793.94/2822: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

779. From Ambassador Dawes: I have just had a call from Simon and Drummond. To them I read my telegram sent in Embassy’s 778, November 22, 4 p.m., so as to apprise them of the exact attitude of Sze. Also I have informed them as individuals, in confidence, of the importance you place, insofar as the presence on the proposed commission of an American is concerned, upon the difference between a commission which the League appoints in spite of the opposition of one of the two parties and which is exclusively under the authority of the League and a commission which is appointed with the approval of both Japanese and Chinese Governments. Without committing you at all, I told them that you were inclined to think it would be desirable to have an American member on the neutral commission of investigators which Japan and China accepted pending an armistice. This I did for the sake of having Simon and Drummond realize the importance, insofar as concerned American participation, of the appointment of the commission by unanimous agreement of the Council, with Japan and China excluded, under article 11 rather than article 15.

Without having first submitted it to Yoshizawa and Sze, Simon and Drummond furnished me with a copy of a tentative Council resolution which takes the place of the previous draft resolution (see my 777, November 21 [22], 1 [2] a.m.), and they hope to appease Sze somewhat by its first paragraph and to obtain his agreement to it. I shall quote its text at the end of this telegram for your observation, information, and such comment as you believe appropriate.

The fact, becoming increasingly evident, is realized by Simon and Drummond that the attitude of the United States is what influences Japan and China most.

I think they understand that one and the same thing, namely, the influence of the United States, is what has mainly influenced the recent [Page 536] effort of Japan toward moderation and what prevents Sze, by his opposition, from immediately checking the Council’s further consideration of the situation under article 11. This led them to inquire of me if you might find it possible to consider suggesting to both Japan and China that they be satisfied substantially with what the purely tentative declaration below suggests. From Simon’s standpoint the reasons advanced for this are obvious. From the American standpoint, some of the reasons against doing this appear to me to be equally obvious: This would constitute a recommendation by the United States on behalf of applying League of Nations machinery, and this might cause misunderstanding in the United States and involve it in the failure of the League efforts, of which the prospects are only too tangible. It is becoming more and more difficult, on the other hand, for the Council to resist the internal pressure of certain members to do something and then depart regardless of consequences.

Therefore, any step the United States can take which would be helpful in averting an impasse just at present between Japan and China should at least be carefully considered. Accordingly, I pass on the suggestion of Simon and await your instructions.

The Japanese withdrawal from Tsitsihar at an early date, if not immediately—which you are assured by Debuchi is being attempted—becomes increasingly important. Should the withdrawal occur, it might greatly facilitate the agreement of both parties to the substance of the Council’s tentative plan of procedure.

Alarming information received by Drummond about the Japanese intention to occupy Chinchow makes him most apprehensive.

I informed Simon and Drummond of your genuine interest in knowing exactly what would be the scope of activities of the proposed commission, its terms of reference, any reservations which may be made by any party, and all other relevant items; that you said these must be submitted to you if you are to make a decision as to participation.

The tentative resolution being considered here, as mentioned above, reads as follows:74

  • [“] 1. The Council recalls and reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30 by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone—a point to which the Council attaches the utmost importance—may be effected as speedily as possible.
  • 2. Considering that events in Manchuria have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24 calls upon the two Governments: [Page 537]
    (a)
    To give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.
    (b)
    To take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.
  • 3. Invites the two parties as well as the other members of the Council to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.
  • 4. Desiring on the other hand in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two Governments,

Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances affecting international relations which threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to the commission. It is understood that the commission has no mandate to interfere in any negotiations which may be initiated between the two parties or to supervise the movements of the military forces of either party.

N. B. The President after the adoption of the resolution will state

(a)
That each of the two Governments will have the right to indicate to the chairman of the commission any question the examination of which it particularly desires.
(b)
That the commission may should it so desire furnish the Council with interim reports.”
  • [Dawes]
  • Shaw
  1. Quotation not paraphrased.