commission. Sze could reply and the Council then name a rapporteur to bring the material together in the form of a resolution which should also include control.
Cecil again stressed that the matter of evacuation still disturbed him. The new Japanese statement’s first four paragraphs called for very far-reaching agreements which would require long discussion. The last paragraph however foresaw the possibility of some earlier evacuation which might mean that the Japanese were prepared to evacuate if the Chinese showed a real intention of carrying out the conditions even if an agreement were not finally drafted. Perhaps it would be worth trying to get a precision on this point.
Scialoja strongly supported the commission idea. This would allow time and the possibility of the parties’ coming to an agreement. Belligerent sentiments would have chance to cool.
Madariaga, replacing Lerroux, while agreeing to the commission was preoccupied with the fact that this was a conflict between a weak and a strong power and that the public might think the Council’s action was a surrender to force. He was sure no member of the Council had ever thought in September when security was first mentioned that it went so far as the Japanese now said. The Council owed it to itself to state that when it spoke of security it meant security in the immediate sense; it must stop somewhere; otherwise it would be astronomic. If the resolution to be adopted spoke of an armistice on the present [Page 525] basis it must also stress the need of immediate evacuation. If there is to be a commission it will take time to form it; could the Council not make an immediate start on it from out of the local elements on the spot? The commission might be a starting point around which to build a system but it must be able to be buttressed in many ways. As regards the United States that Government seemed rather strong as regards article 2 of the Kellogg Pact; as Mr. Briand had said she is willing to go along a good way with the League, there is some reason to fear that the League is behind public sentiment in the United States.
Briand took up this point to say that the members of the Council should not have too great expectations regarding the United States. That Government was not ready to go beyond the Pact of Paris. It contemplated no sanctions. If the Council went too far it might disassociate itself from the United States. The Council therefore must go slowly. Already it had done a great deal; it was only necessary to think what would have been the case if it had not been there. He had the feeling that there were many in Japan who were keenly anxious to resume normal relations with China; the commission might form a rallying point. The Japanese did not want it to interfere with direct negotiations or the movement of troops; still its field was so vast it must be limited in order not to become atmospheric. Also the Council could recall the various promises made, especially that evacuation was to continue; the commission could not work at all if the situation continues as at present. By it however he hoped the Council could save the world’s one single moral agency against war; the League was indeed the barrage behind which public opinion could rally in such crisis.
The Secretary-General here interrupted to restate a little more clearly what he understood to be Ambassador Dawes’ view. He had thought he did not say that the United States was ready to impose sanctions nor yet on the other hand did he say that it was not ready to impose them. Indeed it was for this reason that General Dawes was all the more anxious that the commission to be appointed should be under article 11 rather than article 15. Briand added that American membership in the commission would be of considerable importance and seemed to be assured.
Cecil then drew attention to the desirability of giving the commission power to make interim reports if necessary. The final report would obviously require a good deal of time; some constructive suggestions might be possible at an early date. He again stressed the complete change in the Japanese attitude since September 30. It was very clear then that it was only a matter of protecting Japanese lives and property; there was no suggestion of treaty rights. He was also exercised to know what should be the proper international attitude toward acts short of war. These he felt might fall into three categories: simple protection of lives as in the case of riot; more serious punitive action; or finally military coercion to attain a political end. The last-named seemed to be the case here. It was distinguishable from war only in degree. The Council must guard itself against conniving with such action which is inconsistent with the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. Finally he would like to deny that the use of article 15 would be an approach to article 16; it is only a resort to war which would make the latter operative.
[Page 526]Von Billow approving the commission thought the terms of reference should be large enough to keep the commission in the field for a long time and thus help induce a solution. It might indeed be a point of departure for the solution; it could have much influence on the spot. If the commission reported that order prevailed in Manchuria, for instance, Japan could hardly insist on maintaining her troops there.
The next meeting was fixed for today, Saturday, at 4, in public.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in three sections.↩